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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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TEN YEARS OF WAR AND PEACE

By Archibald Cary Coolidge

WHEN the year 1914 had half run its course the world as a whole appeared fairly tranquil. It is true that there had just been two wars in the Balkans, whence ominous rumblings were still being emitted, that there was strife in Mexico and American troops had been landed at Vera Cruz, that disorder was rife in China, and that the situation in Ireland was critical, nevertheless in the main there was peace on earth and a reasonable amount of good will among men. Today we have peace once more, but of good will among men, or at least among nations, there has been a deplorable decrease. In the last ten years a large part of mankind has passed through a period of untold suffering which in many cases has not yet ended. We have witnessed disasters of appalling magnitude, a waste of human life, a destruction of property, an overthrow of long established governments and the erection of new ones, an unsettlement of the most fixed relations and countless other subversive phenomena undreamt of and undreamable. What does it all mean and whither are we going?

The World War burst upon us like a sudden thunderclap. The storm had long been brewing, so long indeed that many had got used to the threat and gave little heed to it. Statesmen in the countries concerned might be full of apprehensions, and military men be expecting war very soon, as is their wont, but the mass of the public had no particular forebodings. When the crisis did come, five of the six leading European nations were swept into the maelstrom within a fortnight. The Austrian ultimatum started an inexorable sequence, against which rulers and statesmen seemed to struggle in vain. The ultimatum itself was so severe—and meant to be—that no self-respecting state could accept it. When it was not submitted to unconditionally, Austria, who had prepared her demand with deliberation and

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with a realization of the seriousness of the risks incurred, felt she would stultify herself if she accepted the Serbian refusal. Russia could not leave Serbia to her fate. The whole history of the Eastern Question, every ambition of Russia in the Near East, the intensity of her public sentiment as to her duty to protect the weaker Slav peoples, forbade this. But if Russia attacked Austria, Germany, bound by the assurances Berlin had given to Vienna at the start, as well as by the Austro-German treaty of 1879, must support her ally. But then, France was even more bound in honor to stand by Russia, otherwise the Franco-Russian alliance would have been the veriest scrap of paper.

The next development, however, was more uncertain. Germany and France were the only states in Europe brought into the war by existing treaties of alliance. England was tied to France by no formal pact of this sort, and in spite of Anglo-German rivalry and of the Anglo-French entente there were high hopes in Berlin that she would remain neutral. If the Germans, instead of violating the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, had remained on the defensive in the west, taking the ground that they had no quarrel with France, and had thrown their main strength against Russia, we may well doubt whether England, where at first the majority of the Cabinet were against intervention, would have laid her sword on the scale. Had she stood aside, Italy and Rumania might sooner or later have joined the Central Powers, their old allies, instead of doing just the opposite. But the German Government chose to sacrifice political and moral considerations to what it believed to be military ones, as it did a second time with equally fatal effect in 1917 in its relations with the United States.

After the conflict had once begun, the vast majority of people involved, high and low, were convinced, as most of them still are, of the essential righteousness of their cause. This was not altered by the fact that four of the states bargained hard and long with both parties before casting in their lot with either. When they did act, they were as sure as anyone else that they were animated by the highest principles. Their motives were comprehensible and even their miscalculations were not altogether foolish. Turkey and Bulgaria have indeed paid heavily for having guessed wrong, but in 1917 it looked as if it was they who would emerge triumphant and aggrandized, while Italy and Rumania would suffer for their disastrous mistakes.

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The war was fertile in surprises. At the outset no one foresaw its length, though Lord Kitchener came near to doing so. Even the wildest fancies were surpassed by the immensity of the effort, the consumption of life and treasure, the sheer destruction of every kind. The battle of the Marne meant the miscarriage of the long and meticulously prepared German plan of striking France to earth by one terrific blow. On the other hand, British failure at the Dardanelles may well have prolonged the struggle by a couple of years. The Russian Revolution, followed by the withdrawal of Russia from the field and by the forced capitulation of Rumania, would probably have meant German victory but for the entrance into the war of the United States, a contingency undreamt of in July, 1914. The German submarine warfare proved a complete miscalculation in its ultimate objects, but who can say how near it came to success? Had the *Leviathan* alone been sunk by a torpedo, with her cargo of twelve thousand soldiers, we cannot tell what would have been the effect on American opinion and on the transport of armies across the ocean.

When at last Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria had collapsed and Germany had been beaten to her knees, the victorious Allied and Associated Powers, in congress assembled, were called upon to determine how the world was to be refashioned. Thanks chiefly to the desire of President Wilson to array against the Central Empires the moral opinion of mankind, the Allies had welcomed to their ranks a number of nominal adherents—Cuba, Liberia, Siam, and others—who added to the congestion of representatives at the Peace Conference. Under such circumstances all the real decisions had to be made by a few men. It was hard enough to get even them to agree on the many and complicated questions. Though their principles might be theoretically the same, their views were far apart and the interests of their countries differed. Nothing could have been achieved by public debate in a general conclave where all might have a voice and a vote, but where no majority could bind sovereign states. To get results much compromise was indispensable, and compromise can best be reached by a few responsible individuals whose arguments are addressed to each other and not to the gallery. In delicate negotiations, public or private, however friendly, "open diplomacy" is sometimes about as feasible as open strategy in warfare.

Contrary to precedent, the defeated foes were not invited to take part in the discussions of the terms which were to be imposed

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upon them. Such objections as they were permitted to make afterwards met with scant attention. This has been resented by them ever since as a crying injustice. It is unlikely, however, that the presence of their delegates throughout the Conference would have had serious influence on the final result. There were no new facts they could bring forth or arguments they could urge which would have affected the sentiments of the nations which had just come out victorious after four years and a half of life and death conflict. At any rate the Allies did not wish to be bothered by representatives of their enemies to make the difficult work of obtaining a consensus of opinion more difficult still, nor did they propose to run the risk of having some German diplomat repeat the exploits of Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna.

Certain notable articles of the Peace of Versailles were due primarily to a popular craving that those responsible for the terrific suffering and loss the world had undergone should be brought to justice before the tribunal of mankind. This is the explanation of the futile provision for the trial of the Kaiser (the one thing which could have rehabilitated him), who was already well out of harm's way, and also of the extraordinary demand that Germany must acknowledge her guilt as the author of the war. Such a requirement was as unwise as it was unusual. The German people had fought for years in the belief that they were defending themselves against the unprovoked aggression of a coalition of jealous rivals. To be forced now at the point of the sword to announce that the blame was theirs appeared to them a monstrous perversion of the truth. They submitted because they had to, but without the least moral acceptance. Ever since they have been investigating with passion the subject of the origin of the war and of course they are as convinced as ever of their own essential innocence. Even in regard to Belgium they have been unwilling to plead guilty, though outside opinion has been practically unanimous against them. They have jumped at every scrap of so-called evidence that the English and French had intended to act in the same way, and that the Belgians deserved their fate, assumptions of a kind common among culprits. Many of them believe, too, that if they could discover a document which would fasten the responsibility for the World War on some other nation the whole peace treaty would be overturned as being based on a false premise and would have to be remade on totally different lines.

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The three powers in whose hands lay the decision at Paris had the good fortune to be represented by very remarkable men. President Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George were as unlike each other as they could well be, but all three will stand high in the annals of their countries. The mere play of their contrasting personalities presents a fascinating study. The Americans held a position of immense advantage. Not only was their material power unlimited as compared with that of their exhausted associates, but, thanks to circumstances rather than to their superior virtue, they were the most disinterested of the important participants. Their championship of the self-determination of peoples, of the League of Nations and of other general causes was not hampered by previous commitments or by necessities of security and reparations. Nor were their representatives simple inexperienced citizens who were circumvented by the "wily diplomats" of Europe. Clemenceau and Lloyd George were no more professional diplomats than was Wilson, and we may doubt whether any European delegation contained a man of larger and more varied diplomatic experience than Mr. Henry White. The fatal mistake in the American Commission in Paris, fatal not for its work then but for the confirmation of that work afterwards, was that it did not include a Republican of political standing and influence.

Although not ratified by the United States, the Peace of Versailles has been termed an American peace. It was based on propositions laid down in advance by the United States and in the main adhered to. This is particularly true of the geographical provisions where the doctrine of self-determination, which was one of President Wilson's cardinal tenets and which roughly corresponded with that of nationalities, was accepted as the guiding principle. The later treaties followed the model of the first. In disputed questions and matters of detail friends rather than enemies were favored, and there were a few cases of glaring violation, notably the allotment of the German-speaking southern Tyrol to Italy, which France and Great Britain had agreed to in the Treaty of London in 1915 and to which the consent of President Wilson had been obtained in the early days of the Conference, a consent he regretted later but did not feel justified in withdrawing. But in general the principle of self-determination prevailed and in doubtful instances the decision was left to plebiscites. Even if the newly formed countries contain too large

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a percentage of citizens who are hostile to the dominant nationality, they correspond as a whole to the wishes of the majority, and in most cases of the great majority, of their inhabitants.

With the new frontiers due to the Russian revolution and the emancipation of peoples formerly under Russian rule, the Paris Conference had little or nothing to do. The states thus formed are indirect results of the war, though not of the peace. Even Poland and Rumania owe their size to the triumph of Lenin as well as to that of Wilson. Europe today contains more republics than does South America. It is easy enough to declare that many of them are economic monstrosities and cannot live in this age of great agglomerations. But Switzerland has contrived to get on very respectably for the last four centuries, in spite of her scant natural resources, her lack of a seaport, her open frontiers, her two religions and her four recognized languages.

For the disruption of the empire of the Hapsburgs the Allies were not immediately responsible. In the end of 1918 Austria-Hungary went to pieces of itself, and no authority from outside, unless supported by armed force, could have restored it. All that was left for the umpires at Paris was to mark out the lines for the new dominions, and they had trouble enough in determining these and in enforcing their decisions. It has often been asserted that they should have insisted on the preservation of at least the economic unity of the fragments of the former Dual Empire. But such unity could have been imposed on millions of people whose claim to independence had been formally recognized and whose most passionate desire was complete self-determination, right or wrong, only by a foreign administration supported by foreign bayonets. Besides which, the Poles, the Jugoslavs, and the Rumans of Austria-Hungary did not of themselves constitute new states. They joined already existing ones outside. Even what was left of Austria and Hungary showed no inclination to keep up the century-old connection between them.

Austria, despite her recent rally perhaps the least viable of the new republics, is forbidden from entering into a voluntary union with Germany. This flat violation of the principle of nationalities and of the right of self-determination was due to the fears of France, and should not be lasting, though we can understand the repugnance of Frenchmen to granting Germany an accession of territory which would make her larger than she was in 1914. It is all very well to condemn French selfishness in this respect, but

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the English would put on a sadly wry face if circumstances were to lead to a voluntary union between France and Belgium, for which some analogy might be claimed; and as for our virtuous selves, would not the Monroe Doctrine forbid any Latin American state from having enough right of self-determination to enter into a political union with a European power? For France, organic connection with Belgium might serve as a compensation for the building up of a greater Germany, but, unluckily for her, in Belgium (where the dispute between the two nationalities has begun again since the war) it is probable that the Flemish would fiercely oppose closer permanent relations, even if the Belgian monarchy should be succeeded some day by a republic.

For the future peace of Europe the problem of the security of France must be solved somehow or other. The world does not wish to see another Franco-German war nor does it wish to see France led by her fears into making futile attempts to keep Germany in bondage and to check natural recovery by artificial means. French fears are indeed exaggerated, based though they are on the very real grounds of Germany's much greater population and her much higher birth-rate, which renders the disparity ever worse. It should be remembered, on the other hand, that Greater France has a population not of forty but of about one hundred millions—or not much less than the United States. Admitting that as a military and economic unit the average Annamite or Senegalese is not the equal of the German or the American—though there is no reason why a French black should not fight as well as an American one—still the military power of France is not to be measured by her European resources alone. In the World War she drew from her colonial possessions half a million troops of one kind or another. Besides, already before the war the German birth-rate had begun to decline and the process has continued.

Whatever may be the peril of France, that of Poland is incomparably greater. We may hope that the Germans will learn to accept their present boundaries to the west as the last word in the age-long controversies on this subject, but can we expect them to take a similar view to the east, where the territories left to them are not even contiguous and where millions of their compatriots have been put under the rule of a nation which they regard as far inferior to themselves historically and culturally? The decisions of the Allies in regard to the Danzig corridor and to the division

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of Silesia may have been right on moral grounds, but they have hardly made for lasting peace. And Poland's danger is not only from Germany. To her misfortune, she has always lacked clear-cut boundaries, geographical, historical, and ethnical. Today both on the east and on the west her frontiers present few natural features. She may have a good claim to Vilna, but as long as she retains this former capital of Lithuania the present Lithuanian republic will not forgive her. She also counts among her citizens some five million Russians of one kind or another. They are not contented, and just across the border are their kinsmen, now organized into White Russian and Ukrainian national republics to give them greater powers of attraction, and with the whole power of the Soviet Union behind them. To meet this menace, Poland has allied herself with Rumania, a neighbor standing in like fear of Russia. As against Germany, she relies on the assistance of France which, since the days of the Paris Conference, has favored her aspirations as consistently as England has opposed them.

The economic chapter of the Peace Treaties was, if anything, even more complicated than the political. There were the questions of what the Central Powers ought to pay, what they were able to pay, and to whom they ought to pay it, concerning all of which it was possible to hold, in good faith, quite conflicting opinions. In the background there lurked the problem of the debts of the Allied powers to one another and particularly to America.

In theory the defeated nations were not to be penalized by any war indemnity, they were only to be asked to make good what they had wantonly destroyed. This magnanimity was facilitated by the fact that the cost of reparations alone might well equal if not exceed the total of what could be extracted from the Central Powers; indeed this became certain from the moment that Lloyd George, in order to make the British claims comparable to those of the French and to give something to the Colonials, put through the principle that reparations should include pensions.

Before long, too, it dawned on the most reluctant that there was little to be got out of Austria, Hungary, and Turkey. Germany was more promising. She had greater resources and in spite of severe curtailment she was left more nearly intact. But what the Germans really could pay, neither they nor anyone else knew then or knows now.

It is still an open question whether it would have been wise for

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the Peace Conference to have decided in 1919 on a fixed sum for reparations. This was not done, and the official demands were not formulated until two years later. But the amount then named, though accepted by Germany under pressure, was soon recognized to be impossible. Since then there has been an uninterrupted series of proposals, conferences, negotiations and acrimonious discussions until at last the report of the experts has furnished a ground on which there are better chances of agreement and of actually accomplishing something than there have been up to the present time. The report looks like not only the best guess yet made, the one most carefully worked out, and the most impartial; it also has come at a time when in all the countries concerned the public is more than wearied of fruitless controversy and is so eager to get real peace that it is willing to make serious sacrifices of what it believes to be its rights.

A most discouraging complication throughout has been the estrangement between England and France. Of course it was to be expected that when the Allies came to make the peace settlement, and still more when they were called upon to interpret their formulas, there should be a certain divergence of views between them and a cooling off of the enthusiasm they had felt for each other before and during the war. Unfortunately, besides natural differences of opinion in regard to Poland, the Near East, and various other matters, the question of reparations has led to most serious disagreement, due to a clash of fundamental interests for which neither country has been responsible. France, the more self-supporting of the two, but the devastated one, has placed reparations above everything else except her future security. She has insisted on payments which, by making good the vast sums she has had to spend on her devastated regions, should save her from bankruptcy. Compared with this object the sufferings of Germany and the general rehabilitation of Europe have been a secondary outside interest. England, on the other hand, with her huge number of unemployed, has felt that she needed above all the restoration of normal conditions the world over (including Germany) in order to set the wheels of her business going again at full speed. Reparations are comparatively unimportant to her, and the sufferings of France no longer make the appeal they once did. She has sufferings of her own. To her the increasing bankruptcy of Germany and the danger that the Reich might be submerged in anarchy have been real terrors, but she has been

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little worried by Germany's non-payment of her debts and the recrudescence of Teutonic militarism. On the contrary she has accused France of imperialism and of a desire to destroy Germany altogether.

During the years 1920 and 1921 most of the political provisions of the Peace Treaties were gradually put into effect. Plebiscites were held, boundaries were marked out, the new states managed somehow to stand on their own feet, not too shakily, and except in the Near East, where the Treaty of Sèvres proved unworkable, fighting ceased. But the question of reparations, of what Germany could or would pay, made no progress towards a settlement. The French came to feel that, in the conferences and negotiations, they invariably got the worst of it, that they made one concession after another without gaining anything in return, and were continually being duped by the superior cleverness of Lloyd George, for whom their dislike grew into a mania. The fall of Briand was due in good part to the belief that he was continually outwitted by his British colleague.

With the advent of Poincaré the situation changed abruptly. Henceforth it was the French who had their way while the British angrily demurred. Lloyd George came to grief at the Conference of Genoa, where the Germans whom he was trying to aid played him false, the Russians with whom he wished to make terms proved intractable, and the Little Entente, alarmed by his attitude about Galicia and Bessarabia and by his readiness to revise the Peace Treaties, the foundation of their existence, rallied to the support of France. The failure of British policy in the Near East further discredited the British Premier and he fell soon after. His successors, Bonar Law and later Baldwin, though disapproving, were unable in 1923 to prevent the French occupation of the Ruhr, nor did they enjoy even the moral support of the United States, for which they had hoped. Poincaré went on his way undisturbed. In open argument he got the better of Lord Curzon and with public sentiment in France solidly behind him he was as little moved by the fulminations of the British press as by the howls of the German. Now the English are not used to having their wishes ostentatiously disregarded. They were sure that not only was Germany being ruined but that the welfare of Europe and particularly of Britain was being endangered by French greed and blindness, and they deeply resented their own apparent impotence. Poincaré soon became as unpopular in

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England as Lloyd George had been in France, and for about the same sort of reasons.

In the last few months the situation has improved. Germany, which had long been banking on some kind of active support from England, was forced to a surrender by the costly failure of her policy of passive resistance. On the other hand the French, although they had possessed themselves in the Ruhr of a tangible guarantee for ultimate payment, had lost financially by the transaction, and the discreditable fiasco of the separatist movement in the Rhineland made them feel that they had gone too far. Above all they were alarmed by the decline of the franc, whose fall was only checked by outside assistance. The obviously good intentions of Ramsay Macdonald disarmed much suspicion in France, the fall of Poincaré produced satisfaction in England. Public opinion thus was ripe for the Dawes Report. All told, the immediate political prospect in western Europe, though still uncertain enough, gives more reason for optimism than it has done at any time since the outbreak of the war, except for a short moment after the close of hostilities when so many in the victorious countries and some in the defeated indulged in golden visions of a new world where peace on earth should be maintained by the League of Nations.

But an agreement as to Allied Debts still looks sadly far off. American opinion that they should be paid, at least in the main, is apparently as unshaken as ever. On the other hand, the sentiment of the European debtor states is growing stronger that, however theoretically valid their debts to us may be, to exact payment when they are unable to obtain what is owed to themselves would be a crying injustice and a flagrant instance of the oppression of the poor by the rich. In 1922, England missed her opportunity. If she had had the courage and foresight to declare that, while willing to fulfill her own obligations, she would renounce what was due to her from her allies, they would have followed suit by canceling what they owed each other, and the United States would have found itself in the unenviable position of being the sole country exacting its pound of flesh from its friends. The consequent moral pressure on us to show ourselves magnanimous in our turn would have been very difficult to resist, and from this England would have profited. Instead, by the tactless Balfour declaration she angered both the United States and France, and so far her policy of conditional offers has had

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unfortunate results. As for the Baldwin agreement, it may have proved to Americans that Britain had a high sense of financial honor, higher perhaps than that of the nations of the continent, but for their own part they were convinced that they had been generous in their concessions. They had not the least feeling of having been put under any obligation and the attempt to win them over to support British policy against France, which in the British mind underlay the negotiation, failed completely. In England there is today much suppressed anti-American bitterness, a bitterness which is revived as each fresh pay-day comes round, and which does not seem likely to diminish as long as these payments continue. It is not sure, too, that the Baldwin agreement has not complicated rather than facilitated the clearing up of the whole international financial situation, for it has stiffened the attitude of America towards her continental debtors, while its success has not been such as to impress most of them with the advisability of following England's example. Italy in particular, which owes much and is owed nothing by her partners, cares little about German reparations compared with Allied debts.

The spectacle of what is going on south of the Alps is absorbingly interesting and may contain lessons for several countries. Fascismo, starting as an ultra nationalistic movement, with unabashed imperialistic ambitions which it has never disavowed, evolved into an expression of a reaction against the increasing socialistic peril and of a craving for efficiency in place of the apparently hopeless ineptitude of the parliamentary government of Monte Citorio. It has stood for order rather than for law. Indeed, Mussolini has shown almost as much contempt as Lenin for the wishes of the majority if they happen to disagree with his own views. The world has looked on and wondered whether he was a Napoleon or a South American dictator, whether he was a savior of society or a menace to free democracy and to the peace of the globe. But over and above the question of his personal characteristics and achievements, remarkable as they both are, is the broader one of whether he represents a general movement of real significance, as suggested by recent developments in Spain and elsewhere. There is no doubt that today parliamentary, not to say congressional, government, though commonly admitted as a necessity, enjoys but little sentimental popularity. Hereditary and aristocratic privileges are gone not to return, but the prestige of the strong man "who does things," compared with the legis-

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lators who only talk, is if anything on the increase. Unluckily the strong man who puts down opposition at home is not apt to be patient when it comes from abroad, nor when he thinks he has been smitten to turn the other cheek by appealing to the League of Nations.

The League has in truth assumed a tremendous sum of responsibilities as well as of aspirations. The difficulty of its task has been added to by the incorporation of the Covenant into the Peace of Versailles. The motives which dictated this step were of the highest and in keeping with the idea of "the war to end war," but the results have been disadvantageous to both League and Peace Treaty. The combination of the two has, among other things, increased the suspicion which the majority of the voters in the United States felt towards the whole work of the Peace Conference and has helped to keep us out of the League which we took such a part in forming. Our refusal to honor President Wilson's signature was a blow as stunning as it was unexpected abroad. That the League has survived is strong testimony to its vitality. Although people differ about the importance of its actual achievements, in its comparatively crippled condition, and contrast them with the dreams of world regeneration which it was to have made real, no one can deny that whatever it has accomplished has been unselfish and for the good of humanity. To Soviet Russia the League may be an embodiment of the evil bourgeois spirit, to the United States it may be an association of foreign idealists who wish to meddle in our business, to Latin America it may mean chiefly an opportunity to take part in the general affairs of the world free from the aegis of the United States, but to much of Europe it represents the one hope of the future against the recurrence of the disasters which have brought her to the verge of ruin.

Grave as are the perils which still menace the peace of Europe, and immense as are the difficulties in the work of rehabilitation, there are other political problems which are perhaps even more momentous for the world. One of the most immediate arises from the fact that formerly backward peoples have acquired a new consciousness and are no longer willing to submit to being ruled by foreigners. To argue that if left to themselves they will relapse into despotism or anarchy and barbarism may be true, but as they or their leaders do not think so it does not help matters. The danger threatening the governing powers is not open insur-

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rection, which in most cases could be put down without much trouble. The essential difficulty is that as far as we can judge no democracy can and will persist in keeping another nation in permanent subjection. A modern democracy is capable of harshness at a given moment but is ill fitted to maintain an iron rule for an indefinite time. To do so is too much against its own ideals, and there will always be a party at home to espouse the cause of the discontented. The working masses everywhere, preoccupied with the questions of their own immediate betterment, tend to care little for foreign dominion, which they suspect of being only for the benefit of the rich. They are becoming increasingly unwilling to allow their children to be conscripted to hold down malcontent subjects in distant lands, and even the obtaining of the necessary troops by voluntary enlistment is not as easy as it used to be.

Nor let it be supposed that any people is likely to remain content with semi-independence. It may welcome this as a first step, a partial concession, but not for long. There is no logical stopping place, no halfway house which will make a permanent home on the road to equality, and those who have once got well started on that road grow increasingly impatient and resent every effort to delay them on their way to their final goal.

A good result of the above truths is that they have diminished the temptations to imperialism at the expense of backward races. The task of governing them, developing them, exploiting them and elevating them no longer looks as attractive as it once did. People are not so eager as they used to be to "take up the white man's burden." This may prove the salvation of certain countries, notably China. It may be that China at the present moment is, as Lord Curzon has recently said, "nothing more than a great splash on the map—an amorphous collection of human beings without government, without cohesion, without solidity, and with nothing except their vast numbers. China is split up into a series of small, independent governorships under military dictators, who collect the taxes, amuse themselves, despise the Central Government, and do exactly what they will."[1]

Not long ago these were just the circumstances which would invite foreign intervention. Today no power, great or small, is anxious to take over millions of Chinese subjects. The "break-up of China" may be a possibility, but the "partition of China" can hardly be called so. In any event no political vicissitudes will

[1] *The Near East*, July 10, 1924.

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eliminate the vast numbers of the Chinese or the great qualities of the race which must sooner or later ensure them their due place in the framework of society.

It is also evident that existing colonial empires rest upon insecure foundations. There seems, indeed, something unnatural in the spectacle of seven million Dutch ruling over fifty million Malays. Not long ago Germany hoped that Holland would look to her for assistance when the task of controlling so many dependents should prove too arduous, and that thus both the Dutch and their colonies could be attached to the Teuton empire. This dream has vanished, at least for the moment, and the future of the Dutch possessions is highly uncertain. Those of Belgium and Portugal will in their turn present similar problems, though as yet tropical Africa has not reached the cultural stage of agitation for self-government.

Of the hundred million of the population of Greater France, almost sixty are not of European origin. If they are to be kept in permanent French allegiance their loyalty must be secured. The French flatter themselves that they are peculiarly successful in winning the affections of those over whom they rule. So be it, though it is probable they entertain a good many illusions in this respect. In any event, they have an immense task before them. In particular one may well doubt whether the distant millions of their Indo-Chinese empire, who have their own ancient Asiatic civilization and history to look back to, will ultimately consent to submit to foreign control, however slight. It is true their loss might not be very serious for France. Far more vital is the question whether she can permanently assimilate the inhabitants of her territories in North Africa. The European element, even reinforced by the Jews, will always form only a small minority. The large majority of the population are Mohammedans, imbued with the traditions of Islamic empire, and at least half of them speak as their native tongue Arabic, one of the chief cultural languages in the history of the world. The prospect of making good Frenchmen out of them looks discouraging, for if religious antagonisms are less acute than they once were, nationalistic ones are more so. But the loss of North Africa, followed, as would be likely, by that of her tropical holdings further to the southward, would be an irreparable blow to France. Without her colonies she cannot maintain her position in the front rank of nations. Still we must remember that her powers of attraction are great.

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In North Africa she may be able to rally to her side the Berber half of the inhabitants, who are racially of much the same stock as the south Europeans and are not as fanatical as the Arabs, for whom they have little love. If she can do so she will vastly strengthen her position.

Whatever the more distant future may reserve for Holland or France, Great Britain is called upon to face now and at once the problem of how she is to preserve her wonderful empire, perhaps the most remarkable political achievement of any people. The dangers which menace it have long been foreseen by thoughtful observers and are at last beginning to be generally realized. To meet them, such plans as an Imperial Federation and a British Commonwealth of Nations have been devised—so far without marked success. One would have imagined that the magnificent way in which the colonies rallied to the support of the mother country in the World War would have bound them more closely to her. This may yet prove to be the lasting effect. For the moment the reaction produced by the present period of hardship and disillusion is more visible. But supposing that the British Commonwealth of Nations can be made a reality and can include among its loyal components a reconciled Ireland, which is trying to unlearn the hated English language, a Canada, all of whose natural interests draw her closer to the United States, and a South Africa, where the Boer by a superior birth-rate may supplant the Briton as the leading factor and where both are far outnumbered by the blacks—granting a Commonwealth comprising all of these, what is to become of India?

India today, though covering only about a seventh of the territory of the British Empire, contains more than two-thirds of its population. In the last twenty years she has wrested one concession after another from Great Britain—a process hastened by the World War. To all appearances they have quite failed to satisfy her. On the contrary, it seems as if the discontent were steadily becoming more widespread and acute. There is little reason for thinking that the movement will stop. The outlook is rather that within a few years India will be given up as Egypt has been given up. The British democracy will not try to retain her by force. Of that we may be sure. The enormous benefits that England has conferred on the country and its swarming millions will count for nothing in retaining their allegiance. The jealousies, rivalries and hatreds of race and creed among the

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many different peoples, though they may make trouble enough hereafter, have not proved capable of preventing them from combining against their British masters. If India is to be given home rule, as seems inevitable, it takes a stretch of the imagination to conceive of her as merely an Asiatic member of a European commonwealth in which only one other member has as much as a twenty-fifth of her population, and several of them exclude her inhabitants from their territories. We can see no reason, too, why the example of India should not be followed in course of time, and according to the measure of their abilities, by other parts of the British dominions where Asiatics or African races predominate. To be sure, even without them and reduced to its white constituents, the British Commonwealth would cover a large surface on the map and would be one of the first among states, but it would be something very different from the old British Empire.

Of the greater nations the United States can most easily slough off its foreign holdings. We shall let the Philippines go before long, and we shall hardly know the difference. Porto Rico likewise is not essential to our happiness. Our race difficulties are within our own borders, where we have a black population we have absorbed culturally but do not accept as our political and social equals, who are too numerous to be expelled and from whom we cannot get away. It was feared that as a result of the war, in which we had about as many colored men in military service as did the French, we should witness among our negroes an increase of independence or insubordination—call it what we will—that might produce alarming race conflicts in the south. Fortunately these fears have not so far been justified.

Beyond and beside the affairs of the western world, revolutionary Russia has pursued her blood-stained path. At the outbreak of the war the public rallied as enthusiastically in Russia as elsewhere to the support of its rulers and threw itself with passion into the struggle. The army was by far the largest in the world. The resources of the country seemed limitless, but the machinery of the bureaucratic and corrupt administration, inefficient at best, was inadequate to handle the vast numbers of men it had to care for and the innumerable difficulties which confronted it. Russia, too, had no such reserves of educated, intelligent, and patriotic private citizens as did the United States and Western Europe to come to the rescue of the official machine,

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put new vigor into it and supply its deficiencies, nor were the relations between government and people such as to bring about loyal coöperation in time of stress. The Russian soldiers fought with their customary courage; some of their commanders were men of ability and achieved brilliant successes; but as the months went on one disaster followed another in the field and confusion reigned supreme. The autocracy in the hands of a well-meaning but weak, incompetent and blind emperor so completely lost credit that by the beginning of the year 1917 there were on foot several separate conspiracies of a more or less revolutionary character, conspiracies among men of all classes including even members of the imperial family.

The revolution itself broke out almost accidentally and triumphed with scarcely an effort. The old system was too hopeless. But the new improvised government did not succeed, and could hardly expect to succeed, in dealing with the bewildering problems it was called upon to master. To the millions of soldiers at the front "liberty" meant the liberty to go home after years of suffering and slaughter for a cause they did not understand. Hence the armies soon began to melt away. As time went on, the more radical factions in Petrograd got the upper hand and they in their turn were overthrown with little resistance by the Bolsheviks. Communist Russia withdrew from the war and entered upon her career of revolutionizing her own social structure as a prelude to world revolution.

The Soviet Republic is now seven years old. At first, it had to contend with widespread armed resistance which received substantial aid from outside. It triumphed, and since 1921 its authority has been supreme within its borders. The prophecies of violent dissensions among the leaders after the death of Lenin have not as yet proved true. On the other hand, the intended world revolution has spread no further (except for a short time in Hungary) although the Communists, who take their inspiration if not their orders from Moscow, are now a recognized party or faction in every country, and in several constitute a danger to the existing order. In Russia itself scarcely had the Bolsheviks overcome their opponents and established their communistic system when they were obliged by the almost universal economic ruin to reverse their policy and return, in a large measure, to a system of private ownership and trade. Of late there has been at least a beginning of economic recovery, but few dispassionate

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observers would maintain that Russia bids fair to be happy or prosperous for a good while yet. Her relations with the rest of the world, however, are becoming more normal. One after another the European powers, tired of waiting for the oft promised counter revolution which has never eventuated, have recognized the state which in its official title no longer calls itself Russia, but the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, a name emphasizing the fact that it is based not on land or nationality but on a theory of society. Since every good communist regards those of his creed in other countries as his enslaved compatriots, the promises of official Moscow to abstain from propaganda abroad are open to skepticism. Likewise, it is not easy for foreign trade and capital to function in a normal fashion in a country where the rights of private property are at best only tolerated as a disagreeable necessity for the time being, and where there is almost no guarantee against arbitrariness and violence. Russia indeed presents a vast and menacing enigma, and no sure sign of the solution is yet discernible.

The temporary eclipse of Russia, the power which formerly had the least to hope or fear from us, is one cause of the commanding position now held by the United States. The war losses and crying needs of the victorious Allies, as well as the disaster to Germany, have contributed still more to our relative superiority. To be sure, vast as are our territories and resources and large as is our population, they are smaller than those of the British Empire, but our immediately available wealth of men and material is much greater, and we are incomparably more secure against attack from without or dissolution from within. The United States is at present the strong man and the rich man, courted by all and having little to ask or fear from anyone. It cannot, however, expect the popularity it has enjoyed in the past. On the contrary it must be prepared to be widely disliked. Thus, in spite of the extraordinary generosity it has shown so often in recent years, it is charged, as rich men are apt to be, with callous selfishness, and there are Americans who believe that as long as we keep out of the League there is ground for the charge.

President Harding's administration, wishing to prove that even if America had withdrawn from the European embroilment she had not lost her interest in the welfare of the world, called the Disarmament Conference at Washington. The Conference proved a success, if only a partial one. The limitation and

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scrapping of battleships was a step in the right direction, and the Far Eastern agreements, besides bringing about the end of a superfluous alliance, laid the foundation for a better future. Unfortunately, whatever good feeling the Conference created between the United States and Japan has been more than undone by what has seemed to the Japanese the gratuitously nasty treatment they have received in our recent immigration law. Henceforth, though American relations with Japan may be correct and courteous, there is scant reason why she should feel affection for us or pay any more attention to our desires than her own well understood interest demands.

Nor let anyone imagine that the immigration question is settled for all time. It may be for the present, and in the way that is most beneficial to us. We are convinced that we have acted for sufficient cause within our own undoubted rights. None the less we must not forget the spread and power of socialistic ideas in all countries and the weakening of faith in the sanctity of private property, especially in regard to the holding of wide lands. If it is held to be morally wrong and anti-social for one man to possess huge estates, which he may develop or not as he chooses, while hundreds of others near by are relegated to landlessness, why should one people acquire, by similar accident of birth or achievement, a claim to an inordinate share of the good things of life and a right to exclude from them other less fortunate peoples, white, black, or yellow? Already the theory has been urged officially by European statesmen of high standing that the exploitation of the fundamental natural resources of the earth, wherever they may be located, should be open on equal terms to men of all nations. Already it has seemed an anomaly that the Australians should have the right to exclude the Chinese from a continent which is twice the size of China proper and has only about a sixtieth as many inhabitants. But this is only the most flagrant of many cases of the sort, including our own. We shall hear more about these questions some day.

Ten years is but a fleeting instant in even that small portion of history of which we have actual knowledge. But the ten just past have been momentous beyond precedent. It is true we must not ascribe too exclusively to them the political and social changes that have taken place. The decay in the ancient loyalty to the throne and the altar, and in the belief in privilege as a right, is no new thing. The ultimate triumph of democracy throughout the

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civilized—and, indeed, the whole world—has long appeared inevitable to many thinkers, whether they liked it or not. The growing power of the doctrines of international socialism has also been obvious, although their antithesis, extreme nationalism, has gained rather than lost in force, and now the reaction of the other races against the dominant white man constitutes one of the gravest questions of the day. But though the origin of all these movements lies far back of the World War, the war has immeasurably stimulated them. Similarly, the old ideas of general disarmament, international tribunals and associations of nations have been made vital issues by the unparalleled horrors and sufferings we have witnessed. Who would now venture to advocate frankly the imperialism which was unblushingly avowed by leaders of opinion a decade ago?

There have been times in the last ten years when, in the old world at least, men have been tempted to despair of humanity. The aftermath of the war has seemed to some more cruel than the war itself and they see no end to it. Yet there has been progress as well as destruction. Even if we must admit that the cost has been fearful, that more has been destroyed than has been built and that more questions have been raised than have been answered, we may still trust that we have been moving forward not backward. To face with courage the present difficulties of mankind let us have faith and hope in the future and also charity for the past.

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A DEMOCRATIC VIEW

By Norman H. Davis

THE foreign policy of the Government of the United States should be a national policy, not a Democratic policy, nor a Republican policy. It should be one which will bring the greatest moral and material benefits to this country, and to the world in which we have a most important stake. Unfortunately, there is today a difference in the foreign policies of the Democratic and Republican Parties. This has been brought about partly by a difference in domestic policies, but chiefly by a partisan controversy which arose more than four years ago over the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.

The foreign policy of a political party is usually of the same cloth as its domestic policy. The domestic policy of the Democratic Party is to do away with privilege as between individuals, and to secure the coöperation of all citizens for the common good; its standard of success is not the wealth of a few individuals, but the welfare of the people as a whole. Its foreign policy is to do away with privilege as between nations, and to secure the coöperation of all nations for their mutual welfare. The Republican Party, on the other hand, acts upon the theory that special privileges are essential for national prosperity, that tariff bounties must be granted to some, in order that those who are thus enriched may diffuse their wealth and allow it to seep down to the masses. Democrats hold that such an economic theory is unsound. The theory that a few must be enriched by governmental aid in order that they may in turn help others is repugnant to Democratic principles. This fundamental difference in the theories of the two parties in respect of domestic questions leads them to approach foreign questions from a somewhat different point of view. One is more concerned with the human aspects of problems, the other with material aspects. One abhors privilege in any form, the other likes it in certain ways.

I further believe that the Republican Party has chosen its foreign policy as wrongly from the point of view of material expediency as from the humanitarian and moral point of view.

Since Washington in his Farewell Address first gave to the American people those principles of friendship for all nations, and

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partial alliances with none, which served us so well in the early days of our independence, and down to the World War, the foreign policy of the United States has seldom entered into domestic politics nor has it changed greatly with changes of administration. The rule was that it should not be made a partisan political question, but should in general be determined in accordance with our traditional principles of impartial dealings with all nations, partial, entangling alliances with none.

With the complete transformation in conditions of life and with the new interdependence between various parts of the world resulting from the unprecedented scientific and industrial development of the last half-century, America's relation to the rest of the world was changed. The World War proved it startlingly. The assassin's shot at Sarajevo, the bombardment of Belgrade, started a chain of events in which the sinking of the *Lusitania* and Chateau-Thierry proved to be inevitable links. As the war extended, and caught us in the net, it became apparent that the only way to avoid the evil consequences of the European system of alliances, the fatal Balance of Power, was to do away with that system, and substitute for it a general covenant for peace between all the sovereign nations of the world. Even prior to the outbreak of the war statesmen in many lands had been discussing plans of this character. The leaders of thought in both parties in the United States had advocated a League to Enforce Peace, but efforts had been directed primarily towards the adoption of an international code which should make wars more humane and protect the rights of non-belligerents. The World War proved conclusively that once a modern war breaks loose it cannot be controlled, and that once it becomes general in character, so called international laws lose their effectiveness. In such a general war no great nation can find means to protect its rights save by the use of force. The United States was not immune from the operation of the rule.

During the world struggle President Wilson became the outstanding spokesman of all the liberal forces seeking the establishment of a better era in world affairs. He crystallized the aspirations of mankind and gave expression to them in the Fourteen Points, the last of which provided for an Association of Nations with binding covenants to advance justice and preserve peace. At the time, these principles were universally acclaimed as the major objects to be attained through our participation in the war.

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They were accepted and praised by all the leading statesmen in both political parties. They were not Democratic or Republican principles. They were American principles.

The Covenant of the League of Nations, contained in the Treaty of Versailles, was a practical plan to put these American principles into effect. It was simply a pledge between sovereign nations to respect the rights of one another, and to work steadily, openly and in concert for peace. It aimed to do away with the secret diplomacy and the system of alliances which had led to the war. It was designed to remove the fear of the weak and the greed of the strong—the two main causes which lead nations to prepare for war. In essence, it was to establish and apply as between nations the same principles as those upon which the relationships between individuals are based in the American Democracy. It provided rules and measures for settling disputes and securing justice through the orderly processes of law and conciliation, without resort to armed force. It was accepted by the masses of Europe, who were convinced by the lessons of war that it offered the only hope of saving mankind from catastrophe.

Upon the submission of the Treaty of Versailles to the Senate for its ratification, the acceptance of this plan by the United States became a question of partisan strife. The controversy continued throughout the summer and fall of 1920 and was carried into the campaign of that year.

In that campaign the Democratic Party specifically advocated entrance into the League of Nations. The Republican Platform, while not endorsing the League, declared in favor of a concert of nations, or agreements based upon international justice, which "would secure instant and general international conference whenever peace shall be threatened by political action, so that the nations pledged to do, and insist upon doing what is just and fair, may exercise their influence and power for the prevention of war." Since the Democratic Party was pledged to entrance into the League of Nations, and the Republican Party promised to join the League, with reservations, or to create something better to be called an Association of Nations, it is clear that neither party offered the public a chance to vote against organized international coöperation.

Yet the Republican Administration has excused its failure to create the promised association or join the League on the surprising ground that the American people, by a seven million

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majority, repudiated the whole idea of concerted international coöperation.

Such an excuse is a serious indictment of the good faith of the Republican Party. It means that Senator Lodge and those Republican Senators who voted for entrance into the League, with reservations, acted in bad faith. It questions the honesty of the Republican Platform, from which I have quoted above. It is not very complimentary to the Republican nominee for the Presidency, who in the 1920 campaign promised international coöperation through the League or an Association of Nations. How could any vote cast for the Republican ticket in 1920 be counted a vote against organized international coöperation in the face of these promises and the assurance given in the famous manifesto of the thirty-one leading intellectuals of that party, that to vote the Republican ticket was the quickest and surest way of getting into the League of Nations and of starting such organized coöperation quickly?

The dispute over whether the United States should enter the League of Nations is not really an issue between the rank and file of the Republican and Democratic Parties. It is at bottom a factional fight within the Republican Party. My belief is that a large majority of Republicans are in favor of membership in the League of Nations upon terms and conditions which make it clear that by such action we shall not depart from our constitutional practices or take away from Congress its constitutional powers; but that a few of the most positive Republican senators, who are dominant leaders in the party organization, and who are opposed to the League, have caused the Administration to vacillate and allow this nation to flounder in the uncertain sea of isolation, for fear lest the Republican Party should be disrupted. Surely it must be only for the latter reason that the Administration sneers at the League of Nations, calls it a "foreign agency," and claims that our relation to it is a "closed incident" at the same time that it is advocating adherence to the World Court, established under the auspices of the League; and is coöperating in a parsimonious, un-American and ineffective way with several of the committees appointed and supported by the League.

The Democratic Party is united in the belief that just as it is the duty—as well as in the interest—of individuals and sections in this country to coöperate for the maintenance of proper rela-

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tionships between the individuals and sections composing the nation, so it is the duty—and in the interest—of the United States to coöperate with the community of nations, of which it forms a part, for the promotion of justice and the maintenance of peace throughout the world.

The Democratic Party holds that it was the duty—and in the interest—of the United States to help finish the job it undertook when it entered the World War—to repair the ravages of that war and accomplish the objects for which we had spent blood and treasure. It was just as much our duty to do this as it was the duty of any other nation with whom we had been associated. It was also obviously to our advantage to coöperate as fully as possible in hastening political stability and in restoring the industrial and economic life upon which the world's prosperity depends.

When we joined with the Allies in disarming Germany we automatically assumed a solemn moral responsibility towards Germany. While it was Germany's plain duty to comply faithfully to the extent of her utmost ability with the obligations assumed by her under the Treaty, it was equally our duty to oppose any unjust or unreasonable demands which might be made upon her or any attempt to take advantage of the defenseless and disarmed position in which we had helped to place her. When the United States withdrew and refused to discharge her moral obligations towards either victors or vanquished it was most disconcerting both to those with whom we had fought and to those against whom we had fought. Following our example of independent, selfish action, each nation found itself pushed into adopting a separate, nationalistic course, a procedure which has been as vexing and injurious to us as our independent action has been to them, and which has held back the prosperity of the world by delaying the establishment of a real peace.

Following their theory of special privilege, the Republicans made a separate treaty with Germany in which they retained the worst features of the Treaty of Versailles and discarded the best. They tried to get every material advantage out of defeated and defenseless Germany, and dodge every moral responsibility. As usually happens when an attempt is made to get something for nothing, we have secured no material benefits whatever from the separate treaty with Germany, our material interests have actually suffered, and we have lost the moral influence which we

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had, and which might have been used to the great benefit of ourselves and the world.

From the Democratic point of view, the Treaty of Versailles became iniquitous when the moderate and stabilizing influence of America was withdrawn. Had the United States been represented officially on the Reparation Commission, the world's difficult progress toward economic recovery and political stability would today be much further advanced and this country would be running a less grave risk of becoming unduly involved in the affairs of Europe. Admirable as has been the work of the Dawes Committee, it would have been unnecessary to appoint this committee had the United States been officially represented on the Reparation Commission, and had thus been able to exercise the veto power assured to us by the treaty and to use our moral influence, which, before our desertion, was unrivaled.

I have no desire to harp upon what the Republican Administration has done, or failed to do, but it seems to me that we can best determine what our future course shall be by pointing out the pitfalls and hazards of the course we have been pursuing. Instead of meeting the problems that arose out of the war in a frank, wise fashion, the Republican Administration has passed through several unsuccessful stages in an endeavor to find a substitute for the League of Nations and formulate a foreign policy upon which Republican leaders can agree and which will meet the demands of the American people for effective international coöperation. It called a special conference to deal with disarmament and Far Eastern affairs, but this partial and half-hearted step seems to have exhausted all its appetite or resource for further attempts at disarmament and at worthy leadership in world affairs. Those of us who felt the necessity of a reassertion of American leadership were, for a while, encouraged by that partial effort. We felt that it would be followed by something more constructive and permanent. But the Administration failed to follow it up, and the full benefits of it have not been retained.

The main lesson of the Washington Conference is that such sporadic special efforts are ineffective and incomplete. It proved that if a conference makes no provision for a periodic reassembling, misunderstandings arise over questions which have been agreed upon and matters which were overlooked may assume such proportions that much of the ground gained at the confer-

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ence is lost. Misunderstandings have, in fact, arisen over the Naval Treaty, which has not resulted in maintaining the relative ratio of naval strength contemplated. The Washington Conference has further proved that disarmament cannot be dealt with effectively by a few nations and that to limit certain instruments of war may simply increase competition in other weapons (such as new inventions in chemical warfare) for which ratios cannot be intelligently fixed. Organized, careful, continuous conference and coöperation can deal with these matters. Occasional showy conferences of plenipotentiaries cannot.

The Four Power Treaty signed at the Washington Conference was hailed as a great achievement. As a matter of fact, the only nation which, under that treaty, assumed any obligation which it had not already assumed was the United States. Under the Covenant of the League of Nations, England, France, and Japan were previously committed to conference and negotiation whenever peace was threatened in any quarter. Under the Four Power Treaty, they are committed to confer with the United States in case peace is threatened in the Pacific, but they are not thereby freed from their obligation under the Covenant to confer also with all the members of the League. From this point of view the Four Power Treaty seems actually to commit us to negotiations in which we might find ourselves at a serious disadvantage, for according to its provisions we must before taking any action confer with England, France, and Japan, who may be in turn engaged with other interested nations in vital negotiations to which we are not a party.

The Republican Party, in keeping with the general tenor of its domestic policy, attempted in the Four Power Treaty to create in the Pacific a sphere of special privilege for four chosen Powers. Chile, with as long a Pacific coast line as our own, and Russia and other powers with important interests and rights in the Pacific were ignored and excluded. This treaty committed the United States to join with a special group of powers for the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Pacific. It thus had all the earmarks of a partial alliance, which was the one thing Washington most earnestly advised against. In order to overcome these objections, and to bring this treaty into harmony with our traditional principles, the Democrats in the Senate proposed that all powers with interests in the Pacific should be permitted to become parties to it. The Administration opposed such action. But the

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more dangerous aspects of the treaty were, to a great extent, nullified by the adoption of a reservation proposed by Republican senators to the effect that the treaty shall not commit us to anything except to talk.

The United States could assure itself of all the alleged advantages of the Four Power Treaty, and could get rid of all its disadvantages, by entering the League of Nations, or by so widening the treaty's scope as to include all powers with interests in the Pacific. Such would be the Democratic policy.

On April 15th, in his keynote speech before the Republican State Convention in New York, Secretary Hughes appeared anxious for the Administration to get all the credit possible for its achievements at the Washington Conference, and at the same time to demonstrate that by avoiding membership in the League the United States had escaped being made the catspaw of rival and ambitious nations in Europe. The only score on which he could fairly make a differentiation between associating with the members of the League in Geneva and with the representatives of England, France, and Japan at Washington, would be that the United States is concerned in the affairs of the Pacific but not in those of Europe. If he holds such a theory after the events of 1914 and 1917 I can only say that I do not agree with him, and that I do not believe the common-sense of the American people will allow them to agree with him. If it is safe to attend such a conference as that held at Washington, if the United States was able to help the nations represented there to bury their rival ambitions and was able to achieve ends desirable to its own interests and helpful to the cause of world peace, why try to argue at the next moment that similar rival ambitions could not be dissipated in the friendly atmosphere of Geneva with the impartial aid of American representatives? A unanimous vote of the Council is required in all important matters. A nation's own vote therefore protects it. After all, the powers of the Council are advisory rather than executive. Certainly it is less dangerous to be in constant contact with nations through a permanent organization like the League than to wait to call a haphazard special conference to settle some matter that has become so threatening that it may well be beyond control.

American diplomatic representatives are accredited to every nation which is a member of the League. We do not seem to be contaminated by consorting with the governments of those

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nations individually. What is the objection to dealing with them collectively? Every argument of convenience and effectiveness favors such a course.

An effort has of late been made to give the impression that the Monroe Doctrine is competent, single-handed, to preserve world peace and safeguard the world-wide interests of the United States. The Monroe Doctrine, which has existed for one hundred years, did not prevent the World War and it did not keep us out of that war. Furthermore, every effort to expand the Monroe Doctrine merely frightens and alienates the Latin-American countries, whose attitude toward the United States today is markedly less friendly than it has ever been since they attained nationhood and independence.

The purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was to prevent the European system from reaching out to this hemisphere. But while it was designed to permit the Latin-American countries to work out their own salvation without interference from Europe, it was never intended to give the United States the power to dominate them and dictate to them. Of the details of Republican policy in Latin America I cannot speak, because it is described by Republican speakers only in generalities. But the evil effects of that policy are only too plain. The Democratic Party favors a policy of coöperation with the Latin-American countries which would restore and strengthen the friendly relations which have heretofore existed, and which would assign to the Monroe Doctrine only the role for which it was intended.

The Democratic Party favors the independence of the Philippines. The granting of independence could be accompanied by such provisions for helpful guidance and assistance from this nation as may be mutually satisfactory. It does not feel that this country should be the sole judge as to whether or not the Philippines should be independent, and it does not believe that it should fix some date a few years hence for granting independence to the Philippines, as the Republicans have done. How can we tell that the Philippines will be any better prepared for independence in sixteen years than they are today? The Democratic Party recognizes the trend of the times. The old autocratic conception that colonies are not entitled to self-government so long as the dominant nation happens to feel that they are better off under its tutelage is outgrown—and justly.

A comparison of the 1924 platforms of the two parties shows

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very clearly the difference in policy in regard to foreign affairs. The Republicans, having abandoned their promise of an Association of Nations, now make a promise of adhering to the Permanent Court of International Justice. They say that the American people have put the stamp of finality on the repudiation of the League. They promise coöperation with other nations in humanitarian and economic problems through charity and by means of "unofficial" observers. But they intend in the future, as they claim to have done in the past, to keep our hands off all "political" questions.

The Democratic Party, realizing that the World War, from participation in which we were not immune, was caused by political ambitions as well as economic rivalries, and that economic recovery cannot be achieved without political settlements, considers it the part of wisdom to coöperate with other nations in reducing every point of friction which retards the reëstablishment of trade and prosperity or threatens the peace of the world. If we are to regain and hold the moral prestige which was ours under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson we must boldly and honorably and intelligently assume the obligations which we, as the most powerful of nations, owe to the world. We cannot hold ourselves superciliously aloof, congratulating ourselves that we are different from other nations and not concerned in their problems and difficulties. It is our plain duty, to ourselves and to all humanity, to take part in, and to give our moral and official support to, every honest coöperative effort of civilization to outlaw war.

America should not be content to have "unofficial observers" peeping in under the curtain at international conferences. They serve only to fool a few Americans at home and to put America in a ridiculous position abroad. Europe does not understand the theory of international intercourse which prompts the sending of government officials to important international conferences to state the attitude of the United States of America toward vital international matters, but which instructs them to begin every sentence with the words "Of course I do not speak for the United States Government, but—" A government official sent abroad has in the past been either an accredited diplomat, ready to state his government's considered attitude and to take the consequences of the adoption of that attitude, or a secret agent, a spy. In attempting to combine the prestige of the former with the irresponsibility of the latter the Republican Administration has

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not raised the world's opinion of American statesmanship nor evolved an effective manner of dealing with the problems confronting it on every continent.

Nor, by the same token, should we leave to private citizens, acting on invitations from foreign governments, the task of helping to bring order out of world chaos. This sort of participation is inadequate, undignified and cowardly. The problems of the day are too great, too vital to our security and prosperity, to be left to this haphazard treatment. They should be dealt with, because they could be better dealt with, by officials and delegates of the United States Government, chosen and trained for the work, empowered to speak for America in measured and responsible terms.

Without the surrender of any sovereignty, without meddling in the domestic affairs of any nation or in any matters which do not concern the United States, without seeking to impose our will on other nations, without entering into agreements which would diminish the rights of Congress, without committing ourselves in advance to any action in unknown circumstances, America could, and the Democratic Party believes it should, throw all of its power and prestige into the struggle to increase international good will and secure international peace and prosperity.

The argument against the proposed form of international coöperation which loomed so large in the last campaign—the fears of foreign entanglements, of lost sovereignty,—like the arguments in favor of extreme and absolute isolation,—have been destroyed by exposure to time and experience. Four years of fruitful and beneficent operation have demonstrated that the League of Nations is none of those fearsome things which the enemies of Woodrow Wilson pretended to think it was. The actual accomplishments of the League have confirmed the faith of the Democratic Party in the broad vision of its fallen leader. The League is not perfect, it is handicapped by the absence of the United States and Germany, but it represents an honest attempt to substitute law for war. The Democratic Party has waited in vain for the Republican Administration to propose a substitute. There is no substitute. The League is the only solid foundation on which to build the hope of permanent peace. The thought of millions of people who yearn for peace is centered at Geneva.

The Democratic Party is opposed to America's taking advantage of some of the services of the League, as the Republican

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Platform boasts of doing, without paying our share in the organization's expenses. It would better comport with the dignity of the United States, as it would better serve our interests, to accept our full share in this attempt at world organization.

It is just because the Democratic Party is opposed to "foreign entanglements" that it opposes the Republican policy of sitting back and letting other nations pursue a course which may again involve us in a world war. The Democratic Party is not willing to have fifty-four nations about a council table anywhere, dealing with questions which concern the peace and welfare of all the world, and not have America present officially to safeguard her own interests and to throw her influence on the right side. It is confident that the policy it advocates is a fitting policy for America, in accord with the traditions which have made us strong in the past, in accord with our present interests, and in accord with our aspirations for the future. It is confident that such a policy will have the full support of the American people.

In its platform of 1924 the Democratic Party has pledged itself, if entrusted with power, to adopt forthwith a policy of open official international coöperation instead of the furtive and unofficial coöperation now practised by the Republican Administration. It has furthermore reaffirmed its confidence in the ideals of the League of Nations and its belief that the United States could coöperate more satisfactorily and effectively as a member of the League. Since the question of membership in the League has been confused by party strife, and since a foreign policy, to be effective, must be backed by a united nation, the Democratic Party has pledged itself to try to lift this question above partisanship and establish international coöperation as a fixed national policy. There is, of course, a difference between official coöperation with the League and membership in the League. The President has the power and the duty, under the Constitution, to direct the foreign relations of the United States and he may, to the extent that he deems it necessary to discharge his duties and safeguard the interests of this country, send official representatives to deal with any foreign governments or participate in any international conferences. He may not, however, accept membership in the League of Nations without the consent of the Senate, because that involves becoming a party to the Covenant which is in effect a treaty that requires approval by the Senate. As a means, therefore, of raising the question above

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party, the Democrats have proposed that an advisory referendum be held to test public sentiment in regard to membership in the League.

My personal opinion is that a referendum is not necessary to sense public opinion or get a non-partisan consideration of this question. It cannot relieve the President and the Senate of their constitutional powers and duties in respect to foreign relations. I believe the American people prefer to express their will through the representatives selected by them, and in accordance with our long-established constitutional methods. If the sentiment of the American people is in favor of membership in the League, as is my conviction, it will ultimately reach and influence the Senate. If, upon conditions acceptable to the President and the Senate, it is possible to get the Covenant ratified, it would amply demonstrate the extent of popular, non-partisan support for the League, and it certainly would not be necessary or advisable to resort to a referendum.

Since a large majority of the Republican Senators have at one time or another, in one form or another, voted for membership in the League, there is reason to hope that after a survey of past experience and faced with the situation that may then exist abroad, the President and the Senate can agree on conditions upon which the United States would accept League membership.

The Democratic Party is in favor of a foreign policy in keeping with American ideals and conditions, and one which the American people can understand. It believes that it is as impossible as it is unnecessary to attempt to separate foreign and domestic policies. The same ideals of honesty and efficiency, of dignity and decency, should inspire the policies of this Republic at home and abroad. The gross materialism which has wrecked the cabinet of the present Administration has not merely shaken the confidence of the American people; it has decreased our influence and standing throughout the world. It is only as the spirit of coöperation develops at home, only as the spirit of fair play and equal opportunity, to which the Democratic Party is pledged, is made dominant in our domestic politics, that we can hope for healthy, national progress, or deserve to regain the high position of leadership among the nations which we enjoyed under a Democratic Administration.

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A REPUBLICAN VIEW

By Theodore E. Burton

WHEN Colonel House wrote his article, "America in World Affairs: A Democratic View," for the June issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, he was obviously preparing a campaign document. Whatever constructive suggestions he may have offered, however, were either rudely rejected by the Democratic National Convention or submerged in a mass of vague generalities coupled with unsupported allegations and vituperation against Republicans. One may search in vain in the Democratic Platform for any definite or forward-looking policy in foreign affairs.

Aside from questions which exclusively relate to foreign policy, there is but one Democratic argument to which the scope of the present article will justify an answer, and that is the claim set forth in the Democratic Platform and advanced in the article of Colonel House that Republican control has curtailed foreign trade. Criticism has rested especially upon the Tariff Act of 1922. The plain facts utterly disprove the Democratic contention. A comparison of the eighteen months succeeding the enactment of that measure with the eighteen months preceding shows that imports into this country increased by 41 percent, or in an amount totaling $1,670,000,000. There has been a notable increase in the importation of manufactured articles subject to duty. Exports also increased by 12 percent.

Another fact disproves this Democratic argument so commonly advanced. The volume of American trade during the life of the present administration as compared with that in the years preceding the war has shown a far greater increase than that of England, France, Germany, or any other prominent commercial country. This is true because the United States is now enjoying political stability, and its natural companion, material prosperity. The very serious situation as regards exports of wheat and some other farm products is so readily explained that no elaborate statement is necessary. The waste and the abnormal demand which were features of the war period have ceased. At the same time, agricultural production in Europe has experienced a rapid and substantial recovery, and competition from outlying portions

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of the world, as from Canada, Argentina, Australia, and India, has caused serious inroads on the demands made upon the United States.

The Democratic Convention did not see fit to adopt the suggestion of Colonel House that the United States become an associate member of the League of Nations, but instead adopted a plank which for evasion and for the attempt to satisfy both advocates and opponents is unsurpassedly ludicrous.

That plank, after praising the League with only the sky as a limit, and stating that there is no substitute for it as an agency for peace, favors entrance only after a referendum, a proposal for which there is no constitutional warrant or practical method, and which would necessarily involve interminable delay. Such a plan is manifestly impracticable and absurd. The futility of leaving a decision to a national referendum could not be more clearly set forth than in the address of the Honorable Newton D. Baker at the Democratic Convention. Thus we have the spectacle of a political party abandoning what was its foremost principle in 1920, and substituting for it an empty promise. What confidence can the people repose in the foreign policy of a party which beats such a pitiable retreat? The Republican Platform was unequivocal in its opposition to membership in the League, at this time.

There are many in the Republican Party who regard the League of Nations as a most worthy conception, and who favored membership in it if limited by proper reservations; but further consideration in the light of later developments has brought a realization of very serious objections. The present Republican attitude toward the League, therefore, can be most aptly expressed in the words of President Coolidge, who called it "at least the attempted expression of a noble aspiration for world association and understanding," in which, however, America sees, "whether intended or not, a diminution of its independence and in its provisions the final sanction not of conscience but of force." The President's renunciation of membership was not an avoidance of duty to the world, for of that duty he is fully conscious. "We realize," he said in his first address to Congress, "the common bond of humanity, we know the inescapable law of service." On another occasion, he said: "We must meet these burdens and overcome them or they will meet us and overcome us."

The treaty in which the League most unfortunately was incorporated was framed at a time when the very natural passions

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aroused by the war were a dominating factor. It imposed terms as to reparations impossible of fulfilment. Force was regarded as the best guaranty of future peace. Instead of looking to the abatement of hatreds and antagonisms, the treaty was framed for their perpetuation. The map of Europe was remade, and that without regard to natural boundaries. Countries which through generations had grown to be economic units were dismembered. Large populations of superior culture and advancement were placed under the control of those notably inferior. Military considerations received undue weight in the fixing of borders. An express provision was even included in the Covenant of the League to render permanent these boundaries so hastily agreed upon. The whole map of Europe is covered with illustrations of the careless consideration given to this subject.

Equally disappointing to advocates of the League have been developments since the Treaty of Versailles was written. Imperialistic ambitions for territorial expansion and commercial advantages have all the while been in evidence. The stronger nations have refused, even within the League, to afford equality of treatment to the weaker. Propositions for disarmament have been framed, but nothing has been accomplished because the conflicting passions of the dominant European nations and their fear of each other's motives have prevented any agreement.

One of the most important provisions in the Covenant of the League of Nations was Article XVII, which provides that in the event of a dispute between a member of the League and a state which is not a member, the non-member state shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership for the purposes of such dispute. Clearly there has been a bitter controversy between France and Germany, the settlement of which is absolutely essential for permanent peace, but the mandatory article which demands an invitation to Germany has been utterly disregarded. It was perfectly well known that the League was helpless to meet a situation which it had promised to solve.

In brief, it must be said that on major propositions the League has failed, and that that which has been accomplished was given only subordinate attention in the plans of its founders.

All this does not mean that the people of the United States do not look with approval on whatever good the League may accomplish. If in any way it has prevented war, we rejoice. There have been some excellent results in humanitarian work. This

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Administration plans to coöperate wherever American participation can be helpful, and, in the future as in the past, to take part in discussions of direct interest to this country. Such participation has been admittedly useful. It has cost the League nothing. Private American contributions support some of its most important activities.

Many labor under the delusion that our membership in the League would have resulted in a pacified Europe. Those of this opinion have indulged in the beautiful dream that all that is necessary to quiet the raging passions which manifestly persist is for us to say: "Peace, be still!" But whoever seeks a settled Europe must recognize that we are dealing with deeply seated animosities and with rivalries which have developed through many centuries and have been immensely accentuated by the late war.

The futility of any attempt to bring about the peaceful settlement of European questions which does not take into consideration these age-old prejudices is perfectly illustrated by the experience of President Wilson with the Fiume question. On the occasion of his visit to Italy he was received with an acclaim never before accorded to any foreign visitor. Municipalities vied with each other in giving his name to streets and avenues. The people eagerly sought statuettes of him to place in their homes. But when in the utmost good faith he expressed the opinion that Fiume ought not to be claimed by Italy, enthusiastic praise was changed to censure and abounding admiration gave place to ill-will. What the discordant nations of Europe desire, unfortunately, is not the advice or arbitrament of a friendly or impartial nation, but that brand of partisanship which will give support to their ambitious claims. It was only after more than four years, when a spirit akin to despair had arisen from the failure to avert the threat of chaos, that the suggestion of our Secretary of State leading to the Dawes Commission was given favorable consideration. Similar offers made at an earlier date had been received with disfavor.

One of the most important obstacles to membership in the League is the cosmopolitan quality of our population, which is made up of representatives of most races of the earth. No object is more important than to weld our people together, to make of them loyal Americans. We do not wish to destroy their affection for the lands of their birth. We welcome the breadth of vision

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they bring us. But we must have their undivided loyalty. To gain this we must keep out of the quarrels of the home countries. If the United States had been represented in the League at the time of the Corfu incident every possible pressure would have been brought to bear upon the Government to instruct the American representative to take the side either of Greece or of Italy. Passions would have been aroused that were not pro-American, but pro-Greek or pro-Italian, and the process of Americanization of our fellow citizens would have been retarded, because one or the other group would have thought that we had failed them. Representation on the League of Nations would thus prove a disruptive force in American life, because the United States is not altogether a homogeneous country.

It is to be noted that the most stalwart advocates of the League rarely if ever mention the advantage of membership to this country. They merely try to minimize the disadvantages. In pro-League speeches in France, Great Britain or Czechoslovakia the speakers always stress the value of membership to the home country. In pro-League speeches here, speakers stress only the value of American membership to other countries. It is the first duty of any government to consider the welfare of its own nationals. Anything else is disloyal. It is not sufficient, therefore, to prove that American membership in the League would be of advantage to the world. It must also be proved to be of advantage to America.

The Republican Party advocates membership in the Permanent Court of International Justice. Unlike the League, this is not a political but a judicial body. Adherence to the protocol under which it was established would be in full accord with American traditions. To try to build up a new Court merely because it happened to be the group of nations comprising the League which made possible the establishment of the present court, is merely to avoid the issue and to show a quite unjustified fear of the League.

It is unfortunately true that certain senators of both parties have in the past opposed American participation in the Court, but in the declaration of the Republican Platform there is no ambiguity: "We endorse the Permanent Court of International Justice and favor the adherence of the United States to this tribunal, as endorsed by President Coolidge." This adherence is to be under certain reservations, already informally agreed to

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by the most important nations having membership in the Court, which will prevent possible political entanglement with the League. President Coolidge said in a recent speech: "I feel confident that such action [adherence to the Court] would make a greater America, that it would be productive of a higher and finer national spirit and of a more complete national life." The Republican Party as a whole follows the courageous leadership of the President. One of his first acts, when Congress meets in December, will no doubt be to urge adherence by the United States to the protocol of the Court. There should be no doubt as to the issue.

The President has also promised that in case there is favorable action under the recommendations of the Dawes Commission another conference will be called to promote the cause of peace. Such a gathering in our own city of Washington, in an atmosphere of impartiality and good-will, would no doubt accomplish still greater results than the earlier conference of 1921–22. That conference was the most notable advance in the direction of disarmament over a very large area which has occurred in many years, very different from the futile discussions conducted by the League. The beneficent results of the Washington Conference did not come from its spectacular quality; they came because the Government had well defined aims, a practical agenda which it was able to carry through. The conference promoted peace through removing causes of misunderstanding, quite as much as because it put an end to competition in the building of capital ships. A long-standing treaty between Japan and England, which was a serious embarrassment to our position in the Far East, was abrogated. A new era of justice to China was assured. Means were provided for the settlement of controversies in and around the Pacific. These results are well-set stones in that durable structure of world peace which it is the policy of the Republican Party to build.

Colonel House criticizes the omission to consider the claims of Russia at that conference. The implication is that the Soviets should have been invited. Such omission proved the wisdom of the Republican Administration. If an invitation had been made and accepted, preposterous claims would have been presented, and the probabilities are that the Conference would have broken up in disgust. What would have happened is well illustrated by the farcical result of the Genoa Conference. Prime ministers and

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diplomats assembled there with high hopes, but the outcome was barren and discord was aggravated rather than diminished. There is no similar record of so futile and ridiculous a succession of daily gatherings, except in the wrangling and wearisome meetings of the recent Democratic Convention; this latter body, nevertheless, reached a conclusion, which neither the Genoa Conference nor any other international meeting in which Russia was included has succeeded in doing.

There has been no ambiguity in the attitude of the Republican Party toward Russia. There should be no recognition of a government which ignores the sacredness of contracts and all property rights, which bluntly avows that, if its interests so demand, agreements with other nations can be violated at will. There must be no recognition of a government which brutally tramples on human rights. Furthermore, for us to enter into relations with a government constantly striving for the destruction of our own government is unthinkable. These broad issues are above party politics, and the Republicans have never made them an issue. The general rule under which a governing body in control of a country is to be recognized cannot weigh against those moral and political principles which cause us to look askance upon a régime which violates every principle of constitutional government and ignores all international obligations.

It should be added, however, that non-recognition of the Soviet Government indicates no lack of sympathy for Russia, nor of appreciation of the fine qualities of the Russian people. When other nations looked on helplessly, an appropriation of twenty millions was made from the Federal Treasury by a Republican Congress for the hungry and the starving in the Volga Valley, and both by public and private benevolence our people have rendered most efficient aid. We earnestly hope for a reborn democratic Russia to which we can lend assistance without stint.

Let us consider the traditional and practically uniform policy of the United States in foreign affairs. It has been one of careful non-interference and strict neutrality in all that concerns Europe. Even before the Declaration of Independence, a committee of the Continental Congress headed by John Adams framed a model treaty in which he first employed the words "entangling alliances," and advised their avoidance. Beginning with Washington, without respect to party, this has been the general attitude of our chief executives. It was true of Wilson until just before

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our entrance into the Great War. Washington laid down certain general principles which were followed and approved by Jefferson, Monroe, Jackson, Van Buren, Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan.

We may select two typical expressions of this general policy, one by a Democratic president, the other by a Republican. James Buchanan said in his inaugural address: "To avoid entangling alliances has been a maxim of our policy ever since the days of Washington, and its wisdom no one will attempt to dispute." Benjamin Harrison said in his inaugural: "We have happily maintained a policy of non-interference in European affairs. We have been only interested spectators of their contentions in diplomacy and war, ready to use our friendly offices to promote peace, but never obtruding our advice."

Of this general policy, observed for much more than a hundred years, there can be no doubt; but it is maintained that our entrance into the Great War and the close relations now created by commercial and social intercourse dictate a change. That we are more interested than formerly in world affairs, and that our position has been changed by the mighty growth of this nation, may be conceded. There is still, however, a firm foundation for what Washington said: "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation, hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities."

This does not mean that we have not the keenest interest in what happens abroad, nor does it mean for a moment that we should not render friendly offices, not merely in extending benevolent aid to the suffering, but in seeking by friendly intervention to compose differences whenever such action would not cause resentment or be futile. Along these lines the present Administration has met the new situation, has maintained the prestige of the American name, and has sought to solve the duties which changed conditions have imposed upon us. Indeed, the Republican Party recognizes that in foreign affairs this, the strongest nation, should not merely assert its claims but should manifest a disposition to grant generous concessions.

Democratic utterances to the contrary, the Republican Party has a well defined policy. In the last issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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Senator Lodge detailed some of the achievements of the Harding and Coolidge Administrations in their conduct of foreign relations. Without repeating this notable list it must be plain to an unprejudiced observer that the present Administration has maintained a definite program. It has pursued a single, undeviating policy which, broadly speaking, is the protection and extension throughout the world of American rights and interests in such manner as to remove causes of difference and to promote international good-will. Neither the President nor the Secretary of State is an opportunist. Both are building for the future in furtherance of a wise, unhurried, generous national policy.

The Administration has been compelled to realize that in America as in all countries there are two groups of citizens representing extreme views on foreign relations. They may be called jingoes and sentimentalists. They are equally dangerous. One group, distrusting or even hating all foreigners, purely selfish in their motives and in their thinking, endanger peace by their bumptiousness. The other group, purely sentimental, professing such affection for all foreigners that they look askance at their own compatriots, endanger peace by their supineness. Since human nature is not perfect the road to peace lies somewhere between the two extremes. To this road the Republican Administration has held. Its responsible leaders have always given supreme regard to the greatest good of the United States of America, in full knowledge that so-called isolation is impossible and that the greatest good of one means the greatest world good. In these modern days a country prospers in direct, not in adverse ratio to the prosperity of its neighbors—and its neighbors are all the nations of the earth. The Secretary of State said in New York in May, 1924: "There is only one avenue to peace. That is in the settlement of actual differences and the removal of ill will."

It is the purpose of the Republican Party to conclude a series of treaties of commerce and amity to replace old treaties no longer applicable to modern conditions. A treaty along these lines has already been signed with Germany and awaits action by the Senate. Others are in the process of negotiation. They are based on the principle of unconditional-most-favored-nation treatment, a forward step in American practice which has been adopted because of its simplicity, fairness, and ease of interpretation.

One by one the various problems raised by the system of

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mandates established under the Treaty of Versailles are being settled. The treaties already negotiated with various mandatory powers have conserved to America for all time the right of the open door in the mandated territories. American trade, in consequence, is gradually developing. But perhaps the most important aspect of the treaties is that they confirm the rights long since acquired by great missionary interests. Probably few people realize the number of Americans who devote their lives to the improvement of backward races, or the volume of money that flows out from this country to make their humanitarian work possible. These self-sacrificing Americans are nobly supporting and vitalizing the idea of the mandate principle.

Nothing in American foreign policy is more important than our relations with our nearest neighbors, the countries of Latin America. The advent of the Republican Administration found these relations uncertain and strained. Now, toward the end of four years of straightforward, clearly defined and firmly executed Republican policy this uncertainty has been succeeded by confidence and friendship.

The satisfactory settlement of the long standing controversy with Mexico and the resumption of normal relations between the two countries was in itself an important achievement. But in the final analysis even more important was the subsequent vigorous American support of constitutional government in that country, a support which has had a salutary and heartening effect throughout Latin America. The unfortunate custom in some of the smaller countries to the south of us of changing their governments through revolutions instead of through constitutional methods has been checked because of the announced intention of the Government of the United States not to recognize governments created in such a manner. This policy has been given permanent effect by the signing of a treaty in which the United States joins with five Central American countries. When a revolution recently broke out in Honduras a conference was called of representatives of the other Central American states, under an American chairman. This was entirely successful, and it is believed that the new Honduran Government, in spite of another flurry of revolution, will shortly assume power as the result of fair and popular elections. In Nicaragua, revolution has been averted largely because of the unswerving position of the United States. Since the establishment of the independent

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Republic of Panama there have been no diplomatic relations between Colombia and Panama, a dangerous situation. The earnest efforts of this Administration have brought the two countries together so that at last entirely friendly relations have been established. The long-standing controversy between the United States and Colombia has been terminated by a treaty. British cable lines have long held a monopoly in South America to the great detriment of American cable interests and of free and inexpensive communication. Because of the firm stand of the Department of State the doors of communication have been opened to the fair and free competition of all.

There have been many treaties negotiated and signed by various Latin American nations during the last four years with the assistance of this Government, all of them treaties which foster good understandings and therefore tend to make war almost impossible. The most important of these, the impulse towards which was given by Washington, is the treaty of arbitration signed by sixteen nations, which affords a splendid example for the nations of Europe. Latin America recognizes the family ties that bind together the nations of the American continent. The Administration has maintained the principles which make for peace and helpful progress in its open support of constitutional government in Mexico and elsewhere, in its successful endeavors to bring about arbitration of the ancient Tacna-Arica dispute between Peru and Chile, and in carrying through the far-reaching arbitration treaties of Central America. It has proved its altruism and its unselfishness by putting the Dominican Republic on its feet. What the Administration has done for the Dominican Republic it is doing for Haiti, and the withdrawal from Santo Domingo is proof, if any proof were necessary, that just as soon as Haiti can maintain a sound and just government the United States will withdraw from there as well.

The Republican policy toward Latin America has resulted in a spirit of coöperation, friendship, and peace in the Western Hemisphere which is quite new in history, and which has made the Americas a model for the Old World to emulate.

One Democratic attack must be answered both because it is quite unjustified, and because the subject of the attack happens to be an excellent example of the constructive policy of the Administration. The Democratic Platform says: "We condemn

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the Lausanne Treaty. It barters legitimate American rights and betrays Armenia for the Chester oil concession. We favor the protection of American rights in Turkey and the fulfilment of President Wilson's arbitral award respecting Armenia."

The United States was at no time at war with Turkey. Although there was sentiment for such a declaration, the Democratic Administration opposed it, even though the terrible Armenian deportations of 1915–1916 had already occurred. We could not, therefore, participate formally in the peace negotiations at Lausanne. American delegates were sent to that peace conference, however, to ensure recognition of the principles of equal opportunity, the upholding of the rights of Christian minorities, and the protection of American interests, particularly as regards our educational and philanthropic work. The Allies were negotiating with a new Turkey, conscious of nationality, free from the incubus of the old régime, with forward-looking institutions largely modeled on those of the United States. (Both the Sultanate and the Khalifate have been abolished and a republic established.)

It was obvious from the outset that this new Turkey would insist absolutely on the internal freedom which could only come from the abolition of the capitulations, and that it would refuse to establish an independent Armenia carved out, as was the plan, from Turkish territory in which the Armenians were a minority. In this connection it may also be well to point out that this particular plan for an independent Armenia has long since been dropped by responsible Armenian leaders. The only people who continue to urge it are propagandists in this country whose agitation results only in jeopardizing the safety of Armenians in Turkey. The American delegates at Lausanne were of the greatest assistance in causing stipulations to be included in the treaty of peace in which the Turkish Government guaranteed to the minorities civil and political rights, the free use of their languages and religion, and equal treatment under the law. The minority peoples were given precisely the same status as the Moslem Turks, and above all these rights were made a part of the fundamental law of the land. The minorities now hold a stronger position than ever before in Turkish history.

In the negotiation of the treaty between the United States and Turkey the American delegates at Lausanne could not ignore the treaty already negotiated by the Allies. America could not

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demand of Turkey a position of special privilege, since this would be contrary to American practice and would lead to dissension. Our capitulations, furthermore, rested fundamentally on the fact that the treaty of 1830 with Turkey, in giving us most-favored-nation treatment, only put us on an equality with other nations; that equality we maintain under the new treaty. The policy of the open door is fully recognized. As the report of the Foreign Policy Association on the treaty says: "It is difficult to ascertain upon what basis we could justly claim more."

Of especial popular interest is the welfare of the great American religious and educational institutions in Turkey. Political opponents of the treaty, therefore, have liked to assert that there has been a failure to secure the safety and continuance of these humanitarian enterprises. They forget that the representatives of these institutions in Turkey, who know best how they can be protected, have repeatedly urged the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. Further, the opponents of the treaty have overlooked or ignored the substantial safeguards which the treaty settlement provides. As Dr. Gates, President of Robert College, says: "It gives us the good-will of the Turks instead of their ill will." Dr. Barton, of the American Board of Missions, also strongly favors the treaty. Should Democratic opposition in the Senate bring about its ultimate rejection American humanitarian enterprise in Turkey would indeed face disaster.

There remains the criticism that America has deserted the minorities. We could have insisted on an independent Armenia only if we had been willing to send an army and navy to Anatolia to fight for it and to support it after the war, but no American is so blind as to believe that this would have been possible. A commission headed by General Harbord reported that an army of 250,000 men would be required. The Wilson arbitral award as to Armenia, furthermore, was rendered under the Treaty of Sévres, unratified by either the Allies or by Turkey and now a dead letter. Would the Democratic Party declare war against Turkey on this issue, even though contrary to world opinion and the opinion of the most intelligent Armenians as to what is best for their own people?

The Chester concession, of course, had not the remotest connection with any of these questions. It was not under consideration when the treaty was negotiated. The Department of State took no part whatever in securing it. It was a purely private

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enterprise and no questions have arisen in connection with it calling for action on the part of the Government. Neither during the Wilson Administration nor during the Harding and Coolidge Administrations, did the Department of State make any representations whatever concerning it to the Turkish Government. The criticism of the Administration in this regard is entirely without foundation.

The Republican Party believes that the foreign policy of the nation should be as American as its domestic policy. It recognizes the rights of an American citizen in India as well as in Indiana, and proposes to protect those rights so long as the citizen does nothing to forfeit them. It believes that by protecting legitimate American enterprise, by insisting on equality of treatment, it earns the respect of other nations and sets an example of fair dealing. It believes that America is high-minded, inspired by unselfish ideals, and seeks therefore to preserve American independence of action as our greatest asset for aiding other peoples. It knows the value of service to humanity and insists that the highroads and bypaths of this service shall be kept open the world over. It recognizes the just settlement of disputes and the avoidance of unnecessary causes of difference as the basis of good-will, and it knows that good-will is the only sure foundation of world peace.

The Republican Party subscribes to no quack remedies or panaceas. No conventions and covenants can remake human nature in a day. But strict justice, tempered with generosity and understanding, builds international confidence and reduces to a minimum the danger of the injustice which rouses human passions. Honest foreign policy must be farsighted, friendly, strong for the right but considerate for the weak, courageous, unselfish without weakness, consistently progressive. These, I believe, are the fundamental principles upon which the foreign policy of President Coolidge and of the Republican Party is built. Such a policy is the life breath of peace, and affords assurance of an America of constantly growing influence and helpfulness in world affairs.

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A PROGRESSIVE VIEW

By Robert Morss Lovett

IT IS historically characteristic of governments devoted to conservative measures and the maintenance of the *status quo* in domestic matters to develop an aggressive policy in foreign affairs, and similarly for governments whose chief outlook is toward the progressive improvement of existing conditions to seek to disembarrass themselves from the complications of foreign policy. Whether or not much weight should be attached to the popular interpretation of conservative policy as seeking to allay discontent at home by feeding national pride with triumphs abroad, there is an apparent relation between the amount of attention in a democracy which is directed to internal development and reform, and that which can be released to sustain an active interest in external relations. Thus the two great periods of internal development in the United States, one beginning with the administration of Jefferson and the other after the Civil War, were characterized by an indifference toward foreign affairs which yielded only to the aggressions of others. In England the liberal statesmen, Lord John Russell, Cobden, and Gladstone, minimized the interest in external relations, while the conservatives, Disraeli, Palmerston, and Salisbury, emphasized it.

It is natural therefore that the Progressive movement in the United States should be regarded as so deeply concerned with the domestic situation as to be comparatively indifferent to foreign policy, and that its leaders, partly, it is true, through their own utterances, should be considered the most pronounced of isolationists. As a matter of fact the platform of the Third Party devotes its final and longest plank to foreign policy, advocating a program which challenges the attention and thought of the public to an extent immeasurably greater than the conventional pronouncements of the older parties—a plank which, should the Progressives have an opportunity to carry it out in practice, would involve a complete break with the principles upon which the two preceding administrations have acted.

The plank headed Foreign Policy in the Progressive Platform is as follows:

We denounce the mercenary system of foreign policy under recent

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administrations in the interest of financial imperialists, oil monopolists, and international bankers, which has at times degraded our State Department from its high service as a strong and kindly intermediary of defenseless governments to a trading outpost of those interest and concession seekers engaged in the exploitation of weaker nations, as contrary to the will of the American people, destructive of domestic development and provocative of war. We favor an active foreign policy to bring about a revision of the Versailles Treaty in accordance with the terms of the armistice, and to promote firm treaty agreements with all nations to outlaw wars, abolish conscription, drastically reduce land, air, and naval armaments, and guarantee public referendums on peace and war.

There will be a disposition to discount this plank as lip-service to an ideal, as an effervescence of good-will which can by no means be reduced to a practical program, as a talking point for the campaign. On the contrary, it can be shown that this announcement is a characteristic feature of Progressive thought and that it has taken form under the same influences which have moulded the paragraphs which preceded it. As a preliminary consideration it must be recognized that the Progressive Platform is not a logical presentation of a political philosophy or comprehensive statement of a political program. Four years ago the attempt was made to build a new party upon a systematically drawn foundation. It failed. This year, as an alternative, the sponsors of a third party have been content to offer as the basis of their appeal to the country a concrete statement of the historical course of the movement. It is a pragmatic document which has grown out of experience, and has been formulated in respect to actual positions taken up and defended by Progressive leaders in labor organizations, in journalism, and in state and national assemblies. Particularly is it representative of the career and thought of Senator La Follette, whose service in point of time transcends that of any other Progressive. There are many omissions in the Third Party Platform, some of which seem inexcusable to advocates of the causes unrepresented. There are omissions in the program for foreign affairs. Where, one may ask, is any statement in regard to immigration and exclusion? In regard to the debts of the Allies? In regard to the Treaty of Lausanne or the recognition of Russia? On the whole, however, it must be said that the subjects touched upon in the platform are of most immediate and far-reaching concern to the United

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States and those which are most vitally connected historically with the development of Progressive opinion.

It will be seen that the plank is divided into two parts. The first sentence is a self-denying ordinance against imperialism and is in line with the historic position of Liberalism, the position of Cobden against Palmerston. It promises abstention from selfish and mischievous interference of the government, for the advantage of its own citizens, in the affairs of weaker countries. The fundamental evil against which the Progressive strikes is monopoly. Here is a form of monopoly peculiarly despicable which certain privileged classes enjoy, to some extent at the expense of their own countrymen but chiefly as a burden on the people of foreign and helpless lands. The extent to which this development of business imperialism has gone in recent years is quite unknown to most Americans. In the *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1924, Mr. S. G. Inman gives a summary of the situation with reference to the countries to the south of us. Of twenty Latin American republics only six are free from American interference in one form or another. In eleven countries this interference takes the form of official direction of financial policy, and in six this direction is backed by United States troops. Among the more flagrant cases of intervention may be cited Nicaragua, where since 1912 the United States has maintained, by a force of marines, a government opposed by 80 percent of the Nicaraguans but favorable to the American banking house which collects the customs and owns the national bank and railroad. Worse than this is the plight of Haiti, where the United States marines uphold a government chosen under their supervision, where an American financial advisor collects customs and makes loans guaranteed by the United States, where the constitution has been rewritten to permit United States corporations to hold land, and where in Mr. Wilson's administration some 3,000 Haitians were put to death by United States marines. In regard to China, the historic American policy of disinterested benevolence has been succeeded by one of selfish assertion marked by Mr. Hughes' recent note to Peking on the disposition of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In other parts of the world, notably Persia, Turkey, and the East Indies, the State Department is no longer the promoter of a general and wholesome good-will, but the guardian of special financial interests.

This mercenary foreign policy, as in the case of Great Britain,

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began when American capital sought investment beyond the sea. The distinction between the effect of commercial exchange of goods and export of capital was long ago pointed out by Cobden. It is to the advantage of a trader to have his customer prosperous, while to the banker or loan shark the bankruptcy of his client may be his most profitable transaction. The appearance of the United States in the rôle of an empire dates from the Spanish War. Then followed the fomenting of the revolution in Panama and the taking of the Canal Zone. But these overt acts were less obnoxious than the process of insidious penetration and infiltration in other countries which since 1912 has gone on, with characteristic stealth under the Wilson Administration, with cynical avowal under Hughes. The difference between the Third Party movement of 1912 and that of today is at no point more striking than in the attitudes respectively taken toward the question of imperialism. The Progressives of 1912 blindly followed Roosevelt in his defense of a predatory policy of which he was one of the conspicuous exponents. But during the next four years the Progressives awoke. Wilson's bullying attitude toward Mexico, the bombardment of Vera Cruz, and the punitive expedition in pursuit of Villa were targets for their attack. When information in regard to the occupation of Haiti began to leak out the Progressives forced investigation in the Senate. The *Nation* made a vigorous campaign of publicity, and under its auspices was formed the Haiti-Santo-Domingo Independence Society which conducted the case for the oppressed islanders. To Senator Borah belongs the chief credit for forcing the Haitian situation on the attention of a reluctant Senate. Our relations with Mexico and Nicaragua have been especially the charge of Senator La Follette. In March, 1916, he introduced into the Senate a resolution approving Pershing's expedition in pursuit of Villa in terms which restricted the use of force to that single end, and declared the intention of the United States in no way to encroach upon the sovereignty of Mexico. This self-denying ordinance had the same effect as the famous Platt amendment in regard to Cuba, and it was this aspect, doubtless, which led to a vigorous denunciation of it by Senator Albert B. Fall. In July, 1921, Senator La Follette introduced a resolution forbidding the use of American troops in Mexico without the express authority of Congress. In July, 1919, he introduced a resolution inquiring of the State Department why our protected republic of Nicaragua

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was permitted to invade Costa Rica, and why the latter was not permitted to sign the covenant of the League of Nations.

Imperialism is an issue which belongs to the Progressives by peculiar right. Both Democratic and Republican Platforms are entirely silent on the subject. The Progressives recognize it as a moral issue. In the words of Mr. Inman: "Our North American Christian civilization will find its final test in the way we treat our next-door neighbors. We are piling up hatreds, suspicions, records of exploitation and destruction of sovereignty in Latin America such as have never failed in all history to react in wars, suffering, and defeat of high moral and spiritual ideals." The Progressives recognize it also as a political issue. They see the actual and potential embarrassments which affect the realization of the domestic program of the British Labor Party in the face of the situation in India, South Africa, and Egypt, and they are resolved to deal with similar difficulties in good time. They realize that the worst of foreign entanglements—more dangerous than alliances—are those imperial commitments which put the national honor in pawn to selfish interests. If Mr. La Follette is elected President, and only in that event, shall we have an honest effort to treat our neighbors and other weaker countries in a spirit of absolute fairness and good faith, with no taint of selfishness or the influence of privileged individuals or special interests.

The portion of the plank already discussed refers chiefly to the relations of the United States with the Western Hemisphere and Asia; the remainder has reference to Europe. It pledges the United States to seek a revision of the political and financial provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, "in accordance with the terms of the armistice"; and to promote "firm treaty agreements with all nations to outlaw wars, abolish conscription, drastically reduce land, air and naval armaments, and guarantee public referendums on peace and war." Like the first part of the plank this second sentence is a considered formulation of the thought of Progressives and a crystallization of their opinion in regard to the responsibility and function of the United States in the situation growing out of its participation in the World War. It must be read with this background in mind.

During the war those who now call themselves Progressives occupied widely different positions, ranging from that of the conscientious objector against all war to the advocate of military

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participation by the United States in this war, in the hope that it might be the last. On the whole the Progressives held a more detached attitude and professed less illusion in regard to the origin of the war, the character of our associates, and the reason for our participation than either of the two regular parties. After the war, opinion among Progressives tended to move in one direction until it was unified by the Treaty of Versailles. There are some who would accept the Covenant of the League of Nations as a pitiful salvage of their hopes and a salve to their consciences, but the Treaty as a whole they recognize as an instrument of dishonor and destruction, a crime gratuitously added to the crime of the war.

The Progressive Platform calls for a revision of the Treaty of Versailles, first of all because it rests upon the falsehood that Germany is solely responsible for the war and should bear alone the burden of war guilt. The first clause of the treaty which contains this statement is, as Mr. Lloyd George has pointed out, the fundamental hypothesis underlying the whole structure, the major premise from which the various conclusions are drawn. The Platform further recognizes that the treaty is in substantial variation from the pre-armistice agreement on which Germany surrendered. This agreement specifically limited the sums for which Germany was liable to damage done to civilians and their property by land, sea, or the air, and was designed to exclude payments for pensions and other claims approximating the total cost of the war. In respect to the financial clauses of the Treaty, revision is already foreseen through the medium of the Dawes Report. This plan will probably never operate to bring large reparations payments. The time for such fruitful husbandry of German resources has passed. The goose, potential layer of golden eggs, is already dead. It may be hoped, however, that the plan will work successfully to break the endless chain by which political pressure and occupation of territory automatically follow financial default on the part of Germany. But certain territorial clauses of the treaty are no less in violation of the pre-armistice agreement into which were specifically read the Fourteen Points promulgated by President Wilson with their stipulations in regard to annexations and transfers of territory. Some of these provisions, such as those with reference to the Polish corridor and Danzig, the Sarre Valley, the granting of a large part of the Austrian Tyrol to Italy and of Upper Silesia to

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Poland are, quite apart from reference to the pre-armistice agreement, in their nature so unjust and inexpedient that it is impossible to believe that they will not remain a cause of unrest in Europe until they are changed.

It is somewhat surprising to find the Progressives, who of the three political groups engaged in the present contest were most skeptical in regard to the participation of the United States in the war and least concerned in its results, the only party which accepts the responsibility of the United States for those results. Yet of that responsibility there can be no intelligent doubt. Apart from the general fact that the United States lent its military and industrial force to the Allies for purposes categorically defined, there is the specific fact that the pre-armistice agreement which recognized those purposes was negotiated through the intermediation of the President. There is the further circumstance that representatives of this country took a leading part in drawing up the Treaty, and in some cases contributed largely toward formulating the provisions which are most obnoxious. The United States bore its part in continuing the economic pressure upon Germany, after the armistice, which forced that country to assent formally to terms which were not only unjust and degrading but impossible of fulfilment. It has been plausibly argued that the signature of the German commissioners at Versailles was due to the stipulated representation of the United States on the Reparation Commission. The fact that the constitution of this country made it possible for a political quarrel to prevent ratification and ultimately to enable us to secure the advantages of the Treaty of Versailles without committing ourselves to its enforcement, is a waiver of legal but not of moral responsibility. The Progressives were in general opposed to the ratification of the Treaty. The chief argument for such ratification was that by remaining in coöperation with the associated nations we should be able to contribute in the end to the purposes which we accepted as justification for the war, and to the pacification of Europe. The Progressives for the most part did not believe this. They accept, however, the responsibility for these objects, and the obligation to employ to these ends the strategy of the position which the United States has, in the course of events, assumed.

It will be argued, of course, that revision of the Treaty of Versailles is entirely a matter for the nations which signed it,

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one upon which the opinion of the United States can be at best merely academic. On the other hand it may be replied that, quite apart from any special concern in view of the origin of the document, this country has in common with the neutrals of the late war an interest in a settlement so subversive of the principles upon which peace can be maintained, so obnoxious to the revival of prosperity throughout the world. It is clear that the Progressive group now in Congress, from whose experience the present platform is so largely drawn, has become increasingly awake to the relation between the economic welfare of this country and that of Europe. Such considerations may be depended on to give reality to what might otherwise seem a gesture in the air. And if it is further argued that the revision of the Treaty is incredible in view of the multitude of interests which it has created, it may be further replied that the Treaty is now undergoing revision. It has been revised in favor of France; it is being revised in favor of Germany. The force of political gravitation is all against its permanence. We may join with Mr. Roland W. Boyden in the opinion which he has expressed in the June issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS: "Germany, again for her own sake, ought voluntarily to pledge herself to abide by the territorial results of the treaty except as they may in the future be changed by peaceful negotiations with the Allies." But something more is needed to save the situation than pious hope. The Progressive Platform, it may be asserted, is the only one which recognizes the realities of the situation and promises coöperation to secure by peaceful means the results that Mr. Boyden envisages. Should Senator La Follette be elected to the Presidency, his Secretary of State, instead of gumshoeing about London, Paris, and Berlin, offering (we may hope) wise counsel and exercising (we may pray) a wholesome influence, always with an eye cocked toward the bedside of Senator Lodge, will raise in the open court of the world the question of revising the Treaty of Versailles by peaceful conference before it is shot to pieces by the cannon of the next war.

The last words of the plank cover the ground occupied by such arrangements, actual or proposed, as the League of Nations, the Permanent World Court of Justice, the Draft Treaty of Disarmament and Security, and the undertakings of the Washington Conference. Toward these various enterprises Progressives maintain a skeptical and watchful attitude. Not all of them are

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opposed to these measures, and all of them are in sympathy with the ends sought. In general they believe that these pieces of machinery are valuable only when given viability by the force of good-will, and they would take account of the motive power before constructing the engine. Toward the accumulation and releasing of this power in the world, they hold that the United States beyond all other nations is bound to contribute.

At this point there is a clear difference in emphasis between the political philosophy underlying the Progressive Platform and that of many honest liberals. The effort to set up the machinery of coöperation among nations, such as the League of Nations and the Permanent World Court of Justice, depends upon an extension of international law. Now the only kind of international law which is valid for the purpose is analagous to that natural law which individuals have learned to obey because the breaking of it brings swift decline to society and disaster to themselves. The law "thou shalt not kill" has thus come to prevail among the individuals of a civilized state. It does not prevail among nations because our national mind still finds advantage in killing men of other nations and is heedless of the disadvantages to ourselves. International law, as understood today, has little to do with natural right and is largely a mere codification of customs and ceremonies, like the so-called laws of war. Not until nations have advanced in dealing with one another to the point where natural right, so far as it can be perceived, outweighs the immediate temptation of selfish advantage, can we look with hope to the machinery of international organization. This matter is admirably discussed by Mr. Jackson Ralston in his volume "Democracy's International Law," wherein he points out the fallacy involved in the parallel often drawn between the proposed organization of the world and that of the United States. "American peace," he says, "is not due to the fact that we have a common executive, a Congress, and a Supreme Court, useful as all of these instruments may be. It exists because any citizen of the United States equally with any other citizen has a right in perfect freedom to pass state borders with all his family and property; to import and export from place to place within the limits of the United States any sort of property he pleases without hindrance from any state authority; to gain access to and from the seas without any local interference whatsoever." It is often urged that the proposed international arrangements—

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leagues, courts, conferences, and the like—are steps in the right direction. Senator La Follette has a passage in his autobiography discussing the difference between himself and Roosevelt which is in point here. "He (Roosevelt) acted upon the maxim that half a loaf is better than no bread. I believe that half a loaf is fatal whenever it is accepted at the sacrifice of the basic principle sought to be attained. . . . A half-way measure never fairly tests the principle and many utterly discredit it." It is for this reason that the Progressive Platform as a basis for international arrangements at this time emphasizes contract rather than law, treaties rather than leagues and courts which at present can obtain their powers only through such treaties.

In regard to the specific enterprises mentioned the attitude of Senator La Follette is doubtless more critical than that of many of his followers. Nevertheless he represents their spirit. On November 19, 1919, when the Treaty of Versailles was first before the Senate for ratification, he supported Senator Owen's resolution providing that the Fourteen Points should be binding in its execution. This resolution was defeated. Subsequently he proposed six reservations. They were (1) to exempt the United States from any obligation under Article X of the Covenant to give aid in putting down movements to change the sovereignty of subject peoples, Ireland, India, Egypt, Korea, etc.; (2) to provide for its withdrawal from the League of Nations within a year unless conscription were abolished by all members; (3) to provide for similar withdrawal unless the League adopted the referendum of the peoples in regard to entering war; (4) to require general reduction of military and naval establishments; (5) to provide for withdrawal in case a member nation attempted to seize the territory of a non-member state; (6) to provide for withdrawal in case a member nation exercising a mandate over any country attempted to appropriate to itself the resources of that country. Roughly and hastily drawn as these reservations are they are expressive of the Progressive attitude toward world problems. (*a*) There is the duty toward weaker nations whose rights have been so unscrupulously invaded by imperialism, so imperfectly safeguarded by the mandate system of the League of Nations. (*b*) There is the direct summons to the good-will of the world to declare itself by abolishing conscription, by reducing armaments and by adopting the referendum on war.

As to the first it will be urged that the Progressive position

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fails to take account of practical considerations in a world still controlled by the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest. On this point Senator La Follette continues the high tradition of English political thought which began with Edmund Burke. His opposition to the Four Power Treaty negotiated at the Washington Conference was based on this regard for the rights of the weaker. "If we ratify this treaty," he said in the Senate on March 23, 1922, "it means that we deliberately take our place with Japan, and Great Britain, and the imperialists of France in order to profit by the misfortunes of Germany, Russia, and China."

As to the second, it will be asserted that the Progressive Platform is too vague in the absence of specifically defined means to be taken very seriously. It is, however, the clear purpose of the Progressives to bind themselves by "an active foreign policy" to attain so far as they can the object of world peace. If they are accused of vague idealism can it be said that the realism represented by the other parties is more practical? On the subject of disarmament the Republican Platform advocates the calling of a "conference on the limitation of land forces, the use of submarines and poison gas"; but in another part of the same document we read the uncompromising declaration: "There must be no further weakening of our regular army and we advocate appropriations sufficient to provide training for all members of the National Guard, the citizens military training camps and the reserves who may offer themselves for service. We pledge ourselves to round out and to maintain the navy *to the full strength provided the United States by the letter and spirit of the limitation of armaments conference*" (italics mine). The emphasis of this declaration cannot be misunderstood: The army and navy forever! Similarly the Democratic Platform, apparently legislating for the world: "We demand a strict and sweeping reduction of armaments by land and sea so that there shall be no competitive military program or naval building," but adds for home consumption: "Until agreements to this end have been made we advocate an army and navy adequate for our national safety." Again on the subject of referendum for war the same document asserts with what, except for its general level of intelligence, might pass for irony: "Those who furnish the blood and bear the burden imposed by war should *whenever possible* (italics mine) be consulted before the supreme sacrifice is demanded of them."

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In contrast to these cautious and hedging declarations, designed to catch voters coming and going, this at least of actuality the Progressive Platform has—it means what it says. No one can doubt that in event of Senator La Follette's election he will make it the object of "an active foreign policy" to achieve the ends specified. His whole record points that way. And this further element of actuality the Progressive program has—a willingness to bear the cost and take the risk of the first steps. Everyone remembers how the Washington Conference opened in a dawn of promise due to the surprising and unexpected declaration of Secretary Hughes committing his own country first of all to a positive if meagre renunciation. The Progressives are ready to do business on this basis. As their faith in the rights of small nations and backward peoples to choose their own modes of life and enjoy their own resources submits itself instantly to the test of withdrawing the support of their government from private enterprise hostile to these rights, and relinquishing the way of economic imperialism, so their belief in the ultimate dependence of humanity on its own good-will, will prompt them to stimulate good-will by example as well as precept. If Mr. La Follette is elected President we may expect to see his foreign policy directed to promote the pacification and prosperity of the world without subtraction or reservation in favor of the special interests of the United States,—generously and whole-heartedly and patriotically, in the conviction that our own peace and welfare are bound up with those of other nations and that we are strong enough to act on that principle.

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ISLAM AND TURKISH NATIONALISM

By Snouck Hurgronje

THE latest news from Angora, Constantinople, and Arabia brings with it a deluge of impressions and forecasts. Within a few months the last Ottoman Sultan-Khalif, Wahiduddin Mehmed VI, has had to flee from Turkey, first to Mecca, then to San Remo, to meditate on the instability of worldly glory; his cousin Abdulmejid, appointed to the henceforth barely "spiritual" Khalifate, was forced to abdicate and to emigrate with his family to Switzerland; Husein, Grand-Sherif of Mecca, for the last eight years independent King of Western Arabia, acquiesced to his being proclaimed Khalif in Transjordania and perhaps in some other parts; and demonstrations against all these decisions took place in Egypt, India, and other places. It is no wonder that the public is anxious to know what is to become of the Muslim world after all these amazing events.

THE KHALIF NOT THE SPIRITUAL HEAD OF ISLAM

In opposition to the common error that the Khalif is the spiritual head of the Mohammedans, a sort of Muslim pope, let it be remembered that the Muslim community (or the Mohammedan church, to express it in a Western manner) has had but one spiritual head in the good thirteen centuries of its existence: that was Mohammed, the Prophet, God's Apostle, who transmitted the revelations wherefrom the believers derived all that was necessary for the regulation of their lives and thoughts according to Allah's will. Besides being the instrument for the transmission of these oracles, Mohammed as a matter of course became at the same time the authentic interpreter of Allah's words. As this interpretation expanded and grew into completion, the Apostle of God was indeed the spiritual head of his community.

Nowhere in the Qoranic revelations is there trace of a provision being made for the assumption of one of the above functions by another at Mohammed's death. Apart from Mohammed's having had predecessors who had accomplished a similar task among other peoples, his work was considered as essentially connected with and limited to his person. This conception so strongly dominated the thoughts of his community in

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its beginnings that for a couple of centuries they imagined, almost against better judgment, that their whole life was exclusively controlled by the words of God, as collected in the Qoran, and by the sayings and exemplary actions of the Prophet. Judged on the merits of the case, this notion was entirely erroneous, for it did not take into account the great evolution, extending even to the fields of dogma and law, which was brought about by the astoundingly rapid spread of Islam over many lands. If one will compare the system of Islam as it had developed three centuries after the death of Mohammed, with the Qoran, one has the impression of meeting a full-grown man who was last seen in the cradle.

Seeing no lawful way to recognize any authority but that of God and His Apostle, the first generations of Mohammedans found themselves in difficulties which were at first evaded by an artificial and unhistorical extension of the traditions concerning Mohammed's words and deeds. In the first two centuries there was practically no other path to the solution of an urgent new problem than that it be clothed in the form of a narrative about Mohammed. Thousands of sayings and actions were attributed to him just to serve as the foundation for regulations and decisions which later appeared necessary. Thus the main part of the canonical tradition concerning Mohammed is fictitious. Having, during his lifetime, exercised the functions of Apostle of God and spiritual head of his community, he continued for a long time after his death to exercise this last-named function in the imagination of his followers.

But the time came when this procedure was no longer possible. The mass of fictitious traditions could not be augmented without limit, and after two centuries the character of the unsolved problems which still presented themselves no longer permitted the fiction that Mohammed had known and solved them. The canonical tradition was now indeed sufficient to cover the greatest part of a solid system of dogmatics and law that, according to a critical point of view, was the creation of the Mohammedan community, and this system left ever less room for important development or modification. But it was not yet wholly crystallized; the evolution of society and state again and again necessitated revision of application or interpretation. Yes, a close scrutiny of the legislative and dogmatic structure built in the course of two or three centuries could not fail to reveal even to

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Mohammedan scholars without high critical faculties that not all the materials used derived their origin from Mohammed. There began to be felt the need of a trustworthy organ, which lived and remained alive, and which could be consulted at any time on all important questions.

This need sought and has found satisfaction, not in the designation of a person or a special body to continue the work of Mohammed, but in the acceptance of the doctrine of the infallibility of the Mohammedan community in its entirety. This doctrine finally became the foundation of the whole system. The scholars whom public opinion designated as authoritative served as the spokesmen of this infallible church. Any Mohammedan who wants to know may easily ascertain which out of the works of earlier scholars time has found trustworthy and reliable, and whom out of the living doctors he may confidently consult on matters of belief and law. This authority, however, has never been concentrated in a definite body, council or synod, and still less in a single person. Theoretically it has ever been almost intangible; practically one may easily meet with its representatives. It goes without saying that its edicts are not always and everywhere identical. Difference of opinion between the composing elements of the infallible whole is expressly permitted, nay accepted as a blessing of God.

The above account of some main facts in the history of the doctrine of principles in Islam may serve to make it clear that since the death of Mohammed there has never been room in Islam for a spiritual head, able to proclaim or to explain dogma or to interpret and complete the divine law, or for one which could regulate human life in its fullest sense. It is therefore absolutely erroneous to consider the Khalif as the spiritual head of the Mohammedans.

THE KHALIFATE A POLITICAL INSTITUTION

Nevertheless Khalif (or rather, Khalifat Rasul Allah) means nothing more nor less than successor, lieutenant of the Apostle of God. Besides being the mouthpiece of God and the authentic interpreter of the revelations, Mohammed was, in the second period of his prophetic activity,—after his migration to Medina —ruler, judge, and commander-in-chief of the army of his state. It is only in these functions that he had successors, who were indeed addressed as commander of the faithful (*amir al-mu'minin*),

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and later also by the name of *imam* (leader). The Khalifate was born immediately after Mohammed's death out of the press of political circumstances. In the beginning there was some hesitation: neither a word of Allah nor a disposition of His Apostle decided that the political unity of the community after Mohammed should continue under one head. But particularistic inclinations were speedily silenced, for all saw that the young state, without an energetic government fully conscious of its aim, would perish in a short time. The prominent men in Medina decided at once that those of Mohammed's functions which could be exercised by others should continue united in one person, and this decision, as well as their designation of the first Khalif and their definition of his task, they enforced upon the mass of the faithful.

The Muslim community has never had reason to regret this hasty decision. The victory of Muslim arms over the Arabs who revolted against the central government or who had not yet been made subject to Mohammed; the conquest, shortly afterwards undertaken, of the Persian and other important parts of the Byzantine empire; the creation of an enormous world-empire on the simple foundations laid by Mohammed; all that would have been unthinkable without the Khalifate. Islam honored its Khalifs as the authors and preservers of its military glory and of its political power.

This does not tend to deny that the Khalifate was intimately connected with religion. The Mohammedan community is religious in origin and in nature. It was the task of the Khalif to maintain the Law of God within Islam, at the same time seeking to extend the boundaries of the empire of God as much as possible. But even to the first four Khalifs, whose thirty-year reign Muslim historians have intensely idealized, and who, in opposition to their successors, are represented as saintly models of Muslim piety, even to these no legislative power nor personal authority as interpreters of law has been conceded. There is no more evident proof of the political character of the office than the fact that after those golden thirty years the Omayyads, the representatives of the old Meccan aristocracy, could have themselves been recognized as Khalifs, and that the son of Mohammed's most stubborn enemy (Moawiya, the son of Abu Sofyan) because of his political talents proved the logical man to become the successor of God's Apostle—in his functions, of

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course, as chief of the state and of the army, the "commander of the faithful." From that time on the Khalifate, which thus far could be compared with the presidency of a theocratic republic, became something like a constitutional monarchy, whose throne was occupied for ninety years by members of the same family.

Damascus, the Omayyad capital, was in those years the center of an Arabic-Mohammedan realm whose political ideal was the gradual subjection of all mankind. The Omayyads, however, had not gained the supreme power in the state without encountering resistance. From the beginning they had to combat the open and secret opposition of competitors, and although all of these were Arabs, at the time of the formation of their political parties the interests of peoples of other race, subjected by Islam, already demanded recognition. In the political strife, which was very often carried on with religious slogans but which actually was a struggle for the supreme power, the Omayyads in 750 A.D. had to give way to the Abbasids (the descendants of Mohammed's uncle Abbas) who then resided as Khalifs in Bagdad for five centuries. Resided, that is, not ruled; for after a short time the instruments of government at their disposal proved insufficient to preserve the political unity of an empire extending from Spain in the west to Central Asia in the east.

Even if we leave aside, for purposes of brevity, the schismatic movements which gave rise to the foundation of heretical Khalifates, there still would remain a long story to be told of dismemberment of the empire of Islam into numerous states, politically independent, sometimes even hostile to one another, though most of them, in deference to tradition, continued to pay homage to the Abbasid Khalifate. One century only after the appearance of the Abbasids the political unity of Islam had vanished forever. Even at Bagdad the actual power fell into the hands of generals, and afterwards of sultans, who did not abolish the Khalifate but condemned it to inactivity, leaving to it only its exterior glamor.

Two centuries and a half after its birth the Khalifate had become utterly powerless: a monumental symbol of the political unity of Islam which had existed for a short time and the future revival of which was the hope of some, although it was soon conceded that such a revival could only occur by miracle.

Thus, when in 1258 the Mongol storm destroyed Bagdad and put out of the way the accessible members of the Abbasid family,

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this was a bewildering event for the central dominions of Islam, but to the Muslim world it was not an irreparable blow; spiritual interests suffered no damage. Islam had not possessed a single, general spiritual leader since Mohammed's death in 632. The ever-increasing number of spiritual leaders who, intending simply to interpret the law and the dogma, actually determined the development of these norms, had continued their labor during all those centuries in spite of political changes, revolutions and misfortunes, guided by a common catholic instinct but without organization or central direction; and the downfall of the Khalifate disturbed them not at all.

The functions for which the Khalifate had been called into existence had in the thirteenth century passed on to the rulers of the different Mohammedan states, or were no longer exercised. Soon after the gigantic assault of the first hundred years, the project of world-conquest has been laid aside and further served only to determine the attitude of the Muslims toward the outside world and to hinder their coöperation with other communities. The scholars, who together represented the infallible Mohammedan church, generally were distrustful of, if not actually hostile toward, the state authorities, and they expressed their disapproving criticism, *a.o.*, in a tradition which made the Prophet say that only the first four Khalifs bore their title with full right.

It may be said that from the middle of the thirteenth until the middle of the sixteenth centuries Islam did without a Khalif, and even that the majority of the Mohammedans did not so much as notice the lack. Egypt was an exception, but in appearance only. Even accepting the genuineness of the genealogy of the prince who took refuge there, declaring himself an Abbasid escaped from the massacre of Bagdad, we cannot consider his elevation by the slave-sultans of the Nile valley to the dignity of Khalif as anything more nor less than an idle show. A famous Muslim historian has well said that whereas the later Khalifs of Bagdad were at least still able to keep up the appearance of power, the Khalifs who had their seat in Cairo possessed such appearance no longer, but bore the bare name. Although it happened now and then that a Muslim prince deemed it worth the trouble to get for himself a diploma of investiture from such an Egyptian sham Khalif, in general their existence was almost ignored. They mainly served to lend a certain splendor of

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nobility to a dynasty whose members climbed from slavery, through the army, to the throne.

Thus, according to the criterion of the least politically-minded doctors of Islam, the Khalifate lived no more than thirty years. Those who valued facts above theory reckoned this life at two or three centuries, followed by three or four centuries of apparent existence. Without the political unity of the earlier time and without the boundlessly ambitious political program with which Islam began, the Khalifate had indeed lost its *raison d'être*.

Be that as it may, in the course of the sixteenth century the Khalifate showed new signs of life,—not to fulfil a need felt by the Mohammedan world, but because a glorious newly-risen dynasty could not resist the temptation to adorn itself with the highest title ever known amongst Muslims after that of Apostle of God, a title reminiscent more than any other of the grandiose political past of Islam and at the same time firing anew the never entirely extinguished political aspirations of bygone days.

THE OTTOMAN SULTANS AS KHALIFS

According to a false tradition, still current in European literature, the Ottoman conqueror of Egypt, Selim I, in 1517 persuaded the last Abbasid Khalif, whom he found at Cairo, to give over to him his title for the payment of an indemnity. This error is traceable to that in general most meritorious work of the Armenian author d'Ohsson, "Tableau Général de l'Empire Othoman," published at Paris in 1788. Now it is true that, practically speaking, the succession in the Khalifate has often taken place with great deviation from the rules laid down in the law of Islam; but never has this highest office of the original Muslim state been degraded into forming an object of sale. In fact, however, the Ottoman Sultans have shown a great deal of indifference toward the empty title borne by the Abbasids residing in Cairo. They allowed that mock Khalifate to continue its existence until it died a natural death in 1543. Even then they were in no hurry to add that to the many and illustrious titles with which they used to deck themselves out. They had serious reasons for this indifference.

Claims of Turkish Sultans to the title of Khalif were more than susceptible of well-founded challenge. Never before, neither in the years when the genuine Khalifs made Islam into a world-power, nor during the centuries when the powerless Khalifs

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hovered above the Muslim Sultans, had other than Arabs from the tribe of Qoraish been candidates for the Khalifate. This historical fact had even been made a political dogma long before the Turks played a rôle on the Mohammedan stage by means of a tradition attributing to Mohammed the words "The *imams* are from Qoraish." In fact, since the Khalifs had lost all influence, court-poets and other flatterers of princes used liberally to adorn the objects of their praise with this epithet, and after the downfall of the Bagdad Khalifate even Indonesian petty rulers assumed the title; all of which was taken seriously by no one and was only one more indication that the genuine Khalifate had been relegated to history. Quite naturally the Ottomans, being the last Muslim rulers who extended the dominions of Islam by force, were also called by their panegyrists Khalifs of God's Apostle, or even of God himself, but this added little to their glory and nothing to their authority. As far as we know, the Sultans never issued a decree by which they adopted the title officially. There was, however, no lack of obliging doctors who removed the legal objections to a Turkish Khalifate.

The requisites demanded of candidates for the Khalifate as given by the authorities on Mohammedan political law ignore human limitations. A Muslim without blame, perfectly sound in body and mind, equipped with all the qualities and capabilities which make up the perfect ruler, judge, and general,—these are only a few of the conditions considered necessary by the *Shari'ah* (Sacred Law) for him who is to occupy the Khalifate. Let us consider further but two out of the long list. First, the Khalif must be a descendant from Qoraish; and second, he must have at his disposal the instruments of power necessary to make good his authority.

Now the whole Muslim law, as the doctors have explained it in the course of time, is mainly an ideal. Therefore the scholars are of the opinion that its application grows more and more impossible, as human society is deteriorating morally. Applying this principle to their doctrine of the Khalifate, they arrive at the conclusion that only the first four Khalifs have fulfilled all conditions, and that the later occupants of this office became worse and worse. They teach, then, that also in this field one has to acquiesce in the inevitable and be content with what material is at hand. In fact they make so many concessions that little is left of that amazing list of original requirements. But

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the greatest difficulty comes in connection with the two items referred to above,—that he be a descendant from the tribe to which Mohammed belonged, and have at his disposal the necessary instruments of power.

In the twelfth century the question of descent did not as yet cause great difficulty because the first four Khalifs, the Omayyads and the Abbasids, did indeed all belong to the tribe of Qoraish. This requirement was, however, the only one wherein concession seemed impossible; one either was a Qoraishite or was not a Qoraishite, and there was no question of degree. The scholars who undertook to defend the claims of Turkish Sultans to the Khalifate have therefore laid all possible emphasis on the possession of the instruments of power. They argued that the Muslim ruler proving himself more able than others to make his authority recognized by the adherents of Islam as well as by its opponents, was, whatever his descent, the only person worthy of bearing the sacred title which essentially belonged to the Mohammedan world-conquerors.

Without showing an exaggerated appreciation of this title, which could do nothing to remedy the dismemberment of the Muslim community, and which was unable to bring even orthodox Mohammedan princes of Central Asia, India, North Africa, etc., under the sway of the title-bearer, the Turkish Sultans, after the family of the sham Khalifs of Cairo had died out, took pleasure in the flattery and accepted the sacred name. Indeed it did not appear one bit sillier than so many of the inherited titles of European princes, and at that time would not have appeared to better advantage if possessed by any other Muslim prince than the Sultan of Constantinople, who was unequalled in political and military activity.

This ornament did not acquire positive value for the Ottomans until in 1774 their power, especially in Europe, began to decline and the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire commenced. In the west there was often quite an erroneous conception of the character of the Khalifate. It was believed that it represented spiritual authority in distinction from worldly power. The Khalif was in fact considered the Pope of Mohammedanism. The only point of truth in this idea was that after the disintegration of the Muslim empire the Khalifs had gradually lost all worldly authority. The splendor which surrounded them, however, especially in Bagdad until 1258, suggested the

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error that they must be clad with the highest spiritual authority. Now after the assumption of the title by the Turkish Sultans this false conception led to the conclusion that henceforth with the worldly power which they possessed in common with other Muslim rulers they combined the spiritual authority which was to be represented by one person only. It escaped the attention of European statesmen that by assuming the title of Khalif the Ottoman Sultans actually called themselves lords of all Mohammedans, monarchs of all Muslim dominions.

With the political decline of the Ottoman Empire the above-mentioned misconception did brilliant service. When a Turkish Sultan had to cede a part of his territory, inhabited by Mohammedans, then such a cession meant not only a loss for the ruler, but an intolerable injury to any Sultan who called himself Khalif. It was commonly thought among Mohammedans that no true Khalif would ever assent to such a thing. From 1774, when the first treaty of peace implying such a cession was concluded with Russia, appearances were saved by granting to the Khalif continued spiritual authority over the inhabitants of the ceded territory. This authority was in such cases either quite imaginary, or it consisted in a purely formal confirmation of appointments made by the new lords of the country to offices closely connected with the canonical law of Islam, such as that of *qadhi* or of *mufti*. In the ears of the Sultan's subjects, however, the maintenance of his authority as a Khalif meant nothing more nor less than his continued recognition as the ruler, however limited—temporarily, they hoped—his authority might be in certain respects.

Apart from this welcome means of glossing over such inevitable political humiliations, the western misconception of the Khalifate has procured still other advantage to the Ottoman Sultans of recent times. Were they clad with spiritual authority, then might they in a friendly way call non-Mohammedan governments to account for the manner in which they treated their Mohammedan subjects, a proceeding which otherwise would have been considered impudent. On the other hand, Mohammedans under non-Mohammedan rule now felt authorized to appeal in certain events to the Sultan-Khalifs. To them such an appeal took the character of a complaint to their real ruler concerning actions of their temporary oppressors. The Turkish Government could free such a measure from its odium by

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apparently taking up the point of view of the western statesmen.

The Pan-Islamic policy developed under the auspices of Sultan Abdul Hamid (1876–1909) was highly favored by this current error. The British now and then boasted to the Mohammedans in India of their friendship with the "spiritual head of Islam." The Germans tried during the World War to unchain, under the same false banner, Muslim fanaticism against their enemies. All such misconceptions have certainly not furthered political understanding between the adherents of Islam and the rest of mankind. At last even in Turkish circles, where the intellectual influence of Europe has made itself felt, confusion has arisen concerning the Khalifate.

During recent centuries a thorough knowledge of the history of Islam and of Mohammedan peoples has become rare in the Muslim world. This is only one of the many symptoms of its retrogression since the Middle Ages. In 1908 I met in leading Turkish circles at Constantinople persons who asserted in full earnestness that the sherifate of Mecca—a local princedom born out of the political confusion of the twelfth century and finally brought under Turkish sovereignty—was a religious institution inseparable from Islam; and they were unwilling to give up this evident error. Why should not others have adopted the western conception of the Khalif-Pope with the same stubborn simplicity?

This question presents itself to our mind quite spontaneously in view of what happened at Angora in November, 1922, when the National Assembly assumed the Sultanate, *i.e.*, all government functions, and conferred a "spiritual" Khalifate on the prince-painter Abdul Mejid, who seemed to be the nearest claimant after the flight of the last Sultan-Khalif Wahiduddin Mehmed VI. It is difficult to distinguish between the parts played by simplicity and by cunning in this ridiculous distribution of rôles. This Turkish mock Khalifate had from its birth even less importance than that of the Abbasids, instituted by the slave Sultans of Egypt in the thirteenth century. The Egyptian Khalifate was at least in the same capital as the real retainers of power; it was carried on in a blaze of magnificence, and every new Sultan let himself be crowned by the Khalif. To the last Ottoman Khalif, however, even such a show was not left, and neither he nor the National Assembly made any effort to produce the impression that anything proceded from the Khalifate. It is

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as if both parties felt from the beginning that the separation of the "spiritual" Khalifate from the Sultanate was only a transitory measure, a first step on the way leading to entire abolition. (That it was deemed necessary, on the occasion of the abrogation of this vain dignity, to banish the whole Ottoman family from Turkey, seems to indicate the fear that otherwise the adherents of reaction might gather around it awaiting the psychological moment for a *coup d'état*.)

When 666 years ago Bagdad was destroyed by the Mongols, and the glamor of the six-centuries-old Khalifate was extinguished in the blood of all Abbasids who were unable to escape, the Muslim world was not put out of joint for all that horror, and her spiritual direction was not for a moment interrupted. So with the Turkish Khalifate, which never was more nor less than an ornament of power gained by military force, and whose last occupant has now exchanged his palace for a hotel room in Switzerland. Such Mohammedans as attached to it any importance at all never looked to it for decisions concerning dogma or law, but simply for political support in their struggle for independence. This minority of the Muslim community, to be found mostly in lands which have never experienced any contact with the living Khalifate, such as India, may now try to get similar support from the National Assembly in Angora. It remains to be seen whether amongst those Mohammedans who are not entirely indifferent to the Khalifate there will be some who prefer another solution to that offered by Angora, and whether they will take active steps in another direction.

POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR THE KHALIFATE[1]

In considering the question as to whether or not some groups of Muslims will try to find a political fulcrum elsewhere than at Angora, it seems that we may leave out of sight the fugitive Sultan-Khalif at San Remo as well as the exiled "Spiritual" Khalif at Territet. Whatever may be their personal qualifications, neither of them looms up as a possible future head of a powerful political party. Therefore, those to whom the fascination of the Khalifate is inseparable from Turkey, or those who simply prefer the friendship of the most influential Mohammedan state, will have to content themselves with the National Assem-

[1] NOTE—It has not been possible for the author to take into account developments which have taken place since his article was written in the spring.

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bly. If this body, however burdened with its herculean labor for the political and economic reconstruction of Turkey, should find leisure to try to give direction to the political life of Mohammedans in distant countries, it could then very well replace in this respect the Ottoman Sultan-Khalifs.

Amongst the monarchs of other Muslim states many will certainly be unwilling to obey any watchword issuing from Angora, but most of them will understand the uselessness of efforts to take its place themselves. An exception is the King of the Hijaz, Husein bin Ali, who has already been proclaimed Khalif in some Arabic-speaking lands.

The young kingdom of the Hijaz began its existence on June 22, 1916, when Sherif Husein, since 1908 Emir of Mecca (or, as he is usually called in Europe, Grand-Sherif), proclaimed his independence of Turkish sovereignty and joined the Entente in the Great War. Let us here briefly review the government of Mecca during the last nine or ten centuries.

With the decline of the Bagdad Khalifate from the ninth century onwards the central government was no longer able to control regularly such a distant place as Mecca. The Holy City of Islam thus became politically neglected. Some of the numerous descendants of the Prophet (by his daughter, Fatima, and Ali, his cousin), who had been living in Western Arabia since about 1000 A.D., availed themselves of the general unrest to establish their mastery over Mecca and so much of the neighboring territory as they were able to snatch. Strenuous disputes arose amongst some of those Alid families concerning this booty, but about 1200 A.D. Qatâdah became the undisputed lord, and since that time his descendants have been the Emirs of Mecca. The very numerous family of Qatâdah was divided, during all the seven centuries of its existence, by strife for the lordship, or rather for the privilege of exploiting the Meccan pilgrimage. The rulers of the surrounding Muslim states protected their subjects by giving to the pilgrim-caravans military escorts, which often were stationed for a long while at Mecca. From such supervision there developed a protectorate over the holy province, which came to be exercised in the nineteenth century now by Egypt, now by Turkey. Since 1840 the Hijaz has been a Turkish *vilayet*, where an Emir from the family of Qatâdah has represented the traditional authority, but under the supervision of a Turkish governor, or *vali*.

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In 1908 Sherif Husein was appointed to replace his cousin Ali, deposed after the Turkish revolution. Thus he commenced his Emirship under Turkish sovereignty, and at one time aided the Turkish Government to subdue rebel Arabic tribes. It is therefore clear that he, like his predecessors, did not feel any fundamental objection to the supremacy of a Khalifate of Ottoman Sultans. In fact, like many an earlier Grand-Sherif, he has done his best to free himself from the control of the Turkish *valis* sent to supervise his administration; and the various difficulties which the Turkish Government had to face after the revolution of 1908 favored these attempts. When the English navy blockaded the Hijaz and British agents opened to Emir Husein the brilliant prospect of independence for the Arab Mohammedans under his rule if the war should be successfully concluded, he joined England and caused his subjects to swear allegiance to him as King of Western Arabia and of a more extensive territory whose boundaries were to be determined at leisure after the war.

Of course the Turks branded this desertion of Husein as apostasy, and many other Mohammedans more or less emphatically expressed their assent to that disapproval. Those Indian Mohammedans who were interested in the Khalifate would have nothing to do with King Husein, and accused him of having sold himself to Great Britain. The King has always defended himself against this accusation by calling to mind the fact that he had lent his support to the Allies only on well defined conditions, of which the most important was the absolute and unlimited independence of the Arabian lands after the war. He justified his coöperation in depriving the Turkish Empire of these lands by pointing out the attitude, in many respects in defiance to the prescriptions of Islam, which the Turkish Government had assumed after the revolution of 1908.

The glorification of the pagan past of the Turkish race—"the Turanians"—which had become the fashion in leading circles in Constantinople with the slogan "first Turk, then Muslim," and the preference of the Effendis for following modern institutions of state and society rather than the revealed law regulating every department of life, induced Husein to take upon himself, at the head of his Arabs, the defense of the genuine Islam against Angora and Constantinople. He is lauded by his partisans not only as the "Saviour" of the Arabs, but also as the maintainer of the *Shari'ah* (Sacred Law).

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In the Meccan newspaper *The Qiblah*, which appears three times a week and which was born at the same time as the new kingdom, the political opinions of this offspring of Qatâdah are duly expounded. A while ago accusations against the Turkish Government took up a good deal of space; but since the Turkish deputation at Lausanne explicitly recognized, in the name of the Angora Government, the absolute independence of Arabia, these invectives have decreased. Concerning England the tone of the articles has been now sweet, now bitter. In a manifesto (dated November 24, 1923, and published in *The Qiblah* January, 1924) which is addressed to the British Government and the British nation, all kinds of grievances, aired by no means for the first time, are once more summarized. Great Britain, says *The Qiblah*, which owes its victories in Syria and Mesopotamia to the support of Husein, entirely failed to fulfil its solemn promise of coöperation in effecting the complete independence of the Arabian lands. It allowed France, acting as mandatory, to take hold of Syria after the forceful removal of Husein's son, Faisal, who had been destined to be its Emir. England itself retained, as mandates, Transjordania, where Husein's son, Abdallah, was set up as ruler; Mesopotamia, where Faisal was established as monarch; and Palestine, which, in order to fulfil the foolish promise of Balfour, was torn from its Arabian bond and given over to the Zionists. Husein loses no occasion to declare that he still hopes that the British nation may sometime force the British Government to keep its word.

On the question of the Khalifate Husein has always expressed himself with a certain reserve. Of course the Turkish Khalifate, in its later phases, could no longer find favor in his eyes. Husein rightly brands as absurd a Khalif without worldly power. To him the Khalif is the supreme monarch, so proclaimed by the Muslims, who at his accession promises solemnly that he will maintain the law of Islam without reservation. Upon several occasions Husein has made it clearly understood what this maintenance of the law implies in his mind. Thieves had their right hands cut off by his order; those who drank forbidden liquor or those who broke the fast of Ramadhan were publicly flogged, and so on. Articles in *The Qiblah* concerning the Khalifate, however, generally ended with the phrase used when naming those who are deceased: "Allah be merciful to the soul of the Khalifate." In this way it was meant to show that no decision had been made

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as to whether or not this dead Khalifate was capable of resurrection. Whenever flatterers called him "Commander of the Faithful" or "Khalif of God's Apostle," he did not absolutely refuse such homage, but he often pointed out explicitly that he did not assume such titles, and that he was even ready at any time to hand over the task of acting as "Saviour" of the Arabs to any man deemed more fitted than himself for its accomplishment.

Recent events raise the question of whether an important group of Mohammedans is likely to gather around Husein and his liberated Arabs and ask him to put aside exaggerated discretion and to take upon himself the burden of the Khalifate. Thus far this seems not very probable.

In the enormous peninsula of Arabia Husein's influence is limited to the western strip of coast, the province of the Holy Cities. He himself is seated at Mecca, while his son, Ali, is his governor at Medina, but during the eight years of his independent reign he has not yet succeeded in making safe for peaceful pilgrim traffic the way between these two places. The mighty Emir of the Wahhabi's, Bin Sa'ûd, who rules with energy over Central and East Arabia, is his enemy. In Southern Arabia Husein has no influence at all, and his efforts to come to a political understanding with Yahya, the Imam of the Zeidi's in Yemen, had no effect. It is highly questionable whether Transjordania would remain in the hands of Abdallah or Mesopotamia in the hands of Faisal if the British declared their mandates finished. It is still more doubtful whether Syria, supposing that the French gave it up, would join the banner of Husein.

The Muslim world outside of Arabia is even less enthusiastic about the aspirations of Husein to the Khalifate. With Egypt his relations were never cordial, and at the last pilgrimage (1923) they became actually strained. On that occasion Husein's refusal to admit into his country a sanitary mission sent by the Egyptian Government induced the Egyptians to embark their *mahmal*, that symbol of the participation of the Nile valley which used to grace the pilgrimage for centuries, and to take back home the *kiswah*, the new cloth for the House of Allah sent from Egypt annually since immemorial times. The Turkish Government would no more think of recognizing a Meccan Khalifate, in whatsoever shape it might present itself, than would the Sultan of Egypt. The Mohammedans in India by now probably have become convinced that Husein has not sold himself to Great Britain,

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but the Indian movement for the Khalifate will not on that account accept his claims. All know that Husein is unable to lend to Mohammedans under non-Mohammedan rule the support they expect from a Khalif.

The King of the Hijâz is more than septuagenary, and he has never enjoyed an opportunity of acquiring the experience and knowledge necessary for an all but absolute monarch if he is to play a part in international political life. He is full of energy but he is not a little obstinate and has some other qualities which often make it rather difficult to transact business with him. Neither his outward circumstances nor his personal character make Husein an acceptable candidate for the Khalifate. His ancestor Qatâdah on his deathbed urgently exhorted his descendants to limit their ambitions to the sacred province, this territory being difficult of access to other princes and offering them little attraction. Husein is the first of the sons of Qatâdah to act in contradiction to the ancestral will. The near future will decide whether he was wise.

It seems likely that Husein will try to strengthen his position by calling together a Pan-Islamic congress for the discussion of matters in which all Muslims as such are interested. It is true that of late voices have been heard in intellectual Mohammedan circles advocating an international all-Islam congress as the only means of bringing to a desirable solution several problems of high importance for Islam. But such a conference would be likely to choose another kind of president than the autocratic monarch of Western Arabia. And it is still a long way to even serious efforts for the foundation of such an organ for the expression of the *consensus* of opinion of the Mohammedan community. For the time being there is only chaotic confusion, and we are inclined when pronouncing the word "Khalifate" to add, as King Husein used to do until a short time ago, "of blessed memory."

The Pan-Islamic idea is not dead, but many changes will have to take place before the Muslims will be able to point to one man as its generally recognized personification. And this is what a Khalif in the twentieth century should be; otherwise he will be but an idle phantom.

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THE PRESIDENTIAL DILEMMA IN MEXICO

By D.

ON JULY sixth Mexico passed through the trying ordeal of another presidential election. The issues at stake in this election and the difficult task which awaits the coming president, whoever he may be, can best be understood by a brief review of the principal developments across the border during the past three years.

Alvaro Obregón, the retiring president, came into office on December 1, 1920, as the result of a successful revolution and a thoroughly controlled election. Obregón's chief supporters in this revolution, and for nearly three years thereafter, were General Plutarco Elias Calles and Adolfo De la Huerta. Under Obregón's control, Mexico enjoyed a stability and peace she had been a stranger to for nearly a decade. Thanks very largely to the flush production of petroleum, moreover, the national treasury, presided over by De la Huerta, was able for two years to keep itself in funds—another novel experience for a Mexican government—and in the field of international relations the period witnessed three accomplishments of unusual significance.

The first of these accomplishments was the negotiation of the Lamont-De la Huerta agreement in June, 1922, under which Mexico found it possible to satisfy the long neglected demands of her foreign bondholders and to take the first step in the difficult process of restoring her national credit. The second was the adjustment of those outstanding difficulties between Mexico and the United States which had prevented Obregón from drawing upon the moral and financial aid of this country and which constituted a source of grave danger to the peace of the two nations. These matters, including the most important features of the agrarian and petroleum laws in so far as they related to American citizens, were dealt with in a statesmanlike manner by the General and Special Claims Conventions negotiated in Mexico City during the summer of 1923. Finally, as a result of Obregón's willingness to enter into the above agreements, the American Government extended him the recognition which, for perfectly valid reasons, the Wilson and Harding administrations had both withheld.

Despite these constructive developments during the Obregón

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administration, however, many serious evils remained for which no remedy was found. By the fall of 1923 the treasury was nearly bankrupt, and no foreign loan was possible to replenish it. Business conditions entered upon a prolonged period of acute depression, unrelieved by the stream of outside capital which the recognition of Obregón by the United States had been expected to start across the border. The agrarian laws, and particularly the method of their enforcement, led to manifold abuses, discouraged the investment of capital in agriculture, did not greatly benefit the common people, and increased the spirit of restlessness and discontent which has so characterized the Mexico of recent years. Labor questions, also, were becoming increasingly complex; and there was neither wisdom nor ability in the Government to deal with the conflicts between employers and employees, or even to hold in check the bitter feuds which frequently broke out between the rival groups of labor.

It was just at this time, when Mexico's relations with outside powers, particularly with the United States, were on a firmer basis than they had been for many years, but when financial clouds had begun to gather and a deep current of social restlessness was running through the country, that De la Huerta launched his destructive revolution. It is unnecessary here to go into the origin of this revolution or to discuss the motives which lay behind it. It was a movement in which a few ill-advised good men and a great many self-seeking politicians and rascals took part; and thanks very largely to the material aid and moral support furnished Obregón by the United States it met the fate it no doubt merited.

The evils from which Mexico suffered before De la Huerta's defection, were of course greatly intensified by his revolution. This was particularly true of the Government's financial difficulties, of the business depression which gripped the country, and of the lawlessness and banditry which made their appearance in many sections. It was under such circumstances, when the nation was still suffering acutely from the effects of the insurrection, that the presidential election took place.

The two candidates in this election were General Calles of Sonora and General Angel Flores of Sinaloa. In many respects the two men had followed parallel courses in public life. Both had come from humble origins. Both were the product of the Madero-Carranza revolutionary period. Both had been made

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generals of division for unusual military ability. Both had risen to be governors of important states. And both had been loyal to Obregón in his revolution against Carranza and in his later struggle with De la Huerta.

Of the two, Calles stood much closer personally to Obregón than did Flores. He had not only been a member of the famous Sonora triumvirate which overthrew Carranza, but he had also occupied a high place in the president's cabinet from the very beginning of Obregón's term of office. Moreover, he was known to be Obregón's choice for the presidency, and in all probability had been promised the 1924 election when Obregón launched his revolution against Carranza. Calles' career as governor of Sonora, as a federal official and as a military leader, had marked him, too, as a man of determined purpose, ruthless and unscrupulous in his methods, and very much of an opportunist. Though given to the use of liquor himself, he advocated and actually enforced prohibition in the State of Sonora while he was governor; and though a large landholder, in the election just past he presented himself before the people as the champion of the so-called agrarian reform.

The record of Flores marks him as at least the equal of Calles in ability and purpose, and in character and ideals a somewhat better man. He is regarded by many (among whom Obregón himself might possibly be included) as one of the most skilful military leaders produced in Mexico during a decade of revolutions. Under his rule the State of Sinaloa has enjoyed a prosperity and tranquillity which almost no other state in Mexico has known since 1910. As a champion of the Madero revolution, Flores of course professes to be inspired by very advanced social and economic ideals. But he restrained radical labor legislation in Sinaloa, and also refused to permit the representatives of the agrarian movement to put their program into effect within his jurisdiction. In this connection it is said that when these agrarian officials, or "agraristas," made their appearance in Sinaloa Flores invited them to a conference and there pointedly offered them the choice between a free train ride beyond the state's boundaries or a permanent resting place in a nearby cemetery.

The campaign carried on by Flores and Calles, like many political contests north of the Rio Grande, was pretty largely a campaign of generalities and evasions. Calles announced that he was a radical—but not too radical. And Flores assured the voters

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that while he believed in protecting the legitimate rights of capital, he was also a champion of the revolutionary doctrines and would support the just demands of the common people.

The chief support of Calles came from the radical labor groups and from the poorer agricultural classes who regarded him as the exponent of an extreme agrarian or land division policy. A large number of government officials and employees also supported him on account of his relations with Obregón and because of their desire to be on the winning side. Flores, for his part, found his chief backing among the larger land holders, in certain conservative labor quarters, and among the property owning classes generally. Calles' campaign was chiefly carried on by the "Committee Pro-Calles" with its headquarters in Mexico City, while that of Flores was in the hands of the National Political League.

Neither candidate, however, had behind him an organized political party, as that term is understood in the United States or England, for no such party has ever been known to Mexican politics. Of so-called parties, however, most of which were mushroom affairs of high sounding names and no significance, there were almost no end. In Mexico City alone there were nearly twenty of these "parties," or political clubs, which supported Calles, and at least half that number which bore the Flores label. Nor does this take into account the numerous other groups of similar character which were organized solely to back the candidacy of some individual for the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies.

Among the many Calles organizations, the following names may be selected as typical examples: The Party of the Mexican Proletariat, The Revolutionary Association of the Middle Classes, The Labor Party of Mexico, The National Progressive Association, The Radical Mexican Party, The Party of Civic Progress, and the Party of Popular Reform. Some of the groups supporting Flores were: The National Party of Mexico, The National Union Party of the Revolution, The National Progressive Party, the Evolutionary Labor Party, and the National Political League, already mentioned.

The campaign, once actively under way, was carried on with considerable vigor by both candidates, though a lack of funds (more keenly felt in the Flores' camp than in that of his rival, whose connection with the government doubtless helped him somewhat in this regard) served as a check upon the activities of

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the opposing factions. As the date of the election approached, it became evident that the political enemies of General Flores had marked him for assassination. Two or three times his party was attacked by armed bands; on as many other occasions he escaped death by discovering carefully planned schemes against his life, and once a bomb demolished part of a hotel bedroom in which he slept. At last the danger became so great that Flores abandoned his campaign tour entirely and returned to Sinaloa by an out-of-the-way route, much of which he had to travel on horseback, in order to find a place of safety.

This action on the part of Flores, coupled with his brief disappearance from public sight while he was en route to Sinaloa, led to many widely circulated rumors that he and his supporters were about to proclaim another revolution. Official announcements on the subject, while not accusing Flores in person of such a plot, definitely charged some of his followers with having set out to overthrow the Government. And to this charge a sudden flare-up in the State of Oaxaca seemed to give some color. With Flores in person thus driven from the field and his followers placed on the defensive by the charges of revolution made against them, the conclusion that Calles would win the election, long before reached by those familiar with Mexican politics, was fully confirmed.

A slight digression is here worth while. In all past Mexican history, from the beginning of independence down through the accession of Obregón himself to power, there has never been a single election which was determined by popular vote or which did more than merely register the will of the faction in power or furnish the faction out of power the opportunity to revolt.

Now, to have expected the election of 1924 to differ from all the elections which had gone before it, to expect it to express the real will of the Mexican people (particularly when such a will does not in fact actually exist), was of course to expect the impossible. It may be frankly stated that the election of July 6 was "controlled," as all its predecessors had been controlled. But at least it furnished two grounds of encouragement to the friends of self-government in Mexico. It was comparatively free from violence; and it probably brought out more votes than have ever been cast at any other election in Mexican history. Certainly in this last respect, at least, it differed from the great majority of elections prior to 1910. "During my seven years' residence in Mexico," said John W. Foster, American Minister to that country from

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1872 to 1879, "I often visited the polling places on election days, but I never saw a citizen deposit a ballot, and rarely did I find any persons at the polls beside the election officers." In the election of Diaz over Lerdo in 1876, it may be added, Diaz was declared elected without one opposing vote, and not a single opposition member was returned to Congress. In comparison with such elections, the 1924 affair was certainly an improvement.

The official returns of the recent election are not available as this article is written. On July 12, however, the Calles faction claimed the election by some 516,000 votes for Calles against less than 56,000 for Flores. The Flores supporters, however, refused to surrender in this ignominious fashion and issued a counter statement showing that a majority of the votes had been cast in favor of their candidate. Then both groups showered telegrams of congratulation upon their respective leaders. Flores and his supporters have also challenged the claims of Calles on the ground that their opponents were guilty of wholesale violence, fraud and intimidation in the election.

As a result of these charges and disputed claims, the election will now, in all likelihood, be thrown into the Chamber of Deputies which meets early in September. But here a new complication presents itself. The members of this body were also chosen at the last election, and because of the large number of contested seats the attempt to organize the Chamber promises to be a very stormy and tumultuous affair, unless the Calles deputies, with the tacit consent of Obregón, completely intimidate their rivals. Already there are many seats for which two men have presented "official" credentials; some for which three claimants have appeared, and a few for which there are four contestants. Indeed, Mexican newspapers have recently gone so far as to express the fear that the attempt may be made to set up two Chambers of Deputies, each of which would claim the lawful power.

Only a rash prophet would venture a prediction as to the outcome of such a situation as now prevails in Mexican politics. But certain possibilities present themselves which are worthy of a moment's consideration.

First, the Calles-Flores imbroglio may come to such a pass before December that Obregón will decide to retain the presidency to save the Government from ruin. To do this it will be necessary for him to violate (or else amend) one of the most

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cherished provisions of the Constitution of 1917, to return to the old idea of the presidential succession for which Diaz was so condemned, and to repudiate his own solemn pledges against reëlection. Obregón might well do all these things, however, and many others, if in so doing he thought he could save his country from another destructive political upheaval.

Second, it is possible that Calles will come to the presidency and the country still escape a revolution. In this case what may Mexico and the outside world expect from the Calles administration? On this subject there are varying opinions. Some believe that Calles, if left to his own devices, will prove so extremely radical and corrupt that Mexico will soon be reduced to the evil plight of Soviet Russia. Others take the position that Calles is actually a conservative at heart who has only assumed the radical guise for political purposes, and that once in power he will attempt to walk the middle way in economic and social matters. Lastly, there are those who hold that Calles is purely an opportunist who will follow any course that promises to advance his own self-interest.

Third, there is reason to believe that even if Calles becomes president the real authority in Mexico will still remain in the hands of Obregón. Calles is unpopular with a large part of the Mexican people and with the army. He could not, therefore, remain very long in power if Obregón, who now, at least, dominates the army and who has already been offered the portfolio of war in the Calles cabinet, should withdraw his support from him. This Obregón would do if Calles strayed beyond the beaten path.

Fourth, there are rumors that Obregón, Calles and Flores have entered into a compact (similar to the Obregón-Calles-De la Huerta compact of 1920) under which Flores will support Calles during the next four years and then receive the presidency for himself at the hands of the other two. Unless the real attitude of Flores and Calles toward each other has been completely camouflaged, however, it is scarcely possible that these two could give each other the mutual support which this supposed agreement calls for. Still, the lion and the lamb have, on occasion, lain down together in Mexico—temporarily.

Lastly, there is some reason to believe that if Calles assumes power against the genuine opposition of the Flores party the country must prepare to face another revolution. Flores, as already stated, is a strong man—which no one could well say of

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De la Huerta—and a military leader of unusual ability. He is, moreover, thoroughly entrenched in one of the most important states of the republic and controls a section of the country which could not easily be invaded by an enemy. He has also the sympathy (and perhaps could rely on the financial support) of many of the "best" elements of Mexican society and could count on the unpopularity of Calles adding materially to his following. The country, too, is still more or less in a ferment as a result of the De la Huerta uprising. In several of the extreme southern states the Government's authority is as yet only a little more than nominal. In other sections of the country armed bands are still able to defy the federal forces and endanger railway communication or loot important towns. Thus, though suppressed, the De la Huerta movement has not been utterly extinguished, and if the opportunity arose many of its supporters would join any revolution against the Calles régime that gave promise of success. Finally, if Flores should organize a revolution and be able to finance it for even a few months, the Government would find it almost impossible to keep its soldiers in the field because of lack of funds.

Certain factors, on the other hand, may be mentioned as militating against the success of a Flores revolution should such a movement actually be set on foot. In the first place it is evident that many of the thinking people and the business interests of the country, as well as the mass of the common people, are utterly sick of revolution and have come to look upon this method of solving their political problems and other evils with despair. Again, the fate of the De la Huerta revolution and the wholesale executions which marked its tragic aftermath—for few presidents in Mexican history dealt with defeated enemies more drastically than Obregón—have done something at least to discourage movements of a similar character in the immediate future. Lastly, and most important of all, the fear that the United States Government would assist in putting down a revolution in favor of Flores, as it did in the case of the De la Huerta uprising, will make the opposition extremely cautious in its appeal to arms.

In this connection, if Flores sets a revolt in motion against the Calles administration, one wonders if the decision as to the attitude of our Government should take toward such a movement will not cause Mr. Hughes some sleepless nights. Certainly the position of Flores is very different from that occupied by De la

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Huerta. The United States might well assume the responsibility of supporting the recognized and legitimate government of the country against such a revolution as that sponsored by De la Huerta. But to aid Calles against Flores is another matter. To do so on the grounds that the "official" returns of the election were in his favor would leave common sense entirely out of the equation. In Mexico the "official" returns of an election are always in favor of the candidate whom the faction in control of the Government wishes to see in power. And the only method the opposition has ever known of securing a chance at office is by a resort to revolution. For all this, it may be both expedient and necessary for the United States to support Calles as it supported Obregón, if Flores or any of his faction "proclaim" against the Government, in order to prevent the complete economic and political collapse with which another long drawn out revolution in the near future would threaten Mexico.

This review of the present political situation in Mexico would be incomplete without a summary of the most pressing problems in other fields with which the next president,—whether he be Calles, Obregón, or Flores,—will have to deal.

The first and foremost of these problems is that of securing funds for a depleted and harassed treasury. The finances of Mexico today are in a chaotic state. For nearly a year the Government has not been able to meet its current obligations or pay the salaries of its employees except at widely extended and very irregular intervals. It is badly crippled in performing even its most essential functions and has no power at all to carry out its educational program, maintain its railroads, assist in the agricultural development of the country, reëstablish its banking system, or keep its harbors open to navigation.

Mexico's financial plight is equally distressing in the international field. The treasury, despite heroic efforts, has not been able to secure a foreign loan. And though there is probably no truth in the rumor, it is currently reported in Mexico that Ambassador Warren's recent resignation was due to the fact that he was unable to obtain an advance of funds for Obregón from American bankers, and so felt that he could no longer be of any real benefit to the country.

Early in July the Government suspended the interest payments then due upon the national debt, as provided for under the Lamont-De la Huerta agreement, and employed the funds set

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aside for this purpose in other ways. Months ago it was evident that this would happen; but the act has certainly not increased Mexico's credit or enhanced her good name with the investing world. At this writing official announcement has just been made that representatives of the American oil companies operating in Mexico, upon whom Obregón publicly laid the blame for the defeat of his last loan, are soon to go to Mexico City to see the president in person on this and other matters. It is possible, and earnestly to be hoped, that this conference will iron out the difficulties between the administration and the petroleum interests, open up the way for the development of Mexico's great untouched oil resources, and enable the treasury to secure its foreign loan.

Another financial burden of great magnitude which the treasury must sometime expect to have laid upon it, is that of the awards of the two United States-Mexican Claims Commissions which are now about to begin to function. Whether these awards, however, will come in time to embarrass the next administration may well be questioned.

In addition to these financial problems, the next government in Mexico must expect to deal with unusually troublesome disorders in the nation's social and economic life. Chief of these are the widespread unrest in the ranks of labor and the difficulties arising from the agrarian laws, which, in addition to the other problems they produce, are now the excuse for much violence and pillaging by armed bands of agricultural laborers whom the Government cannot hold in check.

This is not the place to discuss whether the recent labor legislation in Mexico is good or bad. It is necessary to point out, however, that the great mass of Mexican laborers are still densely ignorant, that they are easily moved by irresponsible and radical agitators, and that they are frequently employed for political and selfish purposes by utterly unworthy leaders. The marine workers' strike at Vera Cruz, which closed that important port just before the De la Huerta revolution, and the long drawn out strike of the Aguila Oil Company's employees, which began some four months ago, are only illustrations of what the next government must be prepared to face.

The international relations of Mexico are also far from satisfactory. It is a question whether the Mexican Government, having once suspended the Lamont-De la Huerta agreement, will

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not now repudiate it entirely, thus opening up again the whole critical issue of the nation's foreign debt, and rendering futile much that has been done to restore Mexico's international position within the past three years.

In particular, Mexico's relations with England leave much to be desired. Taking the position that the Constitution of 1917 contained provisions contrary to the established principles of international law, and that Great Britain could not lend its sanction to a government which refused to change such provisions, the British Foreign Office has persistently refused to recognize the Obregón Administration. This refusal has naturally increased the anti-British feeling in Mexican official circles, which arose at the time of the Madero revolution and the counter-movement under Victoriano Huerta. Ill feeling has further been intensified by the real or supposed activities of British citizens in the recent De la Huerta uprising. And, whether justified by the facts or not, Obregón has publicly accused some of the highest officials of the most important British oil company in Mexico of having aided and financed the De la Huerta cause.

The spectacular case of Mr. H. A. Cunnard Cummins, in charge of the British interests in Mexico, has recently brought about another serious misunderstanding with England, and incidentally added a new and somewhat curious incident to Mexican diplomatic history. The attempted expulsion of Cummins and the rather ludicrous blockade of the British Legation by Mexican guards have been too widely commented upon in the daily press to require further discussion here. It is interesting, however, to note that Cummins' unpopularity came from his vigorous defense of the rights of a British citizen (a widow named Evans, since murdered, who before her marriage was a citizen of the United States) against the enforcement of the agrarian decrees, and that MacDonald, a Labor Premier, whole-heartedly approved the course pursued by Cummins. MacDonald's stand in the Cummins matter can be construed in only one of two ways—either he has become a reactionary and no longer represents the true labor point of view, or else the agrarian legislation of Mexico contains such serious defects that a genuine, intelligent progressive need not approve of it in its entirety. At any rate, no matter how one interprets MacDonald's position, it is certain that Mexico's action against Cummins destroyed any immediate hope Obregón may have had of securing British recognition or financial aid.

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The above paragraphs set forth in a general way the principal difficulties which the coming government in Mexico must be prepared to face. How can the new president meet these problems? In theory the answer is extremely simple. He must see to it that life and property are protected and that his government abides by the principles of international law.

These are surely the natural and normal requirements to ask of any government, and if they can be met during the next four years Mexico's difficulties will almost disappear. She will be able to obtain the money necessary to restore her national finances and to develop her resources. She will find it possible to carry out a constructive and genuine program of education. She will advance the interests of labor and set the peon classes further along the way of economic and social progress than they have ever gone before. In short, she will actually accomplish some of those fine and splendid things which every Mexican orator loves to dwell upon, but which his government and people so seldom really undertake. That man, whether he is Calles or Flores or Obregón, should be Mexico's next president whose administration will best perform these primary functions of every government and meet these first great needs of every people.

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ETHNIC PROBLEMS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER

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SOVIET POLICY ON THE EUROPEAN BORDER

By Robert F. Kelley

RECENT developments indicate that the ethnic problems arising out of the present line of demarcation between the Soviet Federation and the states of eastern Europe are tending to become political factors of considerable importance. This is particularly true of the boundary between Poland and Soviet Russia. An examination of the accompanying map reveals that the northern section of the western frontier of Soviet Russia—*i.e.*, the boundary with Esthonia and Latvia—approximates very closely the ethnic frontier. The areas under Esthonian and Latvian sovereignty represent to a large extent homogeneous racial entities; economic rather than racial considerations will therefore predominate in the relations between these two states and their eastern neighbor. From the Dvina River to the Dniester, however, it will be observed that the political boundary is not based on ethnographic considerations. This frontier is the one laid down in the treaty of peace concluded at Riga on March 18, 1921, between Russia and the Ukraine on the one hand and Poland on the other, and is fundamentally the same as that stipulated in the armistice and preliminary peace agreement of October 12, 1920.

It is not within the province of this paper to enter into any discussion of the events leading up to the Treaty of Riga. It may be pointed out, however, that the policy of the Soviet power with regard to the determination of its boundary with Poland was not based on the national interests of the Soviet state. The declaration of Joffe at the Riga peace conference in September, 1920, that the Soviets "were willing to recognize as the boundary between Poland and Russia a line which runs much more to the east than the boundary fixed by the Supreme Allied Council on December 3, 1919, whereby Eastern Galicia remains to the west of this boundary," appears to have been the result of the initiative of Lenin himself, who conceived the idea of "proposing to Poland more territory than Clemenceau and Curzon offered her" and who insisted on the signing of the treaty embodying these territorial concessions.[1] In the eyes of Lenin the questions of boundaries

[1] *Izvestia*, January 30, 1924.

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were always of minor importance, secondary to what he considered the basic interests of the workers, *i.e.*, to the union of the proletariat of all countries in a joint struggle against capitalism, a union which is to take the form of a single world Soviet Republic. The fundamental divisions of society are horizontal, into classes, and not vertical, into national entities. The Soviet-Polish frontier represents, therefore, not an attempt to arrive at a definite solution of a difficult problem, but rather an expedient compromise which from the Bolshevik point of view was to have quite a transitory character. To the Poles this frontier, which follows closely the line of the German trenches in 1917–18, appeared justified by military considerations essential to their national existence.

While it may be a matter of dispute as to whether Poland has well-grounded claims, on ethnic grounds, to territories east of the so-called "Curzon line" (laid down by the Allies in 1919), it seems a well-established fact that the region between the Curzon line and the present Polish-Soviet frontier contains extensive areas in which the Polish population is decidedly in the minority. According to data published by the Polish Statistical Office itself, the seven eastern districts of Poland contain no less than 3,739,000 Ukrainians (or Little Russians) and 910,000 White Russians, out of a total population of 8,886,000. In Volhynia, for instance, the Poles number 240,892 as compared with 982,203 Little Russians, and in Stanislavov 298,870 as compared with 937,713; in Polesie there are 213,678 Poles and 156,105 Little Russians and 374,004 White Russians. The essential fact to be remembered is the existence of a situation very favorable to the development of a future Russian "irredentism."

During the first two years following the establishment of normal relations between Soviet Russia and Poland, ethnic questions played a very small rôle in the many controversies that arose between the two states. With the consolidation of the Soviet power, however, and the cessation of foreign and civil wars, Bolshevik leaders were obliged to give more attention to ethnic considerations. This tendency has perhaps been accelerated by the realization that world revolution is no longer imminent and that therefore it is imperative that special emphasis be placed on the strengthening of the Soviet state itself. Two processes towards this end are noticeable—first, the administrative reorganization of Soviet Russia on an ethnic basis, grant-

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ing a certain measure of self-government to the various ethnic groups, and, second, the reintegration on an ethnic basis of the various parts of the former Russian Empire which had tended to escape from the control of Moscow during the period of civil war. This second process culminated in the creation of the Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics by a treaty concluded on December 30, 1922, between the four republics known respectively as the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic, and the Trans-Caucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

At the XII Congress of the Russian Communist Party in April, 1923, considerable attention was devoted to the question of nationalities within the Soviet state. Stalin called attention to the growth of what he termed "Great Russian chauvinism" and to the consequent danger of a "rupture between the proletariat of the former ruling nation and the peasants of the earlier exploited nationalities." In order to prevent this, he declared that the Soviet power must adapt itself to local national requirements, particularly as to the use of the native language and employment of natives in the administration.

The increasing attention given by the Bolshevik leaders to ethnic considerations is further evidenced in the recent enlargement of the territory of White Russia and in the exchange of notes with Poland regarding the alleged oppression of the Russian minorities in Poland. In this connection it should be observed that the Soviet leaders have not failed to comprehend the international implications of their internal policy. At the XII Congress, Stalin pointed out that "We must here in Russia in our Federation solve the national question correctly, in order to set an example to the East, which represents the heavy reserves of our revolution, and thereby increase its confidence and its tendencies towards our Federation."

Subsequent developments show that the Soviet leaders had also in view the effect on the West. The enlargement of the territory of the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic in accordance with the decree of March 3, 1924, was designed to include in White Russia the contiguous territories of Soviet Russia in which the White Russian population predominated. The vast majority of the White Russian population under the Soviet régime is now concentrated in White Russia. According

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to Cherviakov, President of the White Russian Soviet of People's Commissars, "the territory of the newly amalgamated state comprises 9,291,000 dessiatines with a population of about 4,000,000," but "as a result of the Treaty of Riga there are still, according to the most conservative estimates, about 3,000,000 White Russian laborers and peasants living in territories outside of the Soviet Federation contiguous to White Russia." Of course attention has been called to the alleged oppression by the Poles of the White Russian populations in the Grodno and Vilna districts and their consequent turning towards their brethren in the White Russian Socialist Soviet Republic. The sons of the peasants are represented as flocking across the border to Minsk to enter the White Russian State University on account of the closing of White Russian schools by the Poles. Tomas Dombal, an ex-patriated Pole, now head of the Peasant International at Moscow, has predicted that the enlargement of White Russia will further "the revolutionary struggle of the laborers and peasants who are groaning under the yoke of bourgeois Poland and will inspire them with energy for their further struggle, until they achieve complete reunion with their Soviet brothers."

The conciliatory policy of the Soviet leaders towards the interests of the various nationalities has been particularly manifest with regard to the Little Russians. Definite steps have been taken to Ukrainize the governmental apparatus, party organs, schools and Red Army in the Ukraine. A recent resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in March stated that Ukrainization was progressing favorably in the lower organs of the Soviet, but not in the chief central organs. It enjoined all higher officials to learn the Ukrainian language and expedite its use at meetings of the chief governmental bodies.

This new Soviet policy was soon to show itself in the domain of foreign relations. At the Second Federal Congress of Soviets which met at the end of January, 1924, N. A. Skrypnik, a Ukrainian delegate, sharply attacked Poland for its alleged oppression of national minorities: "By the Treaty of Riga the Polish Government took on itself the obligation completely and entirely to observe the rights of the national minorities on those territories which form part of the Polish Republic. Millions of Ukrainians and White Russians and Russians exist in the territory of the Polish Republic, and if we in the Treaty of Riga declare that we—Russia, Ukraine, White Russia, and now the

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Federation of the Socialist Soviet Republics—do not make any state claims to these territories inhabited by our brethren by blood and position, that does not mean that we are not interested in the fulfilment by the Polish Republic of the obligations assumed by it in the treaty of Riga in regard to our brothers and comrades." Kamenev in his reply declared that "our government notes with the greatest attention the declarations which have been made here by the representative of the Ukraine regarding the oppression of our kinsmen in neighboring states." The government, he said, is aware not only of the conditions set forth by Skrypnik but also observes Rumanian oppression in Bessarabia. "We can say only one thing; we know these facts; we hear these groans; we consider them, and will consider them." The same subject came up for discussion at the April session of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee. A resolution was adopted "to request the Federal Central Executive Committee to take steps to ameliorate the position of Ukrainians oppressed in Poland and Rumania."

This agitation assumed a concrete form when the Soviets addressed a note to Warsaw under date of May 10 accusing the Polish Government of violating the Treaty of Riga by denying to the Russian minorities in Poland the treatment guaranteed to these latter in the treaty. The note recites a long series of "acts of violence" committed by the Polish military and civil authorities against Ukrainians and White Russians. It accuses the Polish Government of attempting to dominate the intellectual life of the latter by closing Ukrainian and White Russian schools, thereby obliging the inhabitants of White Russian and Ukrainian districts to send their children to Polish schools. Attention is called to the alleged persecution of the Greek Orthodox Church and to the compulsory colonization of former Polish soldiers on lands chiefly populated by the Ukrainians and White Russians. In concluding, the note reminds the Polish Government that a strict carrying out of Article 7 of the Treaty of Riga "constitutes an indispensable condition to the establishment of good relations and neighborliness which are so necessary to the two nations."

The Polish reply, dated May 15, denies the truth of the accusations of the Soviet Government and states that it can not "acknowledge the contents of the above note as a basis for negotiations." It regards the Russian note as an attempt at interference in the internal affairs of the Polish Republic. To

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the statement that Article 7 of the Treaty of Riga "gives to the Federal Government the right to guard the rights of the national minorities by demanding the exact fulfilment of the treaty by the Polish Government," Warsaw replied that "the Polish Government warns you categorically against the . . . incorrect understanding of Article 7 of the Treaty of Riga, according to which it is mutually recognized that the guarding of the liberties of national minorities is dependent exclusively on the internal legislation of the respective governments."

Along the Rumanian-Soviet frontier we find a somewhat different situation. This boundary, according to the Bolsheviks, is *de facto* in character, and they have consistently refused to recognize the incorporation of Bessarabia in Rumania and still regard that province as an integral part of Soviet territory.[2] At the Rumanian-Soviet conference held in Vienna from March 24 to April 2 of this year, Krestinsky at the opening session declared that the Governments of Russia "have never given their assent to the incorporation of Bessarabia in Rumania and they regard the occupation of Bessarabia in 1918 by Rumanian troops, an occupation which continues up to the present, as a forcible seizure of that territory." Asserting that the Government of the S. S. S. R. was guided by the principle of self-determination of nations in establishing mutual relations with neighboring states, he proposed that a plebiscite of the population of Bessarabia be held. The reply of the Rumanian delegation challenged the assertions made by Krestinsky and refused to consider the demand for a plebiscite, insisting that the Bessarabian question had already been definitely settled by the Great Powers.

It is to be noted that the Soviets, laying aside the question of their historic rights to Bessarabia, brought into the foreground of the discussion the principle of self-determination of peoples. In this connection it is interesting to observe that preceding the Vienna conference numerous meetings of alleged Bessarabian refugees and emigrants were held throughout Russia. Such meetings generally passed resolutions denouncing the Rumanian oppression of Bessarabians, and demanded the liberation of Bessarabia and the creation of a Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic. Radek, writing in the *Pravda*, April 25, 1924, declared that "our demand for a plebiscite in Bessarabia is the vanguard skirmish in the struggle with the policy of imperialism in the

[2]See "The Bessarabian Dispute," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. II, No. 4.

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southeast," and that "the struggle of oppressed nationalities plays a large rôle in the reconstruction of Europe on new principles." Emphasizing the ethnic aspects of the situation, he stated: "Even when the co-relation of forces compels us to acknowledge the fact of such violence, as we have recognized it with regard to Poland which is oppressing White Russians and Ukrainians, we do not cease to consider the struggle of oppressed nationalities as just and we stand, morally and politically, entirely on their side in their struggle for freedom."

It appears, therefore, that with regard to Rumania, as with regard to Poland, the Bolshevik leaders are convinced of the expediency of utilizing ethnic considerations and national interests to further their policies, and that they believe that the question of nationalities has great revolutionary possibilities. In general, it may be said that the Bolsheviks feel that time is on their side and that they do not need to force the issue precipitately. It is apparently not the intention of the Bolsheviks to try to recover Bessarabia by force of arms, but rather to keep Rumania in a nervous state, compelling her to maintain as many troops as possible under arms, thereby weakening her economically and fostering discontent among the laboring masses.

Curiously enough, the situation on the northern section of the Russian frontier in Europe is almost the reverse of what it is further south. In the north it is Russia's neighbor who is complaining of oppression of its kinsfolk by the Bolsheviks, and it is the Soviet Government which is asserting its right to manage its own affairs free from outside intermeddling.

The boundary between Soviet Russia and Finland has been a source of considerable friction between the two countries. The existing line was established by the Treaty of Peace concluded at Dorpat on October 14, 1920. The crux of the present difficulties lies in the existence of a large Finnish population in Soviet territory adjoining the present boundary. These people (commonly called East Karelians) are closely related to the tribes that form the basis of the Finnish nation. The Treaty of Dorpat, while providing for the reincorporation of the districts of Reppola and Porajaren into Soviet Russia, stipulated that they are to be "attached to the autonomous territory of East Karelia which shall be formed of the Karelian population in the Governments of Archangel and Olonets, and enjoy the right of national self-determination." Finland has repeatedly complained of the

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failure of the Soviets to carry out their obligations toward East Karelia. The Bolsheviks have as persistently maintained that "the autonomy of East Karelia is a question of the internal policy of the Russian State, which can be a subject of negotiation only between the Russian and the Karelian people." Although failing in its attempt to secure the intervention of the League of Nations, the Finnish Government still considers the Treaty of Dorpat and its annexed declarations as obligations of an international order, while the Bolsheviks regard the whole matter as purely domestic. The dangerous possibilities of the situation were demonstrated by the serious tension in the relations between the Soviets and Finland during the uprising in East Karelia in the winter of 1920–1921. There is no question of the deep and sincere interest of the Finnish people in the welfare of the East Karelians. This feeling will continue to be a powerful factor in Finnish-Soviet relations.

It is only too evident from all that has been said above that along the greater part of the European (not to say the Asiatic) border of the Soviet Republic there exist serious causes of trouble. The fact that the same nationalities are to be found on the two sides of frontiers (which are of recent origin and are none too well marked geographically) serves to prevent those frontiers from being recognized as permanent. Disturbances on either side inevitably affect the other, and lead to popular excitement and difficulties between the governments. The situation is one that needs close attention.

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OUR NEW IMMIGRATION POLICY

By Robert DeC. Ward

ON MAY 26, 1924, President Coolidge gave his approval to what is officially known as the Immigration Act of 1924. This new law marks a radical change in the immigration policy of the United States. Representative Albert Johnson, chairman of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House of Representatives, has called it, without exaggeration, a second Declaration of Independence. (1) It establishes a definite numerical limitation. (2) The bulk of immigration is to be of the same racial stocks as those that originally settled the United States and still constitute the major part of its population. (3) There is to be a preliminary selection overseas.

This new policy of limitation and of selection, epoch-making as it is, is all the more surprising when it is recalled that the first general immigration act was passed as recently as 1882 and provided only for the exclusion of convicts (except in the case of political offenses), of lunatics, of idiots, and of persons likely to become a public charge. The Act of 1882 was amended and strengthened in various ways by later legislation, but even the last general immigration act, that of 1917, which enumerated some thirty classes of aliens as subject to exclusion for physical, mental, moral or economic reasons, involved no general limitation of numbers, no racial selection, and no overseas inspection. The Chinese Exclusion Acts (1882 and later), the "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Japan (1907), and the so-called "Barred Zone" (1917) represented the only steps which had been taken towards any serious policy of exclusion or of numerical limitation, and all of these were concerned only with people of Asiatic origin. Even the illiteracy test, which was a storm-center of discussion for many years and finally became a part of the Act of 1917, useful as it has proved in several ways, has not operated appreciably to diminish numbers. The Quota Act of 1921, which limited new immigration to three percent of the number of foreign-born living in the United States at the time of the census of 1910, for the first time definitely restricted immigration as a whole, but was passed as temporary war emergency legislation and later extended (until June 30, 1924), still as a temporary measure.

When a nation as large and as powerful as the United States

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adopts a new policy on a matter of such importance, both to itself and to the rest of the world, it is pertinent to inquire into the causes. Let us therefore analyze, so far as may be possible, the general trend of public opinion on this subject, first in the period before federal control of immigration, and then in the three or four decades preceding the passage of the Act of 1924.

For a round hundred years it was a national ideal that the United States should be the asylum for the poor and the oppressed of every land. This very early came to be known as the "traditional" American attitude towards immigration. Curiously enough, there has always been a fundamental error in the popular conception of this tradition. This noble ideal of a refuge, open to all, had its roots in economic conditions far more than in any altruistic spirit of world philanthropy. For many decades the country was very sparsely settled. There was abundant free land. Labor was scarce. The number of immigrants was still very small, and nearly all of them were sturdy pioneers, essentially homogeneous and readily assimilated. There was, therefore, little need to worry about any immigration "problems," and it was comforting to the consciences of our ancestors to keep the doors wide open.

Gradually, in later years, as the stream of incoming aliens assumed what in those days were large proportions, and the first difficulties of assimilation began to appear, a second thought came into the national consciousness—that of the "Melting Pot." The fundamental idea in the theory of the Melting Pot was that environment, not heredity, determines what human beings shall become. It was thought that the great American Melting Pot could fuse into a new homogeneous race, better and finer than the world had ever known, unlimited numbers of aliens of all nations, habits and languages who might choose to come here from any quarter of the globe. It was believed that sending alien children to school, teaching them English, giving them flag drills, letting them recite the Gettysburg Address and read the Declaration of Independence, would make thorough-going Americans of them, similar in all respects to the native-born of the traditional type.

While the dominant feeling for most of the period up to the end of the nineteenth century was indifferent to, or at any rate not in favor of, restrictive legislation, there were not lacking those who from the very foundation of the republic were opposed to free immigration. Washington questioned the advisability of

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immigration except of certain skilled mechanics. Jefferson expressed the wish that there were an ocean of fire between this country and Europe, so that it might be impossible for any more immigrants to come here. The Hartford Convention, in 1812, proclaimed that "the stock population of these states is amply sufficient to render this nation in due time sufficiently great and powerful."

When the influx of German and Irish assumed considerable proportions the feeling against wholly unrestricted immigration grew rapidly, and many of the same arguments were then used as have become familiar in more recent years. It was urged that these people were of different race and religion, that they were undesirable competitors in the labor market, and that they presented difficulties of assimilation. The "Know-Nothing" agitation of the middle of the last century, which was largely anti-Catholic, for a time attained considerable political prominence but was not a restriction movement.

During the last decade of the nineteenth century a distinct change in public opinion began to manifest itself. Of slow growth at first, the new views soon spread more and more rapidly until they have finally been embodied in the new immigration law. Many persons have made the mistake of thinking that the war was the immediate and main cause of this change in the national immigration policy. To the present writer the situation appears in quite a different light. America's experiences during the war, and the prospect of what would happen as the war's aftermath, were unquestionably very potent factors in bringing about the new legislation, but a survey of the literature of immigration during the past thirty or forty years shows that throughout this period firm foundations were being laid upon which the public opinion of the country in favor of effective restriction was being built up. The reason for the gradual reversal of the earlier American policy of free immigration to one of steadily increasing restriction was the very marked change in the general character of immigration which began in the decade 1880–1890. It is significant that in the period 1871–1880 the "old" immigration from northern and western Europe amounted to slightly over 2,000,000 persons while the "new" immigration, from southern and eastern Europe and near Asia, numbered only 180,000. In the years 1897–1914, the period immediately preceding the war, the "old" contributed about 3,000,000 while the "new" contri-

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buted over 10,000,000. The number of arriving aliens was increasing with enormous rapidity. Their racial origins and their characteristics were changing. It was at this point that a real and very serious immigration "problem" arose. The newer immigrants generally had different and lower standards of living. They often retained their loyalty to their native countries. They read their own foreign language newspapers. Barriers of every kind separated them from the native population and from earlier immigrants from northern and western Europe.

The seriousness of the situation was not immediately apparent to the great body of the American people. Most of the writers who dealt with it failed to grasp the importance of the change. But there were exceptions—men who labored to make plain the far-reaching racial, economic, political, and social consequences which would inevitably follow if a policy of unrestricted immigration were continued. In 1892 appeared the late Professor Richmond Mayo-Smith's "Emigration and Immigration," a pioneer volume in the new field. The late Prescott F. Hall clearly set forth the effects of the new immigration in his "Immigration" (1906), and urged the need of immediate and more adequate legislation. In 1894 a group of men in Boston organized the Immigration Restriction League, the first body of its kind in the country. This league has for thirty years been steadily at work, carrying on a general educational campaign for more effective restriction and selection. Americans began to realize that the ideal of furnishing an asylum for all the world's oppressed was coming into conflict with changed economic and social conditions. The cold facts were that the supply of public land was practically exhausted; that acute labor problems, aggravated by the influx of ignorant and unskilled aliens, had arisen; that the large cities were becoming congested with foreigners; that there were too many immigrants for proper assimilation; that large numbers of mentally and physically unfit, and of the economically undesirable, had come to the United States. Those who still honestly clung to the idea of maintaining in the United States a haven of refuge for the oppressed, one by one realized that America can only be such a haven if conditions here are better than they are in the lands from which our immigrants come, and that the only way to maintain our economic, political, educational, and social standards is by means of restriction.

The fallacies of the Melting Pot theory had also become

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obvious. Years before the war it had become increasingly apparent that the Melting Pot was no longer successfully performing its function; that the American population was losing its homogeneous character; that various nationalities of recent immigrants were forming more and more compact racial "blocs," each bloc tenaciously maintaining its own racial character, customs, and traditions. The United States was fast becoming, as Theodore Roosevelt expressed it, a "polyglot boarding house." Furthermore, Americans who gave attention to the results of biological investigation became cognizant of the fact that the laws which rule in the world of the lower animals are also dominant in the case of man. They realized that a heavy draught-horse cannot be made into a trotter by keeping him in a racing stable. Nor can a race true to the old American type be produced by any process of Americanization, so called. What goes into the Melting Pot determines what shall come out of it. If the material fed in is a varied assortment of nationalities, to a considerable extent physically and mentally below par, there can be no hope of producing a superior or even of maintaining a homogeneous race. It is often said, and with truth, that each of the different alien peoples coming to America has something to contribute to American civilization. But what America needs is desirable additions to, and not inferior substitutes for, what it already possesses. There is nothing in biological discovery or principles which would lead to the hope that only the virtues of the various races which were going to make up the future American would survive and the vices be eliminated. The public consciousness awakened to the realization that, to quote Dr. Henry Fairfield Osborn, "education and environment do not fundamentally alter racial values. . . . The true spirit of American democracy, that all men are born with equal rights and duties, has been confused with the political sophistry that all men are born with equal character and ability to govern themselves and others, and with the educational sophistry that education and environment will offset the handicap of ancestry."

In another important respect public opinion underwent a striking change in the decade or two before the war, namely in regard to the relation of immigration to the need for labor. So accustomed had Americans become to seeing vast numbers of foreign laborers flocking into the factories, and mills, and coal mines that it had come to be an axiom that the need for labor

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could only be supplied by a constant and unlimited inflow of immigration. From the time of the first agitation for restriction down to the present, large employers of "cheap labor" have always insisted that the development of industry and the prosperity of the country absolutely depend upon a free inflow of alien labor. Of late years, however, it has been seen that cheap foreign labor may often be so cheap that it is dear at any price; that it is usually, in the long run, both socially and politically very expensive; that a tremendously rapid development of the country is by no means altogether desirable. The conviction spread rapidly that, as Dr. H. H. Laughlin has clearly expressed it, "immigration is a long-time investment in family stocks rather than a short-time investment in productive labor." The question arose whether any American industry which cannot prosper without a continuous supply of cheap alien labor is really worth preserving in a country which boasts of the high standards of living of its wage earners and the high character of its citizenship. The feeling grew that a much more general use of labor-saving machinery, together with the natural increase of the present population, supplemented by a properly restricted and carefully selected immigration, would in time largely solve this labor problem. Americans are unalterably opposed to anything even approximating slave or coolie labor, of whatever race or color, in their country. It became evident that a continuance of the policy of unlimited immigration would inevitably produce here a permanent class of low-grade labor of the coolie type.

In line with this changing trend of public opinion on the question of cheap labor there has been noticeable recently a significant change of attitude on the part of certain far-seeing manufacturers, who realized that a permanent limitation of immigration was to be the settled future policy of the country and who began to adjust themselves to the new situation by decreasing their labor turnover and by increasing the use of labor-saving machinery. The attitude of this group has probably been correctly stated by Mr. Edward A. Filene of Boston, himself a large manufacturer and employer, as follows: "Employers do not need an increased labor supply, since increased use of labor-saving machinery and elimination of waste in production and distribution will for many years reduce costs more rapidly than wages increase, and so prevent undue domination by labor."

Thus American public opinion had for twenty-five or thirty

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years before the war been gradually crystallizing in favor of more restriction. Abundant evidence of this tendency is to be found in the literature on immigration, as well as in the enactment of the successive laws of 1882, 1885, 1891, 1903, 1907, and 1917. The report of the United States Immigration Commission, completed in 1910, which recommended restriction "as demanded by economic, moral, and social considerations," was a very convincing official pronouncement on the question, and did much to convert the nation as a whole to the necessity of prompt action. This commission, it should be noted, suggested a percentage limitation of immigration.

Then came the Great War. Patriotic Americans who had been in doubt on the question of restriction became aggressive restrictionists. Those who had been advocating further effective legislation saw the tide turning their way with irresistible force. During the years of the war various alien racial groups in the country showed clearly enough that their sympathies were not American but European. European antagonisms, bred and nourished through the centuries abroad, came to the surface in the United States. Those who had been relying on the Melting Pot to accomplish assimilation realized that they had cherished false hopes. The statistics of the Draft threw a great deal of light upon the whole problem of the foreign-born in the United States. Americans suddenly awoke to a realization of the danger of having in their country an element of foreign birth, or with one or both parents foreign-born, which constituted one-third of the total population and of which a disquietingly large proportion were unfit for active service because of an inability to speak English or because of inferior intelligence. Further, competent authorities in the United States and unprejudiced observers abroad united in the conviction that the war would be immediately followed by an immigration the volume of which would far exceed anything that had ever been known. Not only this. The new immigration would be composed almost wholly of eastern and southeastern Europeans: people of mixed races, with traditions, customs, political experience and standards of living radically different from those which had been the distinguishing characteristics of the American population. It was the verdict of observers abroad, both official and otherwise, that a Jewish mass-migration, more or less well organized, was imminent. It did not appear that such an immigration, composed chiefly of

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small shop-keepers, pedlers, and sweat-shop workers, would fill any real economic need in the United States. The lessons of the war, and the prospect of a vast immigration following it, suddenly fanned into a brighter flame the smouldering fire of sentiment in favor of restriction. The result was that in the Emergency Act of 1921 the United States for the first time placed a definite numerical limit on immigration.

With the three percent law expiring on June 30, 1924, Congress was faced with the necessity of providing adequate legislation to take the place of the Emergency Act. Under the able leadership of Representative Johnson, of Washington, and with the coöperation of the large majority of an unusually competent committee, an extraordinarily thorough study was made of every aspect of this complex subject. Numerous hearings were held, the published reports of which now constitute an indispensable part of the literature on immigration. In the Senate, Hon. David A. Reed, of Pennsylvania, had charge of the bill and showed great skill in dealing with the parliamentary situations there, as well as in suggesting an important amendment to the bill as it originally passed the House. The enormous majorities by which the bill passed Congress clearly reflected public opinion on this subject.

The main provisions of the Act of 1924 may, for the sake of simplicity and clearness, be grouped under three heads, (1) those dealing with limitation of numbers; (2) those providing for selection; (3) those based on humanitarian motives.

(1) *Limitation.* For three years, or until June 30, 1927, the annual quota is fixed at two percent of the number of foreign-born of each nationality in this country in 1890. This will admit, within the quota, somewhat over 160,000.[1] Under the emergency law of 1921, with its quota of three percent on the basis of the 1910 census, the countries of southern and eastern Europe, including Asiatic Turkey and Palestine, were given about forty-five percent of the total immigration, although they compose less than twelve percent of the total population of the United States. There was thus distinct discrimination in their

[1]It is to be noted, however, that immigrants who were born in the Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or an independent country of Central or South America, and their wives and unmarried children under eighteen if accompanying or following to join them, are allowed to come in without limitation as to numbers provided they are admissible under the provisions of the general immigration act of 1917, which still remains in force as to the classes of aliens who are subject to exclusion for certain physical, mental, economic or moral reasons. Experience in the operation of the new law may show that this very liberal exception in favor of the countries of the Western Hemisphere will require limitation.

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favor, and no less distinct discrimination against the stocks which principally settled the American colonies and established the American form of government, and whose descendants make up over one-half of our white population today. The quotas, in other words, were based on the number of foreign-born in the United States, and took no account of the Americans born in America. The percentage provision in the new law, based on the census of 1890, gives these same countries of southern and eastern Europe and near-Asia quotas roughly in the same proportion to the total immigration as the persons born in those countries and now in the United States bear to the present population of the United States. Southern and eastern Europe will now have slightly over fifteen percent of the total quota immigration—a liberal allowance in view of the fact that they constitute slightly less than twelve percent of the total population. "The use of the 1890 census is not discriminatory. It is used in an effort to preserve as nearly as possible the racial *status quo* in the United States. It is hoped to guarantee, as best we can at this late date, racial homogeneity in the United States."[2]

There was no question of the racial superiority of northwestern Europeans or of the racial inferiority of southeastern Europeans. It was simply a question as to which of these two groups of aliens is, as a whole, best fitted by tradition, political background, customs, education, and habits of thought to adjust itself to American institutions and to American social and economic conditions—to become, in short, an adaptable, homogeneous and helpful element in American national life.

Sec. 11 (b), of the Immigration Act of 1924 reads as follows: "The annual quota of any nationality for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1927, and for each fiscal year thereafter, shall be a number which bears the same ratio to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920 having that national origin bears to the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920, but the minimum quota of any nationality shall be 100." This is Senator Reed's racial origins provision. It cuts straight through the controversy as to whether the quotas should be based on the census of 1890 or that of 1910. It bases the quotas not upon the numbers of those composing the various alien colonies or foreign "blocs" now in the country, ignoring the native-born, but divides them among the nationalities in accor-

[2]68th Congress, 1st Session, H. R. Report No. 350.

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dance with the national origins of the whole population. The fairness of such an apportionment cannot be disputed. It declares, in effect, that what we now are racially we propose to remain. Against such a stand there can be no ground for opposition. Each year's immigration, as Commissioner Curran put it, is to be "an exact miniature of what we are as to stock." This is bedrock immigration policy. It is one of the fairest and most constructive provisions which has ever been embodied in any immigration law.

The so-called Japanese exclusion clause of the Act of 1924 was the subject of more discussion than any other part of the measure. Apart from its diplomatic aspects, it has far more importance as the establishment of a principle than as a means of limiting immigration. With certain fairly numerous and reasonable exceptions, it excludes aliens ineligible to citizenship, thus covering all Orientals. Since 1907 the limitation of Japanese immigration had been accomplished, not by law enacted by Congress, but by an understanding with Japan known as the "Gentlemen's Agreement," which was neither treaty nor law. The insistent demand for the exclusion of Orientals, and the determination of Congress to regulate immigration itself by law, combined to bring about the inclusion of the "ineligible to citizenship" provision in the new legislation. This law settles it once for all that immigration is a domestic matter which Congress proposes absolutely to control and that it is not a subject for treaty.

(2) *Selection.* Another important feature of the new law is the attempt, for the first time, to exercise some control over immigration at the source. Intending immigrants must apply to United States consular officers abroad for "immigration visas." These papers are to contain answers to questions essentially the same as those asked the immigrant on his arrival at our ports, together with full information as to the alien's family status, his occupation, personal appearance, ability to speak, read and write, addresses of relations, destination, personal and family institutional history, etc. In addition, the alien must furnish, if available, copies of his "dossier" and prison and military record, and copies of all other available public records concerning him kept by the government to which he owes allegiance. "The application is to be signed by the alien in the presence of the consular officer, and verified by oath administered by that officer. No immigration visa is to be issued if it appears to the

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consular officer, from statements in the application or in the papers submitted therewith, that the immigrant is inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws," nor "if the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that the immigrant is inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws." Visas for quota immigrants are to be issued only up to the numbers allowed by the quotas, and are to be good for a period not exceeding four months. This plan of visas does not constitute medical or general inspection overseas. That inspection is to be carried out, as it always should be, in the United States, by American inspectors, American doctors, and where American hospitals are provided. But the new plan will at least accomplish a preliminary selection overseas. While there will undoubtedly be many cases of perjury and of fraud in this connection, there can be no question that a great many undesirable aliens, subject to exclusion by law, will be refused their papers by our consuls when application is made.

The new plan is the first real attempt on the part of the United States to exercise some control over the kind of immigrants who shall come here. Hitherto this matter has been left practically altogether in the hands of foreign countries, some of which have certainly had no hesitation about making it easy for their own least desirable citizens to come to America.

(3) *Humanitarian Provisions.* The new law contains many provisions based on broad humanitarian motives. The immigration visa plan should reduce hardships to a minimum, prevent the division of families, and put an end to deportations on account of arrivals in excess of the quotas. Congestion at Ellis Island, with its attendant hardships, will be done away with, and it will therefore be possible to make the medical and general examinations more thorough and more effective. Further, "an immigrant who is the unmarried child under eighteen years of age, or the wife, of a citizen of the United States who resides therein at the time of filing a petition" is admissible as a "non-quota" immigrant provided there is no medical or other ground for exclusion; and in the issuance of immigration visas preference, up to fifty percent of the annual quota of any nationality, is to be given to an alien "who is the unmarried child under twenty-one years of age, the father, the mother, the husband, or the wife, of a citizen of the United States who is twenty-one years of age or over." These two provisions should surely be sufficiently liberal in pre-

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venting the separation of families. Indeed, experience may show that these exceptions in favor of near blood relatives are too liberal, and are open to abuse, in which case they can be modified by law. Among the humanitarian sections mention may further be made of the permission to reënter the United States after temporary absence, and the admission, as non-quota immigrants, of ministers, professors (including their wives and unmarried children under eighteen), and *bona fide* students.

Further, more effective provision is made for preventing the embarkation of aliens who fall into the excluded classes by increasing the fines on the transportation companies in cases where such aliens are brought to the United States. If intending immigrants of this sort are kept from sailing, hardship and suffering are very greatly reduced. Heavy fines on the transportation companies are the only means by which the United States can prevent these companies from taking the passage money from aliens who may later be deported. In each case the Secretary of Labor is to satisfy himself, before imposing the fine, that the existence of the disease or disability might have been detected by competent examination, medical or otherwise, or by "reasonable precaution" at the time of foreign embarkation. In addition, the steamship company is to refund to the alien the price of his ticket from his initial point of departure to the port of arrival. All these provisions are distinctly humane, and in the interests of the alien as well as of the United States.

In all, it can truthfully be said in regard to the Act of 1924 that no immigration measure has had such careful drafting and such diligent, humane and disinterested consideration. It is an emphatic national decision that, to quote President Coolidge, "America must be kept American." It is based on bedrock principles. It marks a turning point in American civilization.

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PRESENT IMMIGRATION QUOTAS

Provided by Act of Congress,[1] approved March 26, 1924, and proclaimed by President Coolidge June 30, 1924

(For each of the countries indicated by an asterisk is established a nominal quota according to the minimum fixed by law. These nominal quotas, as in the case of all quotas hereby established, are available only for persons born within the respective countries who are eligible to citizenship in the United States and admissible under the immigration laws of the United States.)

Country	*Quota*	*Country*	*Quota*
*Afghanistan	100	Liechtenstein	100
Albania	100	Lithuania	344
Andorra	100	Luxemburg	100
Arabian peninsula	100	Monaco	100
Armenia	124	Morocco	100
Australia	121	*Muscat (Oman)	100
Austria	785	Nauru	100
Belgium	512	*Nepal	100
*Bhutan	100	Netherlands	1,648
Bulgaria	100	New Zealand	100
Cameroon (French)	100	Norway	6,453
Cameroon (British)	100	*New Guinea, etc.	100
*China	100	Palestine	100
Czechoslovakia	3,073	Persia	100
Danzig, Free City of	228	Poland	5,982
Denmark	2,789	Portugal	503
Egypt	100	Ruanda, Urundi	100
Esthonia	124	Rumania	603
Ethiopia (Abyssinia)	100	Russia, European and Asiatic	2,248
Finland	471	Samoa, Western	100
France	3,954	San Marino	100
Germany	51,227	*Siam	100
Great Britain and Northern Ireland	34,007	South Africa, Union of	100
		South West Africa	100
Greece	100	Spain	131
Hungary	473	Sweden	9,561
Iceland	100	Switzerland	2,081
*India	100	Syria and The Lebanon	100
Iraq (Mesopotamia)	100	Tanganyika	100
Irish Free State	28,567	Togoland (British)	100
Italy (incl. Dodekanesia, etc.)	3,845	Togoland (French)	100
*Japan	100	Turkey	100
Latvia	142	*Yap, etc.	100
Liberia	100	Yugoslavia	671

[1] "The annual quota of any nationality shall be two per centum of the number of foreign-born individuals of such nationality resident in continental United States as determined by the United States census of 1890, but the minimum quota of any nationality shall be 100" —Sec. 11(a). "For the purposes of this Act nationality shall be determined by country of birth"—Sec. 12(a).

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DAWN

By Count Hugo Lerchenfeld

POLITICAL history is not a sequence of incoherent and haphazard events but a chain of causes and effects. A single individual may decide from one day to the next to alter the whole course and character of his existence, to close one chapter and begin another entirely different in tone and construction. Nations cannot. They are subject to the laws of evolution, for even a revolution is generally only evolution—an explosive sequence of events crowded into a short space of time, but leaving more of the *ancien régime* untouched than usually is at first apparent.

When the Dawes Report was published it was almost universally acclaimed as the opening of a new era. It was to solve all problems, financial and economic, and to bring back peace and prosperity to the world. Certainly the welcome accorded to it showed clearly how deep was the world-wide longing for a settlement.

Valuable as was the Report, its paramount importance was due to the fact that for the first time since the armistice an official conference dealing with reparations was able to put the whole problem on a business basis, and to eliminate all political elements and all illusions as to Germany's capacity to pay unlimited sums. The path indicated by the experts is certainly stony and fraught with danger, but it seems the only way out of a situation which has become more and more intolerable since the days of Versailles. Europe cannot recover as long as large districts like Germany and Russia remain outside the pale of normal international intercourse.

"Finally convinced, as we are, that it is hopeless to build any constructive scheme unless this finds its own guarantee in the fact that it is to the interest of all parties to carry it out in good faith, we put forward our plan, relying upon this interest." This extract from the Dawes Report lays stress upon the two elements essential to success: common-sense and moral responsibility.

Much has been said and written about the Report, often without a very thorough knowledge of its contents and of the underlying situation. It may, therefore, be useful briefly to recapitulate the problems which it is designed to solve.

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Germany's recognized indebtedness is determined by the difference between the maximum of her financial and economic profits and the needs of her population. The per capita rate of taxation is required to be at least as high as in the Allied countries. This indebtedness can only be paid in kind or in labor, but not in money, since money is only the expression of the standing of a country's currency in international exchange. The value of German money can only be maintained if the budget of the Reich is balanced and if the economic balance between Germany and other countries is preserved. The economic balance includes the balance of payments and of commerce between home and foreign markets. On this account we must differentiate clearly between the payments needed to carry out the demands of reparation obligations, and the transfer of such payments to the Allied creditors. Germany's capacity to produce and thus fulfill her engagements is primarily based on the assumptions that the resources of the occupied territory will be restored to her, that the economic unity of these territories with the rest of the country will be reëstablished, and that an end will be made of the present strangulation of trade by the interference of the occupation authorities, especially the military authorities. Only such measures of superintendence and security as are mentioned in the Report should be put into effect. The most important innovation in the new plan is the proposed German Bank, to be organized with the help of a foreign loan as a substitute for the Reichsbank. The Dawes Plan neither establishes the total sum of the reparations, nor does it set a certain number of years as the term for German payments; it limits itself to fixing the extent of yearly payments, assuming that the next four years will be a period of transition and that normal conditions of trade and production may be expected to begin with the fifth year. This estimate of production may be altered if necessary to maintain the stability of the German currency, or to enable the creditors to share the benefits of a favorable development as measured by a joint prosperity index. On the other hand, this sum represents Germany's entire yearly indebtedness, including the expenses of Allied occupation and of all measures necessary for the carrying out of the peace treaty as well as of the experts' proposals.

Optimism is the keynote of the whole scheme. Business can never be carried on without optimism, and the New World is essentially optimistic. But at the same time optimism does not

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absolve us from weighing carefully all possible difficulties. When in the Church of Rome a man of saintly life is proposed for canonization, a so-called canonical trial is held and an *advocatus diaboli* proceeds to set forth all possible reasons why the candidate for sainthood should not be admitted into the company of the elect. So in this case it can be only an advantage to consider what difficulties may arise and when a deadlock may occur. A timely warning may avoid danger and sound criticism means constructive work.

My introductory remark to the effect that historic events are insolubly linked by cause and effect is confirmed by the reparation question. The Treaty of Versailles failed to solve this vital problem and all the measures since taken by the Allies have been conspicuously lacking in justice and judgment. Political and emotional motives have ruled in place of economic considerations. That Americans should have been the first to recognize this fact not only redounds to their credit, but at the same time throws a light on the deeply-rooted misunderstandings which prevented an earlier acceptance of a logical and intelligent procedure.

Mistrust has lain at the bottom of everything, the effect not only of the war but also of the maladjustment of European affairs by the resultant treaties. And this feeling of mistrust is mutual.

The German people mistrust the Anglo-Saxons in the belief that they begrudge Germany her legitimate economic expansion. The clauses of the treaty depriving Germany of her colonies and her merchant marine, denying her right to be treated as an equal in commercial relations, are quoted as proof of the validity of this standpoint. It is felt that no opportunity to exclude German competition will ever be neglected and that the Dawes proposals will be made an instrument towards this end. At the same time England is believed to consider the continuation of Germany as a great continental nation essential to the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Bismarck used to speak of the British plan of using the Germans as their soldiers on the continent. A look at the other side shows the English people still uneasy at Germany's industrial and commercial ambitions, though the nightmare of naval and colonial competition is gone. They hear of the progress which the German industries have made since the war, of new plants erected, of old plants modernized, of the dumping of goods in foreign markets which they hold partly responsible for their millions of unemployed. They read

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imposing statistics of new tonnage sailing under the German flag. They are told of the prosperity of the vanquished and his reckless spending at home and abroad. This mistrust must forcibly influence English policy even under the Labor régime. At the same time the English public is unfavorably impressed by rumors of German armaments and military preparations, as they feel themselves pledged to secure the future peace and safety of their former ally.

Between Germany and France the gulf of mistrust is much deeper. France, according to public opinion in Germany, is to a certain extent ready to coöperate economically with the German captains of industry and finance, but she wants to reduce her neighbor to a state of political disintegration similar to that of the German Federation before 1866. French power and security, it is said, are synonymous to German impotence. For this reason the historical controversy between the two neighbors appears in French eyes as merely the result of permanent Teutonic aggression throughout the centuries. The conquest by Louis XIV of the old provinces of the German Empire, like Lorraine, Alsace, and parts of Flanders, are entirely forgotten, as are Napoleon's imperialism and the national thirst for "la gloire." The war of 1870 is declared Bismarck's most Machiavellian move on the chess-board of politics. Yet recent events on the Rhine, especially the support given by the French authorities to the Separatist movement, seem to justify the German fear that France is pursuing a policy of her own which has nothing to do with her claims for reparation. Now France, and even Poincaré, have accepted the Dawes Report, and Herriot and his cabinet have been giving it their support. Nevertheless the French nationalists are still undaunted, and the demand for "securities" is hovering over the whole situation. In fact, there are two kinds of securities. The first kind is political, a safeguard for national and territorial integrity; the second is economic, a guarantee for the fulfilment of the obligations imposed on Germany. The German people at large, including those belonging to the parliamentary parties which voted for the acceptance of the Report fear that the country will be ground between the millstones of these two types of security, and that even a French Government of the Left will finally yield to nationalistic pressure.

Another complication is the question of Germany's disarmament. The Allies have demanded a final country-wide investi-

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gation before abandoning military control to the League. Inter-allied commissions comprising hundreds of officers and privates have been investigating in Germany ever since 1919, and the presence of these commissions—their very considerable expenses must be paid by Germany—has been a source of continuous excitement. Nor have they prevented a growing movement in favor of military training. Even socialists, though opposed to the old system, complain seriously of the lack of discipline among the youthful elements in the country and advocate a system of militia similar to that of the United States. Also, as a reaction against revolution and socialism, the institutions of the old army have gained widely in popularity. There are parades of old soldiers and dedications of monuments for the dead of the Great War. Organizations have been formed to complement the armed forces in case of riots or communistic disorders. On the whole there is a good deal of activity in consequence of the repressive nature of the Treaty of Versailles, and nothing has so furthered the nationalistic movement as this same repression. But on the other hand there is no army except the official Reichswehr, nor is the Reichswehr so armed and equipped as to be able to carry on modern warfare. While our neighbors are armed to the teeth, absolutely up-to-date in all technical details, Germany is practically at the mercy of every invader. The German Government has accepted the demand for a final investigation, but the way in which the French press commented on the news is characteristic of the spirit of mistrust. The investigation will not bring to light anything of importance, nor will it silence the rumors of German armaments. But this chapter must be finally closed; better feeling is sure to follow from the lifting of this humiliating pressure.

Of course all this refers but indirectly to the Dawes Report, yet it explains the atmosphere in which the scheme has to be carried out.

The Roman sentence "inter arma silent musae" applies to every kind of free activity. Workmen are not machinery but intelligent and highstrung individuals. Visible and obtrusive occupation presses heavily on the population and takes away their feeling of liberty. The Report wisely recommends the restitution of normal economic and administrative conditions without, however, trespassing on prohibited political ground. But its recommendation implies a fundamental change in the methods hitherto adopted by Messrs. Tirard and de Metz; it implies strict neutrality in everything which does not immediately concern the

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occupying forces. Only under such conditions, and by a considerable reduction in the number of troops, can occupation become tolerable, though in any case remaining a heavy and abnormal strain upon the population.

I should like to recount a characteristic episode which took place in Warsaw in 1917 while I was German High Commissionar with the Polish Government following the declaration of a Polish kingdom by the Central Powers. In those days the occupation was intended to be not only peaceful but benevolent. The administration was reformed, self-government introduced, a university and school system instituted with Polish teachers, and if it had not been for the seizure of goods needed for the army, the Poles would have had a comparatively easy time of it. My position brought me into close contact with many Poles—all of them patriots—and I could not help but observe a certain restraint and dissatisfaction not due to our personal relationships. One day I asked a gentleman whom I knew to be reliable and in favor of coöperation with Germany: "What on earth do you advise us to do in order to satisfy the population?" "Get out!" was the heartfelt reply. Comparisons are superfluous.

If the occupation should cease at once the pacification of Europe would be infinitely facilitated. But alas, such a step could probably only be taken by an absolute monarch like the "le bon roi Dagobert." So in spite of the high-flown phrases of enlighted democracy, mistrust will continue to prevail.

The French public believes that Germany has not paid a farthing. One of the reasons why public opinion in France accepted the Dawes Report was the conviction that, once the proposals were put into effect, payments would finally begin. Unfortunately neither of the Commissions dealt with this question. If an official statement of German payments had been published one great element of distrust would have been done away with. Anglo-Saxon experts estimate the total value of such payments in money and kind at about 25 billion gold marks. At the present moment German deliveries under the so-called Micum arrangement, and the receipts under the Franco-Belgian fiscal system, amount to a sum larger by far than the payments proposed by the experts during the transitory period.

Certainly this state of affairs cannot continue without the economic and financial ruin of the debtor. There must be some change, and consequently the majority of the German people

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accept the plan proposed by the experts as a basis for a final arrangement. Chancellor Marx and his Government secured a majority of sixty-five votes in the Reichstag in favor of carrying out a policy of acceptance. Even among the opposition not a few were secretly in agreement with such a policy. Only the extremists on both sides are implacable, because Communists and extreme Nationalists are convinced that their ideals can be attained only by war. But every conscientious German cannot but ask: "Is Germany able to carry out the accepted plan?" This question must be faced to avoid evil consequences. If any failure of the plan were to be met with a good-humored "Hell and Maria!" all would be well, but what will happen if the keystone of the plan, the raising of the necessarily huge amount of capital and the "transfer" of German payments into the circulation of the creditor countries, refuses to work properly? Will there be new sanctions, new wreckage?

In business matters it is best to be sincere and outspoken.

"*Is Germany able to make the Dawes Plan work?*"

A belief in Germany's prosperity is widely spread abroad, especially among her creditors. And yet there is reason for pessimism. Prosperity must be measured by safer instruments than the superficial impressions of tourists. The experts propose a comparatively sound method of figuring prosperity according to an "index" composed of several standards, namely, commercial development, the budget, railroad traffic, the consumption of certain articles like coal, alchohol, sugar, etc., and the birth-rate. In the last few years most of these figures have become increasingly unfavorable, alarming, in fact, in the case of the birth-rate and the total of exports.[1]

Like most industrially active countries before the war, Germany had a surplus of imports over exports, but this was more than compensated for by Germany's receipts from various foreign sources. Since the war these sources of income have dwindled, and consequently not only the commercial but also the eco-

[1]Germany's consumption of coal, which for the last three years before the war had reached an average of 1.6 billion metric tons, fell back to an average of 1.15 in the years following the war.

While in 1913 the exports were valued at 10 billion gold marks, the imports were a little above 12. In the first three months of 1924 only 1.5 billion were exported and 2.1 imported, which would amount to exports valued at only 6 billion gold marks and imports valued at 8.4 billion for the whole year.

In 1913, for every one thousand inhabitants 27 were born and 15 died; in 1923, these figures fell to 15 and 13, showing that births and deaths are now almost even. Since the middle of 1923 the birth-rate has been continuously decreasing.

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nomic balance remained unfavorable, a situation which must bring economic disaster if it is not soon changed. Germany suffers from the loss of large agricultural areas, which means the increased necessity of importing food-stuffs; and her foreign property, according to the McKenna Report, is reduced to nearly one-fifth of its pre-war value. If the foreign mark speculation had not contributed over six billions toward the recuperation of German finances, there would have been no way to buy the necessary raw materials abroad,—one of the most striking examples of the irony of fate, as Mr. Keynes remarks.

The period of inflation was marked by large German sales; but it meant dumping on foreign markets and selling out at home. Germany became the world's favorite department store until the German business world abandoned the mark and calculated in foreign exchanges. When the Rentenmark appeared and stopped her runaway sister in the fabulous relation of 1:1,000,000,000, the prices of German products were higher than those prevailing in any other world markets. The paper mark still remains in circulation, though a monetary outcast, and the value of German property, real estate, bonds, mortgages, and obligations of all kind is adrift on the flood of uncertainty. In fact, circulating capital has been greatly decreased, while the value of real estate is depressed by the daily increasing scarcity of ready money. Interest on cash loans has risen to the rate of five percent a month. The difficulties of carrying on business become more and more pressing. The stock market lags hopelessly. The labor market shows a steady decline.

This is the real situation. That even now crowds fill watering places and pleasure resorts is largely due to the fact that the old spirit of frugality and saving has not yet returned and that too many people follow old Horace's advice: "Carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero!"

Will the sum stipulated in the Dawes Report be raised?

During the transitory period of four years the chief payments are to be made from foreign pockets. Germany, though willing to attract alien capital, will find it very difficult to finance the experts' scheme, and will herself hardly be able to contribute materially to the billions of capital required. This is due to the alarming scarcity of her circulating capital, even if with returning confidence the general public should begin once more to save and invest. The first loan of 800 million gold marks will be a

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comparatively easy affair. Labelled a "Solidarity Loan," it ought to appeal to the American spirit. But this loan is only a small item compared with the capitalization of the railroads and industrial property, and it is doubtful whether even free competition in the international money market, extended over a period of many years will attract the necessary number of subscribers which this will require. Once the loans are started, to pay interest and sinking fund charges will prove less difficult, provided normal conditions are restored.

After the transitory period Germany's internal revenue will become the important factor. There is no doubt that indirect taxation will yield sufficient sums to cover the 1¼ billion required. But this has one great drawback. The German budget is largely based on this taxation, and when the income from the latter is diverted it will prove extremely difficult to raise the necessary funds from other sources. Indirect taxation, like direct taxation, has its natural limits. And the German budget must balance in order to assure the stability of the German currency, which stability is the basis of the entire Dawes scheme.

Let us recapitulate. There has been a deadlock on the question of reparations in consequence of years of futile conferences, and because of the warfare on the Rhine and in the Ruhr. Due to centuries of bad neighborly relations a deep-rooted mistrust poisons all dealings between France and Germany. Now a final effort is to be made to solve the great pending problem. The experts who took up the question were not entirely neutral, since they belong to the several belligerent nations, but they spoke as men trained in business methods with the firm conviction that some workable settlement *must* be achieved. They did not and could not give a verdict on the problem as a whole, and they were not allowed to announce any political opinions. Neither the sum total of reparations nor the final term for their fulfilment has been fixed, though the very silence of the experts on these points demonstrates the absurdity of the former demand for 132 billion gold marks. But some agreement must be reached on this important question, for reparations mean neither an eternal mortgage nor a tribute to be paid by the vanquished to the victor through all time.

The experts believe that after a period of transition Germany will regain, to a great degree, her former prosperity, but in this they seem too optimistic. Germany's losses have crippled her,

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and she is excluded from normal commercial relations with a large and important part of the world's markets. War and revolution, social conflicts and political disturbances, have created general unrest throughout Germany and have so affected the moral balance of the people as to seriously hamper economic activity. The extremists of the Right and the Left have dangerously undermined general public recognition of state authority. Only the unexpected change in the situation caused by the introduction of the Rentenmark prevented an explosion which would have disastrously affected the whole of Europe, but this improvement will prove to be only temporary and artificial unless energetic steps are taken towards settlement and pacification.

These steps for the present can only consist, in addition to adopting the proposed scheme (in good-will and without political reservations), of such additional measures as are necessary to guarantee its working smoothly and to ensure the impartial settlement of conflicts arising in the course of its application. Such conflicts must be removed into the purer sphere of *arbitration*.

This idea is neither new nor difficult of realization. The Dawes Report itself introduces it into the railroad scheme; equity and justice demand it; it underlies every project to replace violence and the power of the strong with moral forces; it is at the bottom of every effort towards international agreement. There is no other way to fight mistrust, which will always be ready to resort to new sanctions in order to force a one-sided solution. "Discite moniti!" Our generation ought surely to have learned its lesson by this time.

The Dawes Report, and the spirit in which it was conceived, may open a new day. The sun is not shining yet; daylight is just beginning, and who knows whether we shall have serene or stormy weather.

The tide of imperialism, sweeping all nations before it, making them love power for power's sake, was responsible for the World War. Each nation, according to Bismarck's vivid picture, was like a journeyman traveling through a trackless forest who unexpectedly stumbles upon another traveler and fires his pistol, for fear the other fellow might shoot first. Mistrust, more or less justifiable, is at the bottom of all international relations. Can it be removed?

When I spoke in Philadelphia in 1923 on "The European Problem," I called the League of Nations an imperfect instru-

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ment because it represented the existing balance of power and lacked real moral authority. Could not a body of highly deserving and competent men, such as are to be found in every nation as representatives of its highest moral forces—a kind of Areopagus—meet to give decisions on highly important contested matters? Could not a council be formed whose high judgment and impartiality would be taken for granted, and which would guide public opinion all over the world? This body and the World Court would coöperate, each working within its own sphere. Other matters of international importance, such as social legislation, sanitary protection, scientific investigation and the like could be allotted to special commissions of experts, as in the present League.

Democracy does not seem to render the world more peaceful. The masses are emotional by nature, skilled propaganda will always succeed in arousing their feelings. Democracy must be tempered by careful political education and by an aristocratic element of leadership. Institutions of the highest moral standards, dealing with problems not in a narrow way but rather in a broad humanitarian sense, will open the minds both of the leaders and the led.

The truth of this statement seems well illustrated by Germany's present international situation, which threatens to dislocate Europe if adequate remedies are not applied. Germany is vitally interested in the solution of several open questions. By the Treaty of Versailles she was forced to acknowledge her responsibility for the World War and was denied the right to form a national state at the very time that other national states were being formed and even augmented by large national minorities. Germany smarts severely under these verdicts, which she cannot acknowledge to be just as long as the verdicts are rendered by a partial tribunal. Such an international body as I propose would be able to investigate, to open the archives, to deliberate and render decisions of universal weight. As long as reparations are generally regarded as an expiatory measure, and the provisions of Versailles considered a punishment for crime, there will be no sound settlement of the peace problem. The German people of good-will want their case tried.

We are living through an extremely strange and uncertain period of human history. There is no idea too preposterous for conception, no theory which is not defended, no solution which is

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not advocated, no ideal which is not disputed. When civilization seemed to have reached its summit and humanity boasted of the achievements of its culture, the greatest of catastrophes shook the world to its very foundations. Now, after marvelous technical accomplishments, and after the reign of skepticism and materialism, a period of spirituality seems to be opening out before us. We live on the threshold of a new epoch; we are the framers of our destiny; out of many possibilities the one we chose will become reality. Seen from this view the Dawes Report becomes symbolic. Dawn—not yet daylight. But hope is the best gift of God to his creation.

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CAN AMERICA EXPORT WHEAT?

By Theodore D. Hammatt

THE wheat growers of the United States, like those of other countries where production is in excess of domestic requirements, are subjected to forces of supply and demand world-wide in origin. That was the situation before the war, and it is the situation today. In the interval, however, changes in competitive conditions, decidedly adverse to American farmers, have taken place. In order to set forth the more important of these changes clearly, certain factors in the world's trade in wheat during the decade ending with the year 1913 must be sketched in as background.

During the decade 1904–1913 the annual wheat crop of the world amounted, in round numbers, to from 3,000 million to 4,000 million bushels. Of the total production during those ten years Europe (excluding Russia) produced 34 percent, Russia and the United States 20 percent each, India 9½ percent, Canada and the Argentine 4½ percent each, Australia 2½ percent, and other countries together 5 percent.

The general trend in world production was upward, due mainly to increased crops in the exporting countries. A nation-by-nation comparison of the average crops of the first five years of the decade with those of the last five years shows that Canada and Australia (figuring in percentages) effected the greatest increases. Russia also made substantial progress. In the United States, the gain in production about kept pace with the increase in population. Argentina's production, on the other hand, decreased, owing to unfavorable seasons. But the underlying trend of wheat production is indicated less surely by the quantities of wheat harvested, which are largely affected by conditions beyond the farmers' control, than by the areas devoted to the crop in different countries. During these ten years the Canadian acreage was expanded by more than 100 percent, and the acreages of Argentina and Australia by upwards of 40 percent. By comparison, the United States and Russia made slow progress. In western Europe the acreage remained practically constant. Thus even before the war the disposition to go more largely into wheat-growing was most apparent in those countries which have since become our strongest competitors.

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Ocean shipments of wheat during these same ten years ranged from 479 million to 665 million bushels. The main flow was towards the industrial areas of western Europe (including the United Kingdom) from Russia, India, and Australia on the east, and from the United States, Canada, and Argentina on the west. Wheat was exported from the Balkans also, but as the Balkan crops are regarded as a part of Europe's domestic supply these shipments may be considered as an inter-state movement. Of the total amount of wheat exported by countries outside of Europe, 98 percent was furnished by the six countries just mentioned, as follows: Russia 27 percent, the United States 22 percent, Argentina 19 percent, Canada 14 percent, Australia 8 percent, and India 8 percent. Year by year the volume of world shipments, just as of world production, tended to increase. Canada increased her exports by 183 percent, Australia by 70 percent, and Russia and India by 32 percent. But the movement from the United States and Argentina decreased. The falling off in exports from the United States, however, was considerable only in 1910–11 and 1911–12; and in the case of the Argentine the decrease in shipments is attributable to poor yields and is not therefore indicative of any permanent change.

Among all these events the significant developments for the United States were the increases in acreage in Canada, the Argentine and Australia, and the large export shipments from Canada and Russia. Both pointed to a much more intense competition in the future.

The statistical records of the decade are evidence of the close relationship between world crops and world prices, and between world prices and world shipments. Charts correlating the size of the world's crops and the corresponding averages of Liverpool quotations show clearly both the depressing effect of increased production and the response of the market to smaller crops. Similar charts illustrating the relation between the volume of world shipments and Liverpool prices, which are generally accepted as fairly representative of world values, demonstrate that the amount of wheat purchased by importing countries increased when prices were relatively low, and decreased when prices were relatively high. A third point of interest brought out by the statistics is that the wheat imported, when added to home grown crops, did not provide a uniform annual supply for the importing countries. Instead of balancing domestic production

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

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and theoretical requirements by imports, the practice of importing countries appears to have been to take only what they could afford at the prevailing price. In years when prices were relatively high the practice seems to have been to resort more generally to alternatives and substitutes.

These three simple market facts have real meaning for American wheat growers, since they suggest that in the future large exports cannot be relied upon to sustain prices in the face of expanding world production. Large exports, as a rule, are the result of relatively low prices and not the cause of high prices.

The war, of course, dislocated the whole international trade in breadstuffs. The main shift in production was from east to west. The closing of the Dardanelles blocked the outward movement of wheat from Russia. The length of the sea routes and the hazards of the voyage restricted the flow from Australia and the Argentine. India's exports fell off sharply. In western Europe itself production greatly decreased. The responsibility of meeting the new demand devolved upon North America, and influenced both by the rising price of wheat and by patriotic motives the United States and Canada responded with enlarged acreages and heavier shipments.

This profound shift in the accustomed sources of supply for practically all importing nations produced new competitive factors in the markets of the world, and these persisted even when peace returned. We have seen that in the five years before the war the six principal countries growing a surplus of wheat were the United States, Russia, India, Canada, Argentina, and Australia. The average annual production of the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia in these years was about 1,126 million bushels, and that of Russia and India 1,015 million bushels, making a total production for the six countries of 2,141 million bushels. In sharp contrast, the average annual production of the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia for the post-war period 1920–1923 was 1,507 million bushels, and that of Russia and India 621 million bushels. In other words, the first four countries increased their production by 381 million bushels, and the other two countries decreased their production by 394 million bushels. The basis for the remarkable gains of the first group of nations is the increase in acreage, which in Canada amounted to 129 percent, in Australia to 32 percent, in the United States to 16 percent, and in Argentina to 6 percent.

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It is of interest to note that the increased crops of Canada and Australia have rendered the British Empire self-supporting in wheat.

The six countries named above together exported annually from 1910 to 1914 about 550 million bushels of wheat, and from 1920 to 1923 about 700 million bushels. But in the war interval Russian and Indian shipments were reduced, on the average, by some 200 million bushels. Hence, the increase in exports from the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia not only made up for the decrease in shipments from Russia and India, but provided 150 million bushels a year in addition. The greatly enlarged offerings of these countries, notwithstanding lower production in Europe, created a "buyers' market," in which importing countries were able, from time to time, to purchase immense quantities of wheat at practically their own price. Available data indicate that they were able, as a whole, to fill their most pressing requirements at such prices.

The accumulated demand at the close of the war, reinforced by a fresh resort to credits, caused wheat prices to turn upward in the spring of 1919 and to move at high levels until the fall of 1920. During the crop year 1920–21 prices fell abruptly and the decline continued in 1921–22; while in 1922–23 and 1923–24 the market may be said to have hovered usually near the level of 1913. American farmers have been told more than once that the low prices of the last three years—ruinously low when the exchange value of wheat is taken into account—have been caused by a lack of export business. But, as a matter of fact, the importing countries both in western Europe and outside of Europe took more foreign wheat during these three years than in any equal period prior to the war. A more logical explanation of the prevailing prices is found in the statistical record of the large stocks available for export in the United States, Canada, Argentina and Australia. The weight of these stocks on the market depressed prices to levels at which wheat could move abroad freely even in the face of Europe's subnormal purchasing power.

As an exporter of wheat the United States must compete chiefly with Canada, Argentina, and Australia. The increase in the average yearly exports of these countries (165 percent, 59 percent, and 70 percent, respectively) above their pre-war averages, has left less room for American wheat in the world's markets.

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The back-pressure of more bountiful harvests in importing countries, and the reappearance of Russian wheat in quantity—developments which may be expected to occur—would render competitive conditions still more difficult. With such an outlook any advantages or disadvantages which the United States may possess as an exporter of wheat become significant. And they must be sought in the cost of production, the period of harvesting, the transportation and marketing charges, the character of the American wheat shipped abroad, and other factors affecting the merchandising of our crop.

The "cost of producing a bushel of wheat"—an elusive term at best—cannot be ascertained for the various exporting countries. But it is not necessary to know the exact figures before conceding that production costs in the United States run higher than in Canada, Argentina, or Australia. The higher charge against the American crop for the use of land or labor, or both, as compared with the charge in any one of the competing countries, is good evidence of the fact; while the progressive decrease since 1919 in wheat acreage in the United States, compared with the steady increase in the areas under cultivation in Canada, Argentina, and Australia, again indicates a lower cost of production in these three countries. A recent report of the United States Tariff Commission on the average cost of production in the prairie provinces of Canada and in certain of our spring wheat states shows a difference in favor of the Canadians of 48 cents a bushel, figuring the land charge at interest on stated values. This was largely due to differences in land values and yields per acre. Not many reliable facts as to cost are available for Argentina or Australia, but the average price of wheat land is probably twice as high in the United States as in either of those two countries or Canada, while farm wages in Argentina are much lower than in the United States and Canada. American wheat growers, then, when weighing their chances of survival in the export trade, would be wise, in the light of such facts as are known, to make allowance for production costs substantially higher than those of their competitors.

The practice of importing countries to forecast their requirements and to provide for them by entering into contracts for future deliveries prevents any one country from gaining a decided advantage over another. Yet it is fortunate for Argentina, in competing with the United States, Canada and Russia, all of

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whose harvest periods occur near together, that her harvest follows theirs at an interval of several months. Otherwise the ocean freights for Argentine shippers would be considerably higher. Australia is in a similar favored position.

When the farmers of the United States export wheat they receive for it the current price paid in the world markets. Since the same rule applies equally to the wheat growers of other surplus-producing countries it develops that transportation becomes a prime factor in the struggle for overseas orders.

Broadly speaking, the wheat growers of Australia and Argentina have the advantage of short hauls by rail, those in the United States and Canada the advantage of lower ocean freights. In Australia the wheat districts are close to the seaboard, but as rail rates per mile are probably twice those in the United States or Canada this advantage is offset by the fact that Sidney and Melbourne are some 8,000 miles farther from Liverpool than either Montreal or New York, with ocean freights to western Europe ranging from 16 to 22 cents per bushel. On the whole, the rather limited information at hand does not seem to show that Australia enjoys any material advantage over North America in the cost of moving wheat from the farm to European markets.

But our other southern competitor, Argentina, has quite decided shipping advantages. The wheat lands occupy a crescent-shaped area lying along both sides of the Parana River and stretching 500 miles inland. From Rosario, twenty-two miles up the river, and from Buenos Aires, on the estuary of the Rio de la Plata, the railroads spread a network of lines through the wheat fields. The length of the rail hauls to ship-side range from a few miles up to 360 miles, but do not average over 150. (In the United States much wheat must travel a good deal further in order to reach Duluth, Chicago, or Kansas City, where it is still far from the seaboard. In fact, no other large exporting country can put its wheat aboard ship as cheaply as Argentina.) But the ocean freights for full cargoes from the La Plata to Liverpool are much higher than from ports in the North Atlantic, running as high as 12 to 15 cents a bushel for the 5,000-mile voyage, as against 6 to 9 cents for the 3,500-mile voyage from New York; and neither Rosario nor Buenos Aires enjoys the very low "parcel rates" prevailing for great quantities of the wheat moving abroad from New York and Philadelphia. Yet, on the basis of recent estimates published by the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Tidewater

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Association, it appears to cost, on the average, some 10 cents less a bushel to move wheat from farms in Argentina to western Europe than from farms in the wheat districts of the United States. Without attempting any exact comparison of through rates, it seems safe to say that the difference in favor of Argentine farmers is enough to constitute an important competitive advantage. And cheap rates, cheap labor, cheap land, together with the depression in the cattle business, are reasons for anticipating still further expansion of the Argentine wheat industry.

Our most formidable competitor, however, is Canada. In 1922–23 she took first place from the United States as an exporter of wheat and in 1923–24 increased her lead. From every point of view Canada appears to be in the wheat business to stay,—and, undoubtedly, on an expanding scale. This fact stands out very clearly in the studies of agricultural export problems which are being made by Dr. Frank M. Surface of the Department of Commerce. The strong points of Canada's position are low production costs, excellent wheat, splendid elevator equipment, and a remarkably well organized marketing system; her big problem, —as in the United States,—is transportation, for her wheat fields lie far inland.

The limits of this article forbid a full description of the Canadian grain trade, but a few of its outstanding features which are of special importance to wheat growers south of the border must be outlined. Canada's foreign markets are all-important to her, as the quantity of wheat she must sell abroad far exceeds the amount she consumes at home. In 1922–23 more than 85 percent of Canadian commercial wheat was exported as grain and flour, and a higher percentage is likely to be sent abroad in 1923–24. As a natural result the trade is organized upon an export basis. Practically speaking, but one kind of wheat (hard spring wheat) is grown in the prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, which contain about 95 percent of the total acreage of the Dominion; little of the soft winter wheat of the eastern provinces enters export channels. The main movement is eastward. The lines of the Canadian Pacific and Canadian National Railways which tap the wheat belt converge on Winnipeg, the central inspection point, through which the wheat moves on to Fort William and Port Arthur, the twin cities at the head of Lake Superior where the principal terminal elevators are located. Thence the grain flows to eastern lake ports,

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both Canadian and American, and thence to Montreal or seaports in the United States. The crop is harvested in the late summer, and the bulk of it exported between the middle of September and the middle of December in order to take advantage of cheap water transportation and avoid the expense of winter storage. During this busy period the great streams of wheat that originate in the 4,500 country elevators of the West are passed through the terminals at the lake front and loaded aboard the boats at a rate which is made possible only by close teamwork among the elevator operators, the railway and shipping companies, the Dominion inspection department, and the banks. American and Canadian vessels alike are employed for the lake carry, and American as well as Canadian railways carry the grain from the eastern lake ports to tidewater. In 1922–23 more wheat was shipped in American bottoms than in Canadian; and Buffalo, Erie, and Toledo received more Canadian grain than all of the Canadian ports on the eastern lakes.

The trading in Canadian wheat is conducted at Winnipeg, the only important wheat market in the Dominion and the largest primary wheat market in the world. The price structure is surprisingly simple. The country prices are derived from Winnipeg quotations covering grain in store at the lake terminal; and the Winnipeg quotations, both cash and futures, are the direct reflection of the prices obtainable for deliveries in the United Kingdom and western Europe. The Dominion Government exercises close supervision over those branches of the trade in which the farmers are associated, and one sees enormous quantities of wheat, localized as to production and of essentially one kind, moving year after year in the same general direction, through well defined and splendidly equipped transportation and commercial channels, to a limited number of principal destinations. Not only do the conditions which are maintained greatly facilitate orderly marketing, but, further, the milling industry coöperates rather than competes with the export trade in grain, for Canadian flour prices, as well as wheat prices, are rarely much out of line with foreign markets.

With production far in excess of her home requirements Canada must sell the bulk of the crop abroad, whatever the price may be, and she has equipped herself to do so in a most efficient manner. Her chief obstacle is the great distances that much of the wheat must be carried by rail, but this competitive handicap has been

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reduced by the liberal rate policy adopted by the railway companies. From the grain belt to Fort William (which corresponds to Duluth and Chicago) wheat rates on a mileage basis are lower than for similar hauls in the United States. And at Fort William Canadian wheat has virtually as ready an access to the North Atlantic ports of the United States as American wheat has at Duluth or Chicago. On the eastern lines, too, congestion promises to be relieved by the larger use of the Vancouver-Panama route.

Russia, although at present eclipsed as an exporter, is still the natural food base of western Europe and should not be lost sight of as a powerful potential competitor. During the five years preceding the war Russia's exports of wheat ranged from 80 million to 220 million bushels a year. The low plane of living of the peasant farmers, and the short routes to markets outside the empire, made extensive wheat growing practicable even with low prices. These basic conditions have not changed and may bring about a resumption of liberal shipping sooner or later, unless the attainment of a stronger economic and political position by the peasants leads to a higher per capita home consumption than before the war.

A decided handicap which the United States faces in its competition for foreign markets is that the wheat which it exports is for the most part mediocre in quality. The United States affords a better home market than is enjoyed by the farmers of any other surplus-producing country, domestic consumption exceeding exports by about four to one, and consequently our best wheat is kept out of foreign markets. In Canada, Argentina, and Australia the population is small and the crop large, which permits their best and most representative wheats to be exported. In the United States this is not the case. American bakers and housewives are exacting, and the mills grind the best of the wheat, paying a premium for the privilege, while foreign buyers must content themselves with what is left. This is the basis for the allegation that American offerings lack quality. The premium our fancy wheats carry in the home market is, of course, a boon to our wheat growers, but it does not strengthen the position of the United States as an exporter.

Whether it is expedient for the United States, all things considered, to devote to the growing of wheat sufficient land, labor, and capital to produce a surplus for export is a pressing question.

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The farmers, of course, will decide it for themselves. The progressive reduction of the planted acreage from 76,683,000 acres in 1919 to 57,111,000 acres in 1924 suggests that many farmers may have come to the conclusion that a reduction of production to the capacity of the home market is the safest policy. If so, the hasty review of competitive conditions given in the preceding paragraphs would seem to support their judgment.

Just now, at the beginning of the crop year 1924–25, trade reports indicate a smaller exportable surplus in Canada and the United States and a greater European demand than in 1923–24, a prospect for which allowance is being made in current prices. Only about one-sixth of the world's wheat crop usually enters into international trade, so a decrease of even five percent of the total production brings about a sharp reduction in exportable supplies. The world market may rule higher in the coming year than in the last. We hope it will. But that is not the main point. In deciding upon a permanent wheat policy for the United States, the long view is more important than the short, and the long view lends little encouragement to the belief that large scale production of wheat on the part of the United States will prove profitable.

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CANADA AND DOWNING STREET

By J. A. Stevenson

THE CONSTITUTION, ADMINISTRATION AND LAWS OF THE EMPIRE. By Prof. A. Berriedale Keith. Glasgow: William Collins & Sons.

THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA. By Prof. W. P. M. Kennedy. New York: Oxford University Press.

THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF 1923. Summary of Proceedings and Appendices. British White Papers Cmd. 1987 and 1988.

LAUSANNE CONFERENCE AND TREATY. Correspondence between the British and Canadian Governments. Sessional Paper No. 232 of the Canadian Parliament, and British White Papers Cmd. 2,146.

ABUNDANT evidence is now available that in the evolution of that unique political entity, the British Commonwealth, foreign affairs have supplanted domestic as the instruments of change in its structure and internal machinery. The end of the nineteenth century found the Dominions completely victorious in their long but peaceful struggle for emancipation from the tutelage of Downing Street in the domestic sphere, and possessed of complete autonomy in the management of their internal social, economic, and political affairs, though still content to entrust to the British Government the supervision and control of their relations with other countries. There exists, however, a very dim borderland between domestic and foreign affairs, and the acquisition of separate treaty-making powers in the commercial and social sphere, such as Canada utilized for the conclusion of the Taft-Fielding reciprocity pact of 1911, represented a partial inroad by the Dominions into the field of international relations. But of that particular branch of statecraft on which hang the issues of peace and war, the British Government retained undivided control and as late as the Conference of 1911 Premier Asquith bluntly declared that the responsibility for the direction of foreign policy could not be shared with the Dominions, although their advice would always be welcomed. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who had toyed at one time with the doctrine of colonial neutrality under certain circumstances, accepted this dictum without protest and reinforced it with the declaration that when Britain was at war Canada was at war. Up to this point the Dominions were subordinate communities possessed of no status in the international field.

The reasons for this tacit acquiescence in British control over

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what most communities regard as the first, last, and most vital of all interests, are not hard to seek. In the struggle for local autonomy Canada, at once the oldest, nearest, and most populous of the British Dominions, had invariably been the pioneer and her sister communities had merely followed along the trails which she had blazed. But in the people of Canada, as of the United States, a strong and justifiable sense of geographical security had bred a confirmed indifference to foreign contacts. The Canadian mind could not contemplate anything worse than temporary friction with its only territorial neighbor, the United States; commercial relations with other foreign countries were meagre; and it seemed like the simplest and cheapest solution, as long as the right to negotiate by Canadian agents a certain class of treaties dealing with social and economic problems was conceded, to leave the wider sphere of foreign policy to the management of the British Government which possessed complete machinery for the task and with rare exceptions had shown an intelligent sense of trusteeship for Dominion interests. As a corollary, the Dominions, while charged with the protection of their own shores, were absolved from all obligations to make any but voluntary contributions, which were forthcoming on a modest scale, for the general defense of the Empire. It was a happy arrangement, for it left the Dominions free to devote all save a fraction of their revenues to internal development and as long as Europe was the chief breeding ground of international trouble British Ministers were best fitted to cope with its recurring effervescences.

But when the German menace loomed up, and Britain began to feel the acute need of assistance from the Dominions to maintain her naval supremacy, the situation changed. In 1912 the Premiers of the Dominions were for the first time given access to the arcana of the Foreign Office, invited to express their views, and promised a share of control in the direction of foreign policy in return for help in the fierce competition of armaments then prevailing. The Great War followed, and among other results it brought to an end the old fabric of the British Empire which had grown up in the nineteenth century. In its place there has since been slowly rising a new structure built out of the same materials but fashioned on a completely different plan.

The termination of the war found all the British Dominions deeply involved in the complex problems of the international melée and vitally interested in their equitable solution on a per-

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manent basis. The part played by the Dominions in the ultimate victory precluded any denial of their claim to a definite share in the making of the peace settlement, but the late Mr. Arthur Sifton once confided to the House of Commons at Ottawa the fact that the separate representation of the Dominions on the British delegation at Paris was only secured in face of the keen opposition of some of the more conservative elements in London. However, it was won, and the right of the Dominions to a determining voice in British foreign policy was firmly established. To promote the continuous utilization of that right there was established an arrangement whereby regular information about both the general trend of British foreign policy and the course of particular negotiations was conveyed to the Dominion Governments. But it was freely recognized that there existed no adequate machinery for the effective exercise of any coöperative control over British policy by the Dominions and plans were laid for a special constitutional conference to deal both with this particular problem and the general political relations of the units of the Empire. It was expected that the Conference of 1921 would undertake this task, but when it met most of the statesmen present, and especially Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Hughes of Australia, had become appalled at the seeming difficulties of the enterprise and combined to smother quietly the projected investigation. At the regular meeting of that Conference some minor adjustments were made but a policy of drift was adopted. The British Foreign Office continued to reach decisions about the foreign policy of the Empire and on the strength of the regular informatory despatches which it sent to Ottawa, Cape Town, and elsewhere and which rarely evoked any comment, critical or otherwise, regarded all the Dominions as committed by implication to the support of the policies which it had evolved. In vain the *Round Table* uttered warnings that the Dominions were being blithely committed to undertakings and settlements to whose possible fruits their Cabinets had given no adequate consideration, and that future requests to honor the obligations thus entered upon so lightly might easily confront them with the alternative of embarking upon unpalatable military adventures or withdrawing from the Commonwealth.

The first warnings of serious flaws in the existing system came in connection with the Near Eastern crisis in September, 1922, when the Turkish Nationalist army, flushed with victory over the

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Greeks, was threatening to wrest control of the Dardanelles from the British army of occupation, and war seemed imminent. There was general agreement about the indiscreet character of the special summons to arms which Mr. Winston Churchill, largely on his own responsibility, sent to the Dominions, but the right of the British Government to call upon the Dominions to honor obligations to which they were undubitably committed by their own representatives could not be gainsaid. But, plainly, both the peoples and parliaments of the Dominions had been denied any but the most cursory knowledge of the nature of these obligations, and in Canada at least there was profound dismay at the sudden prospect of immersion in another European war. This disaster was happily averted, but the episode provided an illuminating revelation of the farcical character of the arrangements whereby the Dominions were supposed to exercise a decisive vote in the shaping of the British foreign policy.

When the Imperial Conference met in 1923 there inevitably took place some post-mortems over different episodes which had occurred since the last gathering in 1921, and there was a prolonged discussion about the treaty-making powers of the Dominions. Naturally the general question of the machinery whereby the units of the British Commonwealth were supposed to achieve a common foreign policy came up for examination and there was general agreement among the overseas delegates that experience had revealed a number of very serious flaws in it and that the methods of communication were particularly unsatisfactory. The Conference agreed to give its sanction to certain changes, of which Canada had been the chief innovator, and ultimately its conclusions upon the subject of the internal diplomatic machinery of the Commonwealth were embodied in a resolution.

This resolution recommended that the governments of the Empire should not negotiate any treaty "without due consideration of its possible effect on other parts of the Empire, or, if circumstances so demand, on the Empire as a whole," and that in negotiating any treaty they should take steps "to ensure that any of the other governments of the Empire likely to be interested are informed, so that if any such government considers that its interests would be affected, it may have an opportunity of expressing its views . . ."

Superficially these arrangements bore every promise of offering a good working basis for coöperation in the field of foreign affairs,

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but in the year since the conclusion of the Conference which endorsed them, there has been a steady accumulation of evidence that in practice the system is far from satisfactory and must be subjected to radical alterations unless misunderstandings and friction between partner units of the Commonwealth are to become chronic and eventually lead to some serious quarrel. It is true that so far Canada has been solely responsible for each case of friction and dissension, and there is ground for suspicion that domestic political motives may have played some part in the attitude of her Government, but there is no reason why the South African or Australian Governments might not be responsible for the next disagreement.

The first serious trouble arose in connection with the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, though its source dated back to the autumn of 1922 when plans were afoot to end the Near Eastern imbroglio by a peace. The precedents of Versailles and Washington would have ordained that British interests be entrusted to a Commonwealth delegation to which the Dominions would contribute members, but Lord Curzon found himself confronted by a revival of a French demand (made on at least one previous occasion but foiled by Mr. Lloyd George) that France's North African colonies should be accorded Dominion status and given separate representation at the Lausanne Conference. Apparently affrighted at the prospect of dealing with Franco-Moslem delegates and of awkward repercussions in India and Egypt, Lord Curzon grasped hurriedly at the simplest solution, the exclusion of the British Dominions from the invitation list to Lausanne; and he invited acquiescence from the Dominion Governments, to whom he communicated confidentially the text of the French demand. He obviously believed that he had secured this acquiescence and although Mr. Mackenzie King, the Canadian Premier, now denies that he gave him any mandate to represent Canada, the sentence "Our Government has no exception to take to the course pursued by His Majesty's Government" in a despatch dated October, 1923, which he avers was framed with a desire to assist the British Government in a serious difficulty, might easily be construed as assent. There were also added in this despatch some formal reservations about the rights of the Canadian Parliament to review the terms and obligations of any treaty which might be concluded at Lausanne, a healthy practice which had been inaugurated by Sir Robert Borden.

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Now the Treaty of Lausanne was clearly within the category of pacts in the negotiation of which the British Dominions were entitled to a voice. Lord Curzon has very properly been assailed in the British Parliament and press for folly in yielding to the demands of the French, but in Canada even more severe criticism has been directed against Mr. Mackenzie King, who is also Minister for External Affairs, for condoning his weakness and not replying that the establishment of peace with Turkey was a direct interest of Canada, that the principle of according the British Dominions an active share in the settlement of foreign policies and the framing of treaties had been firmly established, and that the reversal of the precedents of Versailles and Washington could not be tolerated even for the sake of soothing M. Poincaré. In that event, a Canadian member would have been added to the British delegation and the procedure followed with success at previous conferences would have been continued.

However, Lord Curzon went ahead on the complacent assumption that he spoke for all the realms owning allegiance to George V. The negotiations proceeded, adequate and regular information about their progress was conveyed to the Dominion Governments, and the Treaty of Lausanne emerged. Its merits were explained by Lord Curzon to the Imperial Conference in October, 1923, and while Mr. King asserts that he hinted at difficulties about concurrence on the part of Canada, the report of the proceedings contains no record of any dissentient protest. Accordingly, when the British Colonial Office invited concurrence by Canada in the act of ratification, there was considerable surprise and apprehension in London when Mr. King intimated inability to concur. The terms of the despatch sent from Ottawa on March 24 were quite definite:

> "The Government of Canada not having been invited to send a representative to the Lausanne Conference and not having participated in the proceedings of the Conference either directly or indirectly, and not being for this reason a signatory to the Treaty on behalf of Canada . . . my Ministers do not feel that they are in a position to recommend to Parliament the approval of the peace treaty with Turkey and the Conventions thereto. Without the approval of Parliament they feel they are not warranted in signifying concurrence in ratification of the Treaty and Conventions. With respect to ratification, however, they will not take exception to such course as His Majesty's Government may deem it advisable to recommend."

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Further, Mr. King, bestirred by a debate at Westminster and some veiled strictures upon his conduct by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, reinforced the foregoing despatch by a statement to the Canadian Parliament on April 2nd in which he reiterated the sentiments of the despatch and declared that "the Treaty does not impose obligations upon Canada."

Now if the words of Mr. King's despatch and speech mean anything, the Canadian Government had at this time decided to contract Canada completely out of the Treaty of Lausanne and lay down the principle of limited liability in the management of the foreign policy of the Commonwealth. For this adventure some motive was probably derived from the domestic political situation in Canada. In order to appease the Progressive Party the Government had committed itself in the Speech from the Throne to tariff reductions highly unpalatable to the strongly protectionist element among the Quebec Liberals, and Lord Curzon's weakness had presented a unique opportunity for a nationalist gesture which would please French-Canada, always suspicious of European commitments, by raising the whole question of Commonwealth relations, and divert attention from the fiscal issue.

However, the British Government seems to have taken grave alarm at this threatened breach in the political solidarity of the Commonwealth, and extensive correspondence followed between Ottawa and Downing Street. Its terms have not been revealed but it is not improbable that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, apprehending charges by British Tories that the appearance of a Labor Government at Westminster had driven Canada out of the Commonwealth, and scenting in the Canadian attitude an encouragement to American advocates of nationalist isolation, pressed Mr. King very firmly for an exact definition of his principles of "limited liability." If Canada was to have no responsibilities about the Dardanelles, was she to have none at all in Europe, none in Asia, none in the Pacific Ocean, but merely to relapse into the complacent isolation which Senator Hiram Johnson prescribes for the United States?

If Mr. MacDonald took this line he raised graver issues than Mr. Mackenzie King, whose political position is at the best delicate, cared to contemplate. At any rate, the British Foreign Office soon afterwards issued a semi-official communiqué to the effect that Canada had agreed to accept the Treaty, and in a

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full-dress debate Mr. King admitted its validity in these words: "Legally and technically Canada will be bound by the ratification of the Treaty; in other words, speaking internationally, the whole British Empire in relation to the rest of the world will stand as one when this treaty is ratified."

For the mollification of his nationalist supporters who deplored his retreat from his earlier position, the Canadian Premier indulged in some *obiter dicta* about the inferior quality of legal as compared with moral obligations, which, he argued, were in the case of the Lausanne pact lesser in degree than those derived from the treaties of Versailles and Washington. In this debate, Mr. Meighen, speaking for the Conservative opposition, attacked Mr. King for abandoning the ground gained by the Dominions since 1914 and reducing Canada to her old colonial status. He criticised the terms of the Lausanne Treaty and complained that Canada was now bound to dangerous and unsound commitments which the presence of her own representative at Lausanne might have obviated by insisting on a modification of their terms. He also descanted upon the danger of excessive European commitments for Canada and warned British statesmen never to forget that the Commonwealth was a world rather than a European power, and that it would always be difficult to secure the enthusiastic coöperation of the overseas Dominions in further European adventures.

Here Mr. Meighen put his finger upon the practical elements of the situation. Successive Canadian Governments have tried to secure a modification of Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations, acting in deference to a genuine popular distrust of heavy commitments in European politics. They have found procedure and forms, as in the case of the Lausanne episode, a very convenient weapon for their purposes; but the real objection is to the actual obligations involved. This coolness on the part of the Dominions toward commitments in Europe is gradually being realized in Britain, and there is developing there a school of political opinion which agrees with Mr. Meighen in insisting that the British Commonwealth's real interest lies outside Europe and that the proper policy is a speedy divorcement from the European melée and concentration upon the better political and economic organization of the Commonwealth. The MacDonald Government, however, is internationalist rather than Imperialist in its sympathies, and while there is some basis

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for the pleas of the anti-European school, the economic interests of Britain, if nothing else, prevent contemptuous indifference to the state of affairs in Europe.

With Canada's concurrence, the Lausanne episode ended. But it left a feeling of disquietude in London, and during one of the debates at Westminster Mr. Ramsay MacDonald intimated his intention of setting up a special committee to explore the problem of Commonwealth relations and in effect to perform the duties which had been assigned to the abandoned special constitutional conference.

But before any steps could be taken to organize this body further trouble developed in connection with the Interallied Conference on Reparations. Once more there arose difficulties about the composition of the British delegation and there is a suspicion that it was with the object of soothing French susceptibilities once more that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald invited the Dominions to be content with the presence of representatives in an advisory capacity. Objections were at once raised by Canada and other Dominions which were all interested in the reparation problem, and a preliminary conference was held in London between British Ministers and the Dominion High Commissioners to settle the personnel of the British delegation. But it failed to reach a satisfactory solution, probably because the British feared that the intellectual quality and diplomatic experience of the nominees of the Dominions available on the spot would be inadequate for the very delicate and complicated negotiations of the Conference.

There were further exchanges with Ottawa and the other capitals, but Mr. King had evidently learned his lesson and determined to expose himself to no more charges that he had forfeited the ground won at Versailles and dragged his country back to a colonial status. Eventually, after considerable discussion and controversy, an agreement was reached to adopt the panel system first initiated at Versailles. On the panel are representatives of Britain and all the Dominions, but only three of its members can simultaneously sit at the conference table. Of these, one is always a Dominion representative and the result is that Senator N. A. Belcourt, the Canadian plenipotentiary, while he is consulted about every step in the negotiations, can only take his turn at the conference table with the other Dominion delegates. Mr. King represented his acceptance of this plan as a

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great concession, and obviously it is only a temporary makeshift, for the Dominions will not permanently agree to the principle that in the active part of a Commonwealth delegation the mother country should always have two delegates to their one.

This latest controversy has reëmphasized the need for a clarification of the internal problem of Commonwealth relations and Mr. J. H. Thomas, speaking for the MacDonald Government in a debate on July 29, proclaimed its resolute determination to conduct a thorough exploration of the whole situation and to seek by agreement a satisfactory solution which would obviate a recurrence of the recent disagreements and confusions. Mr. MacDonald had suggested a special committee, but Mr. Thomas spoke of a conference, and it is believed that the correspondence now passing between the various governments on the subject proposes a round table gathering of representatives not merely of governments but of all political parties, with the aim of giving permanence to any arrangements agreed upon.

It is natural that problems of such importance to all British subjects should have produced a voluminous literature of comment and interpretation by writers both in England and in the Dominions. Prof. Berriedale Keith, whose tenure of the Chair of Sanskrit at Edinburgh University has not diminished an interest acquired at the British Colonial Office in the constitutional problems of the Commonwealth, is known as the author of the two great standard textbooks on this subject—"Responsible Government in the Dominions" and "Imperial Unity and the Dominions." In his latest work "The Constitution, Administration and Laws of the Empire" he summarises the main conclusions of his earlier books and brings his survey of the problem down to the end of the Imperial Conference of 1923.

Prof. Keith is a convinced protagonist of the principle of Dominion autonomy, but he holds that the Commonwealth "offers as matters stand the most effective means of the development of autonomy without the burdens of complete independence and the loss of prestige involved." He believes that the immediate outlook for the Commonwealth is development along the present lines of autonomy, with the utilization of the League of Nations as the instrument through which the individuality of the Dominions and India can best attain expression without the inconveniences resulting from a break-up of the Commonwealth, and he argues that the existence of the League of Nations, which

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many British Imperialists dislike as tending to weaken the ties of the Commonwealth, indirectly supplies a motive which may be of great importance in promoting unity. In his view the resolution of the Imperial Conference of 1923 leaves untouched the control of the British Government over the conclusion and ratification of treaties, but there should never be any occasion for the exercise of the right of veto if the principles asserted in the resolution are respected by all parts of the Commonwealth in their negotiations. In common with his Canadian disciples (such as Prof. Kennedy) Prof. Keith rejects the idea both of Imperial Federation and an Imperial Council and believes that under present conditions no more effective machinery to secure coöperation in foreign affairs appears possible than the periodical meeting in conference of the Premiers of the Empire, supplemented by telegraphic communication and the regular supply of full confidential reports on foreign affairs by the British Government, which enable Dominion Governments to form their own opinions and in turn present their own views, besides guiding opinion in the Dominion Parliaments.

But recent events suggest the serious inadequacy of the present system of inter-communication, and the *Round Table* argues that its faults are due to its inherent inferiority to the plan of inter-communication now in operation between foreign governments. It points out that the strength of the international diplomatic system lies in its reinforcement of cable and mail correspondence with the personal contacts of diplomatic representatives, and it advocates the establishment of a special system of diplomatic relations between the partner units of the Commonwealth. Under such a plan the Dominions would each keep in London two High Commissioners, one performing the social and publicity duties now entrusted to the present High Commissioners, and the other selected for his diplomatic and political abilities. Each of the Dominions also would send to its other partners in the Empire a competent diplomatic representative who would perform much the same duties as do accredited envoys at foreign capitals. Prof. Keith offers no comment upon these proposals but suggests the desirability of making provision for the arbitration of disputes arising between the different British units, as there would be objections to referring domestic differences to the Court of International Justice.

Prof. Kennedy devotes the greater part of his book to a very

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comprehensive history of the development of Canadian autonomy, and only in the last chapter—headed "The Imperial Tie"—does he examine the problem of Commonwealth relations. He is a vigorous exponent of a theory which has found support among influential Canadian politicians like Mr. N. W. Rowell, to the effect that the theory of "constitutional right" which has been usefully employed to limit the prerogatives of the British Crown can be successfully applied to the wider field of Commonwealth relationships. He finds that insistence on what he regards as the antiquated doctrine of sovereignty, one, exclusive and indivisible, is the main obstacle to the evolution of the greater unities which political exigencies, as distinct from political dogma, require today; and he urges a general recognition that constitutional developments have gradually overlaid the old legal provisions defining Canadian inferiority with new conventions establishing the nationhood of Canada and her equality with Great Britain under the Crown. To him the former is the shadow, the latter the substance. The dead hand of the Austinian principle of sovereignty should not, he thinks, be allowed to interfere with the procedure built up by a succession of liberal changes.

But, unfortunately, French and American statesmen, who have a notorious partiality for the written word in such matters, would still be justified by an examination of the constitutional documents available in classifying the Dominions as subordinate political communities, no more entitled to full national status at international conferences than Algeria or Porto Rico. They simply cannot understand the peculiar *ménage* of the British Commonwealth nor rid themselves of the suspicion that it is maintained for the purpose of increasing the numerical strength of British delegations at international conferences. The cold truth is that Britain and the Dominions have dodged the responsibility of regularizing their new system in the eyes of the outer world and that the recent controversies are in essence the result of a thoroughly illogical attitude taken up by the component members of the British Commonwealth *vis-à-vis* the other nations of the world. The Imperial Conference now projected by the British Government will fail to reach any definite or adequate solution of its problems unless as part of the task it faces the duty of regularizing in the eyes of the rest of the world the new British Commonwealth which has arisen since the war.

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THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

By Frederick Deane

The Chinese-Soviet negotiations which for a year have played so large a part in Peking politics were terminated on May 31 when the Foreign Office of the Chinese Government announced that it had resumed diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. One of the most important provisions of the new arrangement covers the *modus operandi* of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Article IX, Section 5 specifies that "the Governments of the two contracting parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the exclusion of any third party or parties."

The status of this railway had been one of the two most important questions at issue between the two countries; and in the eyes of the foreign powers who had jealously watched the negotiations at Peking it had been the most important issue. French financiers interested in the railway, Japanese interests in Manchuria, interests of the Allied Powers in general consequent upon the Interallied control of the railway during the troublous days of the military operations in Siberia, have all combined to make the status of the Chinese Eastern one of the most involved problems of the Far East.

In Peking the affairs of Chinese Eastern Railway had always been considered a question of purely domestic concern, subject only to negotiations with Russia. The Powers, however, have felt differently, and at the Washington Conference the following resolutions were passed:

I

"Resolved, that the preservation of the Chinese Eastern Railway for those in interest requires that better protection be given to the railway and the persons engaged in its operation and use; a more careful selection of personnel to secure efficient service, and a more economical use of funds to prevent waste of property.

"That the subject should immediately be dealt with through the proper diplomatic channels."

II

"The Powers other than China in agreeing to the resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway, reserve the right to insist hereafter upon the responsibility of China for the performance or non-performance of the obligations toward the foreign stockholders, bondholders, and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which the Powers deem to result from the contracts under which the railroad was built and the action of China thereunder and the obligations which they deem to be in the nature of a trust resulting from the exercise of power by the Chinese Government over the possession and the administration of the railroad."

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Several of the Powers attempted later to take up the subject "through the proper diplomatic channels" in Peking and the American Legation addressed to the Chinese Government a note quoting the second resolution and stating that "the Government of the United States of America stands for the protection of all interests in the railway, including Russian, and could not approve a change in the *status quo*, by whomsoever initiated, unless the rights of all creditors and other parties in interest were adequately protected." To these advances the Chinese Government replied that it had nothing to do with the reservation of the Washington Conference, and that its "trusteeship" was based on the original contract for the construction of the railway and the supplement thereto, both of which agreements were entered into with the Russo-Asiatic (formerly Russo-Chinese) Bank, the holder of all the stock.

What are the merits of this controversy? A summary of the circumstances governing the construction of the road and its later operation may be enlightening.

China's disastrous war with Japan and the consequent Treaty of Shimoneseki (April 7, 1895) gave Russia much concern. The cession to Japan of the lower part of the Liaotung Peninsula, in Manchuria, was particularly disconcerting to Russia because her own ambitions in the Far East were endangered by the occupation of that region by another Power. Consequently, she assumed the rôle of China's friend. After an exchange of views with the European Powers (during the course of which an agreement was reached by Russia and Germany for a certain amount of future exploitation of China) support for Russian policy was promised by both France and Germany. Pressure was then brought on Japan to accept a money compensation in lieu of the lower part of the Liaotung Peninsula which had been ceded to her. Japan had to agree, and on November 8, 1895, signed the Peking Convention which returned to China the Manchurian territory.

Meanwhile, to enable China to meet her financial obligations, Russia arranged and guaranteed the Chinese Government 4 percent gold loan of 1895 (her first foreign loan), which was handled by a Franco-Russian banking syndicate. As compensation for their assistance the French banks requested the Russian Government to help them in extending French financial business in China and for this purpose the Russo-Chinese (now Russo-Asiatic) Bank was founded under Russian charter but with French capital predominant. By a special agreement, involving the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Chinese Government later acquired an interest in the bank, which she still retains; but the shares originally held by the Russian Government were subsequently sold to private holders.

During the progress of these negotiations the Trans-Siberian Railway

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was gradually approaching the Chinese frontier in Manchuria. The most direct route to Vladivostock, the eastern terminus, lay through Chinese territory. The "friendly" attitude of Russia in the matter of the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula was then made to bear fruit. Count Witte persuaded Li Hung Chang, who was representing his government at the coronation of the Tsar in 1896, to bring the Chinese Government into a secret treaty of alliance against Japan.



THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

The official text of this treaty has never been published, but according to an English translation it contained a convention granting the Russo-Chinese Bank a concession for the construction and operation of a railway on Chinese territory, connecting the two sections of the Trans-Siberian. This concession was consummated that same year by a contract between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank.

The contract provided *inter alia* that the Chinese Government should purchase an interest amounting to 5,000,000 Kuping taels in the Russo-Chinese Bank; that the bank should establish a company to be known

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as the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, the statutes of which should be coördinated with those of the Russian Railways; that only Russian and Chinese subjects might be shareholders; that the Chinese Government should take measures to assure the safety of the railway and personnel; and that the line should pass to the Chinese Government free of charge at the end of eighty years from the date of completion. There was also a clause providing for the purchase of the road by the Chinese Government at the end of thirty-six years.

About a year and a half after the railway project was settled Russia secured a lease on the Liaotung Peninsula and the Chinese Eastern Railway was granted an extension to its original concession so that the leased territory might be connected with the Siberian system. But Russia was not permitted to keep all that she had gained by her devious diplomacy. The Russo-Japanese War despoiled her of the leased territory, which, together with the South Manchuria Railway (as the new extension had been named) was transferred to Japan by the Treaty of Portsmouth.

In spite of this the Chinese Eastern Railway itself was a constantly growing enterprise up to the time of the Russian Revolution in March, 1917. The Russo-Asiatic Bank remained the only stockholder and the Russian Government held all the bonds, estimated at 400,000,000 gold rubles. During the ensuing period of political chaos in Russia, however, the railroad became a very serious problem to the Chinese Government. In consequence, on October 2, 1920, the Chinese Government and the Russo-Asiatic Bank signed a supplement to the original construction agreement. In the supplement the Chinese Government announced its decision "to assume provisionally (pending an agreement which the Chinese Government will come to with the Russian Government recognized by China regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway) the supreme administration of the Railway."

Certain other factors, however, had meanwhile been introduced into the situation. In August, 1918, Japanese troops had appeared on the scene, in accordance with the secret military agreement between China and Japan aimed at stopping "the steady penetration of hostile influence into Russian territory." As the military situation became more involved the railway service became more disorganized, until it was no longer capable of satisfying even the military requirements of the Allied forces operating in Siberia. Under the circumstances the American Government offered the suggestion that "for the purpose of more efficient technical management, and without prejudice to any claims of financial or political interest, the Siberian Railway System, including therein the Chinese Eastern Railway, should, during the existing emergency, be entrusted to a Commission directed by Mr. Stevens." This suggestion resulted in an informal agreement by the

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governments interested, supplemented by an agreement with the Omsk Government, and in the appointment of a Technical Board and an Allied Military Transportation Board.

The accounts of the Chinese Eastern Railway on January 1, 1922, show the following amounts of gold rubles as due to governments other than the Chinese and Russian:

To South Manchuria Railway (Japan) for coal	2,150,000
To Inter-Allied Technical Committee.....	2,815,000
To Inter-Allied Purchasing Committee.....	2,054,000
Total.....	7,019,000

These debits, with the possible exception of the item for coal, are obviously the result of Inter-Allied control and were incurred mainly to expedite the transportation of Allied troops. On the other side, we find the amounts due to the Chinese Eastern Railway by Allied Governments for transportation of troops during the intervention in Siberia totaling the sum of 10,648,000 gold rubles. The balance is in the railway's favor.

Now that China has recognized the *de facto* Russian Government and has agreed upon a joint settlement (to the exclusion of any third party) of the Chinese Eastern Railway problem, the reason for any further concern in the railway on the part of the Powers represented at the Washington Conference does not seem clear. Indeed, aside from the oft repeated "equal opportunity" policy which enters into all public undertakings in China, and unless the two governments definitely decide to repudiate the foreign obligations of the road, further "interest" may be looked upon as interference in China's sovereign rights. China is not likely to entertain the idea of repudiation even if it were suggested by the Soviet Government, unless she undertook to assume the obligations herself.

The French Government considers that it has a contingent interest in the affairs of the railway because of the preponderance of French capital in the Russo-Asiatic Bank,[1] but as the bank was (and is) a Russian concern, and as the contract for the construction of the road specifically stated that the shareholders in the Chinese Eastern Railway Company should be Russian and Chinese only, the natural assumption is that the two governments interested in the contract purposely limited the nationality of the stockholders to avoid any possible international complications. And the bank, in whose name the contract was signed, was presumably aware of the intentions of the two governments in making the restriction. From the premises it would seem natural that the Chinese Government should consider the

[1] It has been recently reported (London *Times*, July 19) that the Soviet Government has acquired a dominant interest in the Russo-Asiatic Bank by the purchase of a large quantity of its shares through the intermediary of two Russian financiers in Paris.

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status of the Chinese Eastern Railway as a question concerning only itself, the Russian Government, and the Russo-Asiatic Bank as a Russian company, not as a question requiring negotiation with the French or any other government.

However dissatisfied Washington may be with the recognition of the Soviets by the Chinese Government, it can hardly protest against the decision that the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be placed under joint Chinese-Russian control until the question of its future is definitely settled by the two governments. The fact that the road owes the American Government for materials purchased and monies advanced during the existence of the Interallied Commission is hardly sufficient ground for such interference. There are other Chinese Government Railways far more deeply obligated to American and other nationals, but the Powers concerned do not suggest interference in their control. Furthermore, the materials supplied and the funds advanced to the Chinese Eastern Railway were for the purpose of facilitating the Interallied military adventure into Siberia; and, in addition, the bill against the Allied Governments for the transportation of troops still remains unpaid. Finally, one might add, the sum of 5,000,000 Kuping taels, plus interest, which the original contract stipulated should be paid to the Chinese Government upon completion of construction (1905), has never been paid, and the road has little prospect of paying it in the near future. This claim gives the Chinese Government a further right to assume control of the road in conjunction with the Russian Government, to whom the road was hypothecated at its very inception, always provided, as the United States Government reiterated at the Washington Conference, that the railway is "maintained as an artery of commerce, with free opportunity to all and unfair discrimination against none."

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SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Harry Elmer Barnes

General International Relations

A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE. Vol. VI. Edited by H. W. V. Temperley. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924, 709 pp.

The completion of the standard English work on the subject, published under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs. The present volume deals with the Near East and also presents general conclusions on certain world-wide aspects of the Peace Treaty.

THESE EVENTFUL YEARS: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN THE MAKING. New York: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1924, 2 vols.

Eighty-four chapters on the origins, conduct and results of the war, the progress of science, education and the arts, and including a look into the future by H. G. Wells. Among the papers, which inevitably are of unequal value, are many of importance and interest.

THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS UNDER MODERN DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONS. By D. C. Poole. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924, 208 pp.

Williamstown lectures dealing with the technique of foreign relations and the problems and difficulties of democratic control.

A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL INTERCOURSE. By C. Delisle Burns. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924, 159 pp.

A very suggestive brief history of international relations.

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL PROGRESS. By G. A. Johnston. London: Allen and Unwin, 1924.

A thorough summary of the achievements of the labor section of the League of Nations.

LE DÉSÉQUILIBRE DU MONDE. By G. Le Bon. Paris: Flammarion, 1924, 291 pp.

An analysis of current world problems by the irrepressible French social psychologist and publicist.

ET NYT EUROPA. By C. F. Heerfordt. Copenhagen: Thanning and Appels Forlag, 1924.

A constructive survey of various plans for international organization to end war.

L'ÉGLISE ET LE PROBLÈME INTERNATIONAL. By R. P. Coulet. Paris: Spes, 1923, 240 pp.

A judicious survey of the policies and opportunities of the Catholic Church in the modern world order.

THE WILL TO PEACE. By C. A. F. Rhys Davids. London: Fisher Unwin, 1924, 160 pp.

A somewhat mystical psychological and philosophical study.

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Foreign Relations of the United States

AMERICAN PROBLEMS. By W. E. Borah. New York: Duffield, 1924, 322 pp.
A collection of the Senator's addresses, dealing largely with questions of American foreign policy.

AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD. By H. A. Gibbons. New York: Century, 1924, 227 pp.
A breezy and suggestive discussion of the more important phases of America's foreign policy.

THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. By E. S. Corwin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1924.
A good, juristic analysis.

IMMIGRATION: SELECT DOCUMENTS AND CASE RECORDS. By Edith Abbott. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924, 809 pp.
A *monumental compilation.*

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES. By G. M. Fisk and P. S. Pierce. New York: Macmillan, 1924, 322 pp.
The author emphasizes the American aspects of the problem.

THE PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN TRADE. By C. A. Griffin. New York: Macmillan, 1924, 348 pp.
A comprehensive economic analysis, stressing the principles and machinery involved.

SUGAR IN RELATION TO THE TARIFF. By Philip G. Wright. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1924, 312 pp.
The conclusions of an impartial investigator working with the staff of the Institute of Economics. Of value to everyone interested in the tariff, whether as an economic or a political question.

Europe

THE REVIVAL OF EUROPE. By H. G. Alexander. London: Allen and Unwin, 1924.
A constructive argument for increasing the power and importance of the League of Nations.

L'EUROPE AU JOUR LE JOUR. By A. Gauvain. Paris: Bossard, 1921–24, fourteen volumes.
A highly valuable collection of the articles published by this distinguished French publicist in the *Journal des Débats* since 1908.

EUROPA IRREDENTA. By M. H. Boehm. Berlin: Hobbing, 1924, 334 pp.
An important study of the problem of nationalism in contemporary Europe.

EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY AND EMIGRATION. By Helmer Key. London: Methuen, 1924, 169 pp.
A suggestive book maintaining that the salvation of Europe depends upon systematic and extensive emigration and colonization.

THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM. By R. B. Mowat. London: Milford, 1924, 96 pp.
A brief history of European international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia.

LE RÉGIME PARLEMENTAIRE. By R. Redslob. Paris: Giard, 1924, 356 pp.
A comparative study of representative government in the leading European states

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SEABORNE TRADE. (History of the Great War, Based on Official Documents.) By C. E. Fayle. London: Murray, 1923–24, four volumes.

A solid narrative laying stress on the naval and commercial history as well as the military.

LA GRANDE GUERRE. By General Thévenet. Paris: Colin, 1924, 200 pp.

A clear, concise, impartial summary of the war.

LE RÔLE DU HAUT COMMANDEMENT AU POINT DE VUE ÉCONOMIQUE DE 1914 À 1921. By P. Bruneau. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1924.

A very interesting and original study of the unique economic problems of modern warfare.

LE BLOCUS ET LA GUERRE SOUSMARINE. By A. Laurens. Paris: Colin, 1924.

A concise work on the Allied blockade and the German submarine campaign.

THE NEW EDUCATION IN EUROPE. By F. W. Roman. New York: Dutton, 1923, 271 pp.

A detailed reference work on contemporary educational changes in Great Britain, France and Germany.

POINCARÉ: A BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAIT. By S. Huddleston. Boston: Little, Brown, 1924, 192 pp.

A biography of the former French premier by the Paris correspondent of the London *Times*.

THE TREACHERY OF FRANCE. By C. J. C. Street. London: Allan, 1924, 179 pp.

A violent criticism of French post-war policy, urging England's withdrawal from the Entente and closer coöperation with America.

RÉPONSE AU KAISER. By R. Viviani. Paris: Ferenczi, 1924.

A rebuttal to the Kaiser's Memoirs.

LE BILAN DE LA RUHR ET LES RÉPARATIONS. By G. Barruch. Brussels: Editions du Flambeau, 1924.

A criticism of the French policy in the Ruhr.

DAS SCHICKSAL DER RUHRGEBIETS. By K. Lachmann. Frankfurt: Frankfurter Sozietäts-druckerei, 1924.

A critical account of the French occupation of the Ruhr urging the removal elsewhere of the German Ruhr industries.

THE SAAR CONTROVERSY. By W. R. Bisschop. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1924, 186 pp.

A competent historical analysis.

LE TERRITOIRE DE LA SARRE. By J. Priou. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1923, 223 pp.

One of the best French books on events in the Saar basin since 1919.

LA POLITICA ESTERA DELL' ITALIA DAL 1897 AL 1920. By L. Bissolati. Milan: Treves, 1923.

A history of Italian foreign policy in the last generation by a liberal Italian statesman.

COME SI SCATENÒ LA GUERRA MONODIALE. By C. Barbagallo. Rome: Segati, 1924.

An Italian account of the origins of the war.

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L'ITALIE ET LE CONFLIT EUROPÉEN 1914–16. By J. Alazard. Paris: Alcan, 1924.

A sketch of Italy's entry into the World War.

I DISCORSI PER LA GUERRA E PER LA PACE. By V. E. Orlando. Foligno: Campitelli, 1924.

The former premier's memoirs of the period since 1914.

THE AWAKENING OF ITALY. By L. Villari. London: Methuen, 1924.

A sympathetic survey of the Fascisti movement.

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A description of the new constitutions and their operation.

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An excellent study of the post-war régime in Austria.

MEIN KAMPF UM DEN FRIEDEN. By M. Karolyi. Munich: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1924, 520 pp.

The first volume of the important memoirs of the first president of the Hungarian republic.

REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY. By O. Jaszi. London: King, 1924, 236 pp.

An interesting account of the three Hungarian revolutions of 1918–19 by one of Karolyi's ministers.

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A survey of political conditions and international relations in central Europe and the Balkans.

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An admirably clear summary.

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IZ ZAPISOK. By S. P. Beletsky. Petrograd: Izdatelstvo Byloe, 1924, 101 pp.

Probably the most authoritative summary of the facts about Rasputin and his activities.

THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY. By A. L. Strong. London: Labour Publishing Co., 1924, 249 pp.

Sympathetic with the Bolshevik régime. Valuable on economic topics.

KRASNY TERROR V ROSII. By S. P. Melgunov. Berlin: Vataga, 1924.

The most impressive summary of evidence sustaining the charge of Bolshevik violence and terrorism.

IMPRESSIONS OF SOVIET RUSSIA. By C. Sarolea. London: Nash and Grayson, 1924, 276 pp.

Thorough on educational and cultural matters.

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The British Empire

THE RESOURCES OF THE EMPIRE. Edited by E. Geddes and S. Barrow. London: Benn, 1924, twelve volumes.

A series by expert authorities on the natural resources and products of the British Empire.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, THE MAN OF TOMORROW. By Iconoclast. New York: Seltzer, 1924, 286 pp.

An able and timely character study and biography of the new English Prime Minister.

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Brief biographical sketches of the members of the new Labor Party cabinet.

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An excellent treatment of recent history.

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A valuable collection of composite authorship representing all shades of opinion on contemporary Irish problems.

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An interesting sociological study.

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A realistic description of contemporary Indian conditions and of the growth of disaffection towards English rule.

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A thorough and accurate survey of the economic situation of the new Rumania.

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An account of the results of the substitution of small holdings for the great rural estates.

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A sympathetic history of the expansion of Greece since 1815.

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A warning about the development of aggressive Turkish nationalism.

ISLAM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MUSULMAN. By A. Servier. New York: Scribner's, 1924, 271 pp.

A contribution to the history and psychology of Arab culture. More sympathetic to the Turk than to the Arab.

A CONSUL IN THE EAST. By A. G. Wratislaw. London: Blackwood, 1924, 361 pp.

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L'EMPIRE COLONIAL DE LA FRANCE. By V. Beauregard. Paris: Challamel, 1924.

A succinct history based on the doctrine that France possesses a special colonizing genius, and that her future lies in her colonies.

THE REAL RHODESIA. By E. T. Jollie. London: Hutchinson, 1924, 311 pp.

A good descriptive work.

GENERAL BOTHA. By Earl Buxton. London: Murray, 1923.

A good biography of an eminent Boer general and statesman. Valuable for contemporary South African history.

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A valuable collection of treaty texts.

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A concise survey of Pan-American conferences, including the Santiago Conference of 1923.

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A survey of the relations of the Latin American states with a plea for unity against the aggression of the United States.

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A penetrating study of the rival imperialisms in Asia, with its main emphasis on the part played by the United States.

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A comparative study of organic communal life in the Far East, especially in India and China.

MODERN DEMOCRACY IN CHINA. By M. J. Bau. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1924, 467 pp.

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A thorough, historical and descriptive narrative.

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HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. By R. G. Gettell. New York: Century, 1924, 511 pp.

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A somewhat erratic book on an important subject.

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A philosophic and not over realistic study of conflicts of race, religion, economic classes and national groups.

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Documents may be procured from the following: United States, Government Printing Office, Washington; Great Britain, P. S. King & Son, 2 Great Smith St., London, or British Library of Information, 44 Whitehall St., New York City; France, Librairie Terquem, 1 rue Scribe, Paris; League of Nations, International Labor Office and Permanent Court of International Justice, World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston.

Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

ABYSSINIA

REPORT from the Government of Abyssinia on the Question of Slavery. 5 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 209. M. 66. 1924. VI.)

ALBANIA

LETTRE de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs au Secrétaire général sur la Frontière Albanaise Dans la Région de Saint-Naoum. Note sur les délibérations de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs au sujet de l'attribution de monastère de St. Naoum. 22 Pièces Annexes. 33 cm. 40 p. (League of Nations, C. 293. M. 94. 1924. VII.)

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REPORT in relation to claims presented by Government of China against Government of the United States arising out of negligent or unlawful acts in China of persons connected with military and naval forces of United States. Washington, 1924. 4 p. 23½ cm. (68th Cong., 1st sess., S. doc. 96.) $.05.

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DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE with Colombia. Message from the President of the United States, transmitting a letter from the Secretary of State and submitting diplomatic correspondence in connection with the ratification of a treaty concluded between the United States and Colombia on April 6, 1914, and the securing of any oil concessions for American citizens. Washington, 1924. 71 p. 23½ cm. (68th Cong., 1st sess., S. doc. 64.)

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REQUEST for Advisory Opinion transmitted to the Court under the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of June 17, 1924, with the text of that Resolution. Question of the Saint-Naoum Monastery (Albanian frontier). Leyden, 1924. 8 p. 31 cm.

REQUEST instituting proceedings addressed to the Registrar of the Court, in conformity with Article 40 of the Statute, through the intermediary of the Greek Legation at The Hague, on May 13, 1924. (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions.) Leyden, 1924. 10 p. 31 cm.

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FINLAND

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

RECORDS of the Fourth Assembly. Text of Debates of Plenary Meetings. 420 p. 33 cm. (*Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 13.) $3.20.

Minutes of the First Committee (constitutional questions). 61 p. 33 cm. (*Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 14.) $.50.

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AGENDA of the Fifth Session of the Assembly. 5 double pages. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A. 3. 1924.) $.05.

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CONVENTION regarding the organization of the Statute of the Tangier Zone. Signed at Paris, December 18, 1923. London, 1924. (Parl. Pap., Morocco No. 1 (1924). Cmd. 2096.) 1s.

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TREATY between the United Kingdom and Nepal, together with Note respecting the Importation of Arms and Ammunition into Nepal. Signed at Katmandu, December 21, 1923. London, 1924. (Parl. Pap., Misc. No. 5 (1924). Cmd. 2112.) 2d.

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FIRST REPORT of Special Arbitration Committee. (Parl. Pap., 1924. Cmd. 2072.) 3d.

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TREATY regulating the status of Spitsbergen and conferring the sovereignty on Norway. Signed at Paris, February 9, 1920. London, 1924. 17 p. 24½ cm. Map. (Treaty Series No. 18 (1924). Cmd. 2092.) 1s.

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II

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Relations between states are indexed in English alphabetical order under the name of the first state party thereto. All dates are 1924 unless otherwise indicated. Abbreviations: *A. J. I. L., Sup.*, American Journal of International Law, Supplement; *Cong. Rec.*, Congressional Record; *Cur. Hist.*, Current History; *int.*, international(e).

AFGHANISTAN - RUSSIA — General treaty signed at Moscow, Feb. 28, 1920. *Politica*, April–May, p. 130 (French text).

BRITISH EMPIRE — *Canada* — Correspondence between British and Canadian Governments (Oct. 27, 1922–Mar. 24, 1924) in regard to the Treaty of Lausanne, London *Times*, May 27, p. 15.

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Correspondence of July 19, 1923, to May 23, 1924, between the British Government and the Irish Free State and the Government of Northern Ireland, London *Times*, June 7, p. 13.

Report of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in regard to the refusal of the Government of Northern Ireland to appoint a member to the Irish Boundary Commission, London *Times*, August 2, p. 15.

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FRANCE — *Foreign Policy* — Speech of former Premier Poincaré before the Senate attacking the policy of Premier Herriot, *Le Temps*, July 12, p. 3.

Reply of Premier Herriot before the Senate, *Le Temps*, July 13, p. 3; London *Times*, July 12, p. 12.

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